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I. Introduction
My hometown of Houston, Texas played host to two high-profile
criminal trials in 2002: first, the Andrea Yates capital murder case;'
then, the obstruction of justice trial against accounting firm Arthur
23Andersen. Both cases drew worldwide attention. Both cases
involved contentious legal issues and resulted in at least somewhat
surprising verdicts. Following the trials, jurors in both cases granted
post-verdict interviews to the press.
As a Houstonian and a member of the legal profession, I found
these post-verdict interviews enlightening. The four jurors who spoke
to the press in the Yates case squarely confronted the question posed
on hundreds of editorial pages following the verdict: How could a
woman who murdered her own children to save them from Satan be
sane?' The jurors admitted that they believed Yates was mentally ill
at the time of the murders, but pointed to evidence that convinced
them that Yates could distinguish right from wrong.' As a result, the
jurors said they had to reject Yates's insanity defense, despite her
history of severe postpartum depression and suicidal behavior.6 The
verdict was unpopular with many, but most critical commentators
directed their complaints at the law and not the jury.7
1. The Andrea Yates trial opened on Feb. 18, 2002. See Jim Yardley, Trial Opens in
Case of Drowned Children, N.Y. Times A12 (Feb. 19, 2002).
2. The Arthur Andersen trial began on May 6, 2002. See Jeff Leeds, Trial of
Andersen Will Begin Today, L.A. Times C1 (May 6, 2002).
3. With respect to the Yates trial, See, e.g., Karen Brooks, Yates Spared Death
Sentence in Murder of 5 Kids, Hamilton Spectator D1 (Mar. 16, 2002); Damon Johnston,
Ode to the Innocents, Perth (Australia) Sunday Times (Mar. 17, 2002) . For international
coverage of the Arthur Andersen case, See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo & Jonathan Weil,
Andersen Case is Now in the Hands of the Jury, The Scotsman 5 (June 7, 2002); Kristen
Hays, Selection of Jury Begins in Andersen Trial, Toronto Star, D6 (May 6, 2002); Laurie
Laird, Andersen's Amazing Fall From Global Leader to Global Pariah, Daily Mail 76
(June 20, 2002).
4. See Lisa Teachey, Jurors Say they Believed Yates Knew Right From Wrong,
Houston Chron. Al (Mar. 18, 2002).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g. Paul Burka, It's Crazy: Andrea Yates and the Insanity of the Insanity
Defense, Tex. Monthly 8 (July 2002); James Howard Gibbons, Can Anyone Else Tell Right
From Wrong?, Houston Chron. A26 (Mar. 18, 2002); Charles Krauthammer, As A Matter
of Justice, Not Sympathy, Andrea Yates Should Have Been Acquitted, Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette A12 (Mar. 16, 2002); E.R. Shipp, The Last Word on the Yates Decisions: A Rush
Job to an Injustice, Daily News (N.Y.) 49 (Mar. 17, 2002); Editorial, Texas Law is the
Wrong Approach, Ventura County Star B6 (Mar. 20, 2002); Christopher L. Tritico, Real
Culprit in Yates Case is the System, Tex. Lawyer 39 (Mar. 29, 2002).
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The Andersen case was a riveting drama of a different sort.
While Yates jurors reached a verdict in less than four hours,' the
Andersen jury deliberated for ten days before finding the firm guilty
of obstructing justice in the federal Enron investigation.9 Post-verdict
interviews revealed, surprisingly, that Andersen's extensive shredding
of Enron-related documents was not essential to the jury's decision."
Rather, the verdict rested on the actions of one Andersen attorney
who jurors agreed was the "corrupt agent" in the case."
Andersen jurors disclosed other fascinating insights into the jury
room following the verdict. In one interview, the foreman noted that
the jurors treated each other with respect and civility. 2 He also
described how jurors devoted the first two days of deliberations to
examining evidence' 3-an example of "evidence-driven
deliberations," which are considered by some to be more productive
than typical "verdict-based deliberations."14 Another juror explained
how jury members tackled the complex issues in the case using
poster-sized tablets and felt-tipped markers. 5 And finally, one juror
reported that two unnamed jurors had trouble staying awake during
the trial, and were apparently chastised by the judge.
6
News accounts featuring post-verdict comments by jurors in
these cases helped me, and I suspect many others, to gain a better
understanding of the verdicts as well as the nature of jury service. By
talking to the press about their decisions, these jurors provided
average citizens with insight into the reasoning behind the verdicts.
Especially in controversial cases, I believe the public is more likely to
accept a verdict when citizens are privy to jurors' explanations
8. The Yates jurors took three and a half hours to reach a verdict. See Carol
Christian & Lisa Teachey, Yates Found Guilty, Houston Chron. Al (Mar. 13, 2002).
9. See Tom Fowler & Todd Ackerman, The Andersen Verdict: Andersen Guilty,
Houston Chron. Al (June 16, 2002).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Steve Brewer, Andersen Verdict: I Wanted to See Andersen Win, Houston
Chron. A33 (June 16,2002).
13. Id.
14. "Evidence-driven deliberations" are those in which jurors consider individual
pieces of evidence and judge the significance of each before voting on guilt. "Verdict-
based deliberations" occur when jurors begin by identifying the majority position and then
work to change the minority members' minds. See Stephen J. Adler, The Jury 17 (Times
Books 1994).
15. See Mary Flood, The Andersen Verdict: Decision by Jurors Hinged on Memo,
Houston Chron. Al (June 16, 2002).
16. See Eric Berger, Two Jurors May Have Gotten Snooze Warning, Houston Chron.
2 (Bus.) (June 22, 2002).
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regarding the decision than when the verdict stands alone, shrouded
in mystery.
A number of courts and commentators, however, take a much
less sanguine view of post-verdict juror interviews.'8 According to
these critics, post-verdict interviews jeopardize the very foundation of
our jury system because they endanger defendants' fair trial rights,
invade jurors' privacy, and distort public perception of jury verdicts.'9
Under this view, post-verdict interviews threaten the defendant's
ability to receive a fair trial in several ways. First, the knowledge that
jurors could be questioned by the media may intimidate some panel
members into basing their verdicts on public opinion rather than on
the facts of the case." Second, the threat of post-decision media
interviews could stifle free speech during deliberations.2' Jurors might
self-censor their remarks on the chance that another juror will
disclose them, which, in turn, could affect the outcome of the case.22
Furthermore, it has been argued that the possibility of lucrative post-
verdict interviews with media outlets that engage in checkbook
17. See infra nn. 625-29 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babcock, Preserving the Jury's Privacy, N.Y. Times A19
(July 24, 2002) (describing post-verdict juror interviews as "problematic").
19. See generally Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of
Postverdict Interviews, 1993 U. I11. L. Rev. 295 (presenting many of the arguments against
post-verdict juror interviews).
20. See id. at 314 (warning that post-verdict juror interviews will cause jurors to reach
those verdicts they can justify in the "court of public opinion"); Kenneth B. Nunn, When
Juries Meet the Press: Rethinking the Jury's Representative Function in Highly Publicized
Cases, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 405, 428-31 (1995) (asserting that through post-verdict
interviews, jurors are exposed to public attention that may cause them to render verdicts
based on anticipated community sentiment rather than on the merits).
21. See U.S. v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. In re
Capital City Press, 523 U.S. 1075 (1998) (upholding trial court order forbidding post-
verdict juror interviews regarding deliberations because of "the threat presented to
freedom of speech within the jury room"); Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 295 (stating that to
deliberate freely, jurors must feel confident that what they say in the jury room will not be
revealed to outsiders).
22. See U.S. v. Doherty, 675 F.Supp. 719, 724 (D. Mass. 1987) (stating that chilling
effect of post-verdict interviews on future deliberations justified imposing a seven-day
waiting period following verdict before jurors identities could be released to public or
jurors could be interviewed); Nancy Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures, A Study of
Post-Verdict Interviews of Jurors, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 465, 473 (1997) (postulating that post-
verdict interviews chill speech in the jury room because jurors fear that their comments
will be revealed to the press by fellow panel members); Nunn, supra n. 20, at 432 (arguing
that post-verdict interviews discourage jurors from expressing biased views in the jury
room, removing the opportunity for other jurors to challenge those views).
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journalism could tempt some jurors into altering their votes in an
attempt to create the most marketable end product.23
Post-verdict juror interviews are also said to invade jurors'
privacy. Although jurors are free to refuse media comment, their
remarks during deliberations may be disclosed to the press by more
talkative panel members. It is feared that these vocal jurors may
reveal private matters concerning, or opinions held by, a fellow juror
that could be embarrassing or could subject the juror to public
criticism.25 Additionally, the perceived lack of juror privacy resulting
from post-verdict interviews, as well as the risk of press hounding in
high-profile cases, is thought to discourage other citizens from serving
on juries.26
Finally, some scholars fear that by illuminating the inner
mechanisms of the jury, juror interviews reduce the "mystery" that
traditionally surrounds jury verdicts.27 This, in turn, could subject the
jury system to criticism that might reduce public confidence in the
finality of verdicts. Juror interviews are said to negatively affect the
public's assessment of the justice system, 9 to weaken the public's
perception of jury verdicts as group, rather than individual,
23. See Nunn, supra n. 20, at 433-34 (indicating that media attention in high-profile
trials may attract jurors who are more interested in fame and profit than in returning just
verdicts); Marcy Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 389, 402-03 (1994)
(acknowledging fear that jurors may distort a trial outcome to make a more profitable
story, but stating that such fear is theoretical).
24. See Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 307 (maintaining that post-verdict interviews by the
press invade juror privacy to a greater extent than does voir dire, because the media's
questioning is not limited by the ethical rules that apply to judges and attorneys).
25. See William R. Bagley, Jr., Note, Jury Room Secrecy: Has the Time Come to
Unlock the Door?, 32 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 481 (1999) (stating that post-verdict juror
interviews interfere with juror privacy because one juror may reveal the intimate
comments of another juror).
26. See Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 295-96 (asserting that post-verdict interviews teach
future jurors that their deliberations will not be private); Alison Markovitz, Student
Author, Jury Secrecy During Deliberations, 110 Yale L.J. 1493, 1507 (2001) (stating that
subjecting jurors to an onslaught of post-verdict media scrutiny may cause future jurors to
avoid jury service).
27. See Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 296 (claiming that public confidence will be
strongest in a verdict that is "difficult to disagree with because the secrecy of the jurors'
deliberations and the general nature of the verdict make it hard to know precisely on what
it was based").
28. Id.
29. See Nunn, supra n. 20, at 437 (arguing that post-verdict interviews encourage
"second guessing" that will reduce respect for jury verdicts and the criminal justice
system).
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decisions, 0 and to detract from jury integrity by creating an
undignified spectacle. 1
A number of remedies have been both proposed and imposed to
avert the predicted detrimental effects of post-verdict juror
interviews. On the milder side, some trial judges have cautioned
jurors not to discuss deliberations with the press,32 or have forbidden
the media from making repeated requests for interviews or from
asking jurors about the votes or opinions of other jurors in a case."
Other judges have issued orders that entirely prohibit reporters from
questioning jurors about their deliberations.34 In fact, the New Jersey
Supreme Court recently upheld a judge's order barring all
juror/media contact following a mistrial until a verdict was returned in
the retrial.3" The U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the
decision -a result that will surely invite other judges to limit or ban
post-verdict juror interviews.
It has also been suggested that judges administer "secrecy oaths"
to jurors requiring them to refrain from discussing their deliberations
for at least a set period of time following a verdict.37 Other
approaches involve the use of anonymous juries38 or the trial judge's
30. See Marder, supra n. 22, at 470-73 (declaring that post-verdict interviews threaten
the essential group nature of jury verdicts, robbing them of "power and meaning").
31. Id. at 474 (stating that by pursuing jurors for interviews following a verdict, the
press creates a scene that debases the trial proceedings).
32. See U.S. v. Antar, 38 F. 3d 1348, 1363-64 (3rd Cir. 1994) (stating that the trial
judge may stress to jurors the importance of keeping deliberations confidential); In re
Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F. 2d 88, 90-91 (1st Cir. 1990) (describing trial judge's
admonition to jury to keep deliberations private as "proper," although order withholding
juror identities overturned).
33. See U.S. v. Harrelson, 713 F. 2d 1114, 1115 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom.,
El Paso Times v. U.S., 465 U.S. 1041 (1984) (upholding trial court's order forbidding
"repeated requests" for interviews and prohibiting press inquiry into specific votes by
other jurors); see also Gerald T. Wetherington, Hanson Lawton & Donald I. Pollock,
Preparing for the High Profile Case: An Omnibus Treatment for Judges and Lawyers, 51
Fla. L. Rev. 425, 486 (1999) (recommending that judges instruct jurors not to reveal
statements made, opinions expressed, or votes cast by other jurors during deliberations).
34. See, e.g., U.S. v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2001) (enforcing gag order that
prohibited post-verdict juror interviews regarding deliberations).
35. State v. Neulander, 173 N.J. 193 (2002), cert. denied sub nom., Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. New Jersey, 537 U.S. 1192 (2003).
36. Id.
37. See Marder, supra n. 21, at 542.
38. See U.S. v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 918-19 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding trial court's
refusal to divulge juror identities following verdict as necessary to protect juror privacy
and to prevent harassment by the press).
Professor Nancy King has suggested the blanket use of anonymous juries in
criminal cases, but for reasons other than to discourage post-verdict juror interviews.
Professor King would allow media access to jurors following trials as long as jurors were
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temporary impoundment of juror names and addresses.3 9 Post-verdict
juror interviews would decline, as a result, because it would be more
difficult for the media to locate and contact jurors following a trial. At
least one scholar has gone so far as to call for state or federal
legislation making it a crime for jurors to discuss their deliberations
with anyone, or for the media to question jurors about such
deliberations."
The free speech concerns posed by these solutions to the
"problem" of post-verdict juror interviews should be obvious. After a
verdict has been reached, jurors have a First Amendment right to
speak about their jury experiences," the media have a First
Amendment right both to question jurors" and to publish jurors'
comments about their decisions,43 and the public has a First
Amendment right to know about the operation of our criminal justice
system." To overcome these rights, the state must prove that post-
verdict juror interviews create an overriding danger to some other
equally important interest, such as jurors' privacy rights or
defendants' Sixth Amendment fair trial rights, and that any regulation
of juror interviews is narrowly tailored to advance that overriding
interest.45
One would assume, therefore, that the evidence collected by
critics of post-verdict juror interviews establishing these dangers
would be overwhelming. To the contrary, the predicted perils
associated with juror interviews are sustained on little more than
speculation and conjecture. For example, the opponents of post-
verdict interviews not only assume that jurors will restrict their
identified in interviews by number or not at all. See Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The
Case for Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 123, 156-
58 (1999).
39. See U.S. v. Butt, 753 F.Supp. 44, 45 (D. Mass. 1990) (affirming judge's right to
delay releasing juror identities for seven days following verdict); U.S. v. Doherty, 675
F.Supp. 719, 725 (D. Mass. 1987) (upholding trial court's order impounding juror names
and addresses and forbidding post-verdict juror interviews for seven days after verdict
returned).
40. See Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 308-10 (arguing that the media should be held
criminally liable for asking jurors about deliberations without court permission);
Copernicus T. Gaza, Student Author, Getting Inside the Jury's Head: Media Access to
Jurors After the Trial, 12 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 311, 343-44 (1995) (calling for state and
federal legislation making it illegal for a juror to discuss the votes or comments of fellow
jurors following a verdict).
41. See infra Part II.B.2.
42. See infra nn. 647-92 and accompanying text.
43. See infra nn. 582-84 and accompanying text.
44. See infra nn. 548-51 and accompanying text.
45. See infra nn. 552-55, 651-83 and accompanying text.
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deliberations for fear a vocal juror may reveal their private
comments, 6 but also take for granted that jurors do in fact regularly
disclose the private comments of other jurors to the press.47 Very little
empirical research has been done to determine the validity of these
presuppositions, in part because of the difficult nature of jury
research.
To learn what jurors say in post-verdict interviews, Professor
Nancy Marder analyzed fifty-two articles in which jurors spoke to the
press and that were published in four major newspapers and two
magazines during the fifteen-year period from 1980 to 1995.48
Although I disagree with her characterization of post-verdict
interviews as "troubling, 4 9  her research provides a valuable
beginning. She recognized that by looking at the content of juror
interviews, we can better determine whether they pose such a danger
to the jury system as to warrant curtailment of First Amendment
rights belonging to jurors, the press, and the public °.5 To that effect, I
have undertaken a somewhat similar, although more extensive, look
at juror interviews.
Part II summarizes the methodology and results of that inquiry.
Thanks to search-friendly electronic newspaper archives, I was able to
find and examine more than 750 articles published during the past
eighteen years in one newspaper, the Houston Chronicle, in which
jurors were questioned by the press. While this study sheds light on
simple questions such as whether post-verdict juror interviews are
becoming more common, it also looks to see how often jurors identify
holdouts or reveal statements of other jurors that could be considered
private, embarrassing, or otherwise inappropriate.
Part III of the article juxtaposes study results with the arguments
both for and against post-verdict juror interviews. For example, do
jurors tend to explain their verdicts, or lack thereof in a mistrial
situation, when they talk to the press? If not, then post-verdict
interviews can hardly be said to serve an educational function or to
assist in furthering public acceptance of verdicts. By the same token,
46. See infra nn. 395-398 and accompanying text.
47. See Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 314 (stating that jurors in high-profile cases will
"inevitably" be affected in the jury room by knowledge that they may be interviewed by
the press, but presenting no findings documenting such an effect); Marder, supra n. 22, at
473 (noting that her research revealed no instance where jurors said they limited their
comments during deliberations for fear those comments would be revealed during post-
verdict interviews).
48. Marder, supra n. 22, at 476.
49. Id. at 474.
50. Id. at 468.
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post-verdict interviews would be unlikely to stifle jury room debate or
invade juror privacy if they rarely involve objectionable revelations
by one juror about another. Included in this section is an overview of
relevant case law applying these arguments to either limit or allow
press access to jurors following a trial.
Based on my analysis of 761 articles involving juror interviews, I
conclude in Part IV that any furor over the perceived negative effects
of post-verdict interviews is little more than a tempest in a teapot.
The predicted horrors associated with post-verdict juror interviews
have not materialized. Given the undeniable free speech claims
associated with post-verdict interviews, and the potential benefits of
such interviews with respect to public understanding and acceptance
of verdicts, any legislative or judicial attempts to routinely restrict
juror interviews would violate both the spirit and the letter of the
First Amendment.
II. What Do Jurors Tell the Press? A Content Analysis of
Eighteen Years of Juror Interviews
To judge whether post-verdict interviews either benefit or
threaten the operation of our jury system, we at least need to know
what jurors actually reveal to the press about their decisions or their
service. Through my search of the Houston Chronicle electronic
archives, I retrieved and reviewed 761 articles in which jurors
commented on, or declined to be interviewed about, a case. In this
part of the Article, I explain my methodology and set out the results
of my content analysis of these pieces, focusing on both the frequency
and content of juror comments.
A. Methodological Details
All the juror interviews analyzed in this Article come from one
major metropolitan daily newspaper, the Houston Chronicle-
although the trials were conducted nationwide. As a result, the time
parameters of this study are based on the available electronic archives
of that newspaper, which go back to 1985. I felt it was preferable to
study as many articles as could be found involving juror interviews
from one newspaper than to pick and choose a sampling of articles
from several newspapers or magazines. First, this approach
eliminated authorial discretion regarding which articles to
incorporate into the study-all were included. Second, to the extent
that press accounts of juror interviews may influence potential jurors,
a comprehensive study from one source helps create a sense of what
2003]
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residents of one American city have learned about jury service over
the years.
In collecting articles containing post-verdict juror interviews, I
was as inclusive as possible. I retrieved articles where jurors
(including alternate and dismissed jurors) talked to reporters about,
or refused to discuss, high- and low-profile criminal and civil cases,
mistrials, and cases that were dismissed or settled before a verdict was
rendered. Many of these articles were written by local journalists;
others came from national wire services. I encountered letters to the
editor,"1 personal essays,52 and diaries written by jurors.3 I found
editorials and columns that republished juror comments that had
already appeared in news articles,54 and book reviews that quoted
juror remarks made to book authors. I ran across news articles that
appeared days, months, and years after a decision that repeated
comments given by jurors to the press immediately following the
verdict. 6 All were included in the study, based on the rationale that
each contributed to the public's perception of how often jurors talk to
the press, and of what they talk about. However, I did not incorporate
the many articles I found where jurors spoke following a verdict not
to the press, but only to court personnel, generally prosecutors or
defense attorneys, who then repeated the jurors' comments to the
press." Although these articles, too, may influence public assessment
of the jury system, they raise the issue of whether jurors should be
allowed to talk to other trial participants following a trial, rather than
whether the press should be permitted to conduct post-verdict juror
interviews.
51. See, e.g., Lorna Barnhart, Viewpoints: Juror Shedding Tears Still, Houston Chron.
A25 (Mar. 22, 2000) (juror's letter to the editor regarding case outcome).
52. See, e.g., Patricia Timpanaro, Mistrial Left Void for Juror, Houston Chron. 1
(Lifestyle) (Jan. 18, 1998) (juror's essay about jury service).
53. See David Flick, Ringside Seat to History, Houston Chron. A45 (Aug. 11, 2002)
(describing diary written by juror during trial of Jack Ruby).
54. See, e.g., Editorial, Listen, Please: Judge Leal Should Give His Full Attention to a
Trial, Houston Chron. B14 (Aug. 8, 1993) (citing juror remarks in editorial).
55. See, e.g., George Christian, The Battle for Getty, Houston Chron. 22 (Zest) (June
21, 1987) (repeating juror comments to book author in book review).
56. See, e.g., John Makeig, Some Jurors Support Fourth Simms Murder Trial-At Any
Cost, Houston Chron. A25 (Sept. 28, 1995) (reporting comments of jurors one month
following defendant's third mistrial, and repeating juror comments from first mistrial two
years earlier).
57. See, e.g., Carol Christian, Double-Murder Case Ends in Mistrial, Houston Chron.
A22 (May 15, 2002) (recounting defense attorney's discussion with holdout juror following
mistrial); Patti Muck, Light Sentence For Killer Stuns Clerk's Family, Houston Chron. A13
(May 4, 1992) (describing prosecutor's conversation with juror in which juror apologized
for awarding lenient -sentence).
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I must note that while my archival hunt for post-verdict juror
interviews was certainly exhausting, it may not be exhaustive.
Although I searched in many different ways to find every article
where jurors commented-or refused to comment-to a member of
the media, a few may have escaped my dragnet. However, I believe
that the articles included in this study form a significant and sufficient
data pool from which to draw the observations that follow.
B. Looking at the Numbers: Interviews, No Comments, Statements, and
Press Conferences
In total, my search unearthed 761 Houston Chronicle articles
from 1985 to 2002 where jurors were approached by the press, or
contacted the press themselves. In sixty-five of those articles (9
percent), the authors noted that although jurors were approached,
none would respond to the media." However, within these sixty-five
original "no comments," jurors later talked to the press in nine of the
cases (14 percent). 9 Furthermore, in eleven of the no-comment
articles (17 percent), jurors refused to talk directly to reporters, but
did speak to attorneys or other courtroom sources who then repeated
the juror comments to the press.'
Of the remaining 696 articles where jurors agreed to be
interviewed by the press, 489 articles involved criminal cases (70
percent) and 207 dealt with civil cases (30 percent). Seventy-seven
articles (11 percent) referred to cases that ended in a mistrial. The
58. See, e.g., Carol Christian, Cross-Dresser's Sex Abuse Case a Mistrial After Jury
Deadlocks, Houston Chron. A37 (Apr. 6, 2002) (noting that the jurors "declined to speak
to reporters as they left the courtroom").
Of course, jurors may have refused press requests for interviews in other
instances where the author simply did not mention the "no comment" in his or her article
about the case. And admittedly, one or two of the articles were difficult to categorize. For
example, jury members in a 1994 retrial refused to comment to the reporters, but the press
account contained quotes from a juror in the original trial, fourteen years earlier. To avoid
double-counting, I listed the article as one where jurors spoke to the press, although
arguably it also could have fit into the "no comment" pile. See Patti Muck, The 'Animal'
Avoids Second Death Penalty, Houston Chron. A19 (Jan. 21 1994).
59. For example, in a negligence case against the Mormon Church involving a
pedophile youth leader, jurors originally refused to comment to the press. See Paul
McKay, Molested Boy Wins More Than Sought Against Church, Houston Chron. A37
(Oct. 9, 1998). Seven months later, however, the named jury foreman and other unnamed
jurors spoke to reporters about the case. See Paul McKay, Mormons Caught Up in Wave
of Pedophile Accusations, Houston Chron. Al (May 9, 1999).
60. See, e.g., Harvey Rice, Man, 20, Convicted of Two Slayings, Houston Chron. Al
(Mar. 1, 2000) (noting that although jurors refused to comment to the press, jurors spoke
to the defense attorney who told reporters that the jury based its guilty verdict on
accomplice testimony).
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largest number of articles containing juror comments appeared in
1990 (sixty-three) while the smallest number of such articles were
printed in 2001 (twenty-four). The following table summarizes year-
by-year numbers of articles in criminal and civil cases where jurors
spoke to the press:
Year Articles I Articles I Total Articles
Criminal Civil Containing Juror
Comments
1985 19 9 28
1986 34 12 46
1987 30 10 40
1988 26 19 45
1989 32 10 42
1990 44 18 62
1991 21 5 26
1992 26 13 39
1993 22 6 28
1994 23 10 33
1995 26 11 37
1996 19 10 29
1997 25 22 47
1998 33 15 48
1999 31 12 43
2000 28 12 40
2001 14 10 24
2002 36 3 39
Figure 1: Articles containing juror interviews published in the Houston
Chronicle per year.
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The above table shows that, at least in the Houston Chronicle, there
has been no discernible trend towards publishing increasing numbers
of post-verdict juror interviews. This result differs from that obtained
by Professor Marder, who reviewed fifty-two articles published
between 1980 and 1995. She found that 94 percent of those juror
interviews appeared between 1988 and 1995, the last eight years of
her study.6 During those same years in the Houston Chronicle, 312
post-verdict juror interviews were published, which equals just 45
percent of the total 696 articles. Articles published within the last
eight years of my investigation, 1995 to 2002, account for just about
the same percentage of total juror interviews-44 percent (307 out of
696).
I classified 43 percent of the juror interview articles (304 out of
696) and 23 percent of the no-comment articles (15 out of 65) as
involving clearly "high profile" cases, although this was necessarily a
subjective determination.62 Some of these cases were unquestionably
high profile on a national scale, such as the O.J. Simpson, Rodney
King, Amadou Diallo, Susan McDougal, and Timothy McVeigh trials.
Other controversies that I included in the high-profile category might
be well known only to residents of Texas or the city of Houston.63 By
the same token, I excluded stories about cases that may well have
qualified as high profile in other cities, but not in Houston. The
important point to note is that jurors comment to the press about
their decisions in both high- and low-profile proceedings: post-verdict
juror interviews are not limited to cases that attract intense media
scrutiny.
With regard to the number of jurors who grant post-verdict
interviews, in many articles it was impossible to determine with any
certainty exactly how many jurors spoke to the press. In a story that
identified three jurors, for example, and then referred to comments
from "several jurors," there was no way to know whether the three
named jurors were the same "several" jurors or additional unnamed
panelists.' However, for all 696 articles, I was able to calculate a
61. Marder, supra n. 22, at 476.
62. A high profile case has been described as one that involves "shocking crimes,
parental child abuse, toxic and deadly products, famous people, public figures,
environmental damage, child custody wars and other subjects." Wetherington, Lawton, &
Pollock, supra n. 33, at 429.
63. See, e.g., Deborah Tedford, Mistrial is Declared in Sting Case, Houston Chron. Al
(May 22, 1998) (detailing corruption trial of five Houston public officials).
64. See, e.g., Steve Olafson, 21 Steelworkers Who Contracted Asbestos Disease Win
$115 Million, Houston Chron. Al (Feb. 20, 1998) (naming two jurors but also attributing
remarks to "jurors").
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minimum number of interviewed jurors. So, for example, an article
that identified four jurors by name and also referred to statements
made by "some jurors" or "other jurors" was counted as containing
the comments of only four jurors. Any articles that relied solely on
"jurors said" for attribution were categorized as including the
comments of only one, unnamed juror. The table below lists how
many articles contained comments by different minimum numbers of
jurors per jury.
Figure 2: Number of jurors cited per article.
Included in Table 2 above are articles that contained comments
from alternate or dismissed jurors, as well as thoughts from "real"
jurors in a case, which explains how more than twelve jurors per jury
could theoretically talk to the press.65 Additionally, eight articles
65. Only one article was categorized as including comments of more than twelve
jurors. See Seth Mydans, Leader of Jury Defends Verdict in Denny Case, Houston Chron.
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combined comments from jurors on more than one jury into one
story. 6 The table shows that out of a total of 696 articles, more than
half (64 percent; 444 articles) included remarks from only one juror,
or used an uncertain phrase such as "jurors said" for attribution.
Approximately 83 percent, or 579 articles, included the comments of
no more than two identifiable jurors.
It should be noted that although Table 2 lists fourteen articles
that ostensibly included comments by eleven or more members of a
specific jury, in no instance did that many jury members grant
separate interviews with the press. Rather, these articles all involved
criminal cases where the jury called a press conference or issued a
joint statement to the media.6 7 So, for example, in a case where one
named juror spoke to the press, but was said to be "summing it up for
the others," I classified the article as containing the remarks of one
named and eleven unnamed jurors.' No more than eight jurors from
any one jury actually spoke individually to the media.69 However, it
was impossible to know how many jurors in total were contacted by
the press for these articles, or whether comments from additional
jurors were obtained but not used in the reporter's story.
Furthermore, not every article involved a case that used a twelve-
member jury. °
I also kept track of how many jurors were identified in the
articles by full name, and how many asked to remain anonymous, or
were otherwise unidentified or referred to only by first name. Out of
the 696 articles where jurors spoke with the press, 146 (21 percent)
contained comments from only unnamed or partially identified jurors.
Of the 444 articles where only one discernible juror was interviewed,
A4 (Oct. 26, 1993) (quoting joint statement issued by full jury and including one alternate
juror's response).
66. See, e.g., John Makeig, Simms Sent to Death Row, Houston Chron. A41 (Mar. 8,
1996) (repeating comments from a total of five jurors from three different juries in three
of defendant's four trials ).
67. See, e.g., Michael Fleeman, Jurors Say Vote on Guilt was Harder Than Sentence,
Houston Chron. A16 (June 15, 1997) (eleven jurors hold press conference to discuss
Timothy McVeigh verdict); Patty Reinert & Richard Stewart, 3
rd Defendant Gets Life
Sentence in Jasper Man's Dragging Death, Houston Chron. Al (Nov. 19, 1999) (jurors
issue group statement to the media after verdict).
68. Jennifer Liebrum, Murderer With AIDS Gets Death, Houston Chron. A27 (May
20,1994).
69. See, e.g., Evan Moore, The Judge and the Wildcatter, Houston Chron. Texas
Magazine at 8 (Jan. 14, 2001) (quoting comments of two named and six unnamed jurors in
murder case).
70. See, e.g., Patti Muck, Sheriff Guilty of Rights Violations, Houston Chron. A29
(June 20, 1996) (reporting comments of three jurors out of eight-member jury).
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112 articles (25 percent) did not list that juror's full name. This
indicates that although many jurors were fully identified in these
articles, a significant number of jurors requested, and were granted,
anonymity by the press.
Most commonly, jurors commented to the press
contemporaneously with, or just a few days after, rendering a verdict.
However, at least forty-four articles (6 percent) involved a significant
time lapse between the case result and the juror's comments. These
time lags ranged from eighteen days7' to thirty-seven years,72 with
seventeen articles reporting comments given within two years of a
jury's decision, and sixteen articles including juror comments made
ten or more years following a trial.
One last point regarding numbers: in reading these articles, I was
struck by how often the jury foreman spoke to the press. In fact, the
comments of jury foremen were reported in 264 out of the 696 articles
(38 percent).73 In 153 articles out of 444 where only one juror spoke to
the press (34 percent), that juror was described as the jury foreman,
and in 97 percent of those articles (148 out of 153), the foreman was
fully identified by name. It appears that in a significant number of
instances, jurors believe communicating with the press is part of the
foreman's job.
C. The Heart of the Matter: Examining What Jurors Tell the Press
1. Explaining Why They Do the Things They Do
More than anything else, jurors attempt to explain their decisions
when they are interviewed by the press. Of the 696 articles I collected
where jurors talked to the media, 556 articles (80 percent) included
juror explanations of the case result. 4 Jurors specified evidentiary
71. See Nicholas C. Chriss, Juror Says He Admires Beam's Racist Views, Houston
Chron. §1 at 1 (Apr. 26, 1988) (quoting juror eighteen days after trial).
72. See Christopher Sullivan, Convicted Killer or Political Prisoner?, Houston Chron.
A46 (Feb. 19, 1995) (containing juror comments about case decided in 1957).
73. This is a conservative number, because the jury foreman may not always be
identified as such when she or he speaks to the press. Compare Terry Kliewer, Moon Case
Takes Shine Off Abuse Law, But Statute Will Stay, Houston Chron. Al (Feb. 25, 1996)
(quoting named juror who was not identified as the foreman) with Patty Muck & Steve
Olafson, Moon Found Not Guilty, Houston Chron. Al (Feb. 23, 1996) (quoting same
named juror who is identified as the jury foreman).
74. This total includes articles containing comments from jurors who spoke to the
press after mistrials had been declared, or after cases settled before verdicts had been
reached, about how they would have decided the case or their interpretations of the
evidence. See, e.g., Jerry Urban & George Flynn, HL&P Officials Upbeat Over Nuclear
Plant Deal, Houston Chron. Al (May 2, 1996) (reporting jury foreman's explanation of
reasons for their decisions in 63 percent of those articles (350 out of
556). Sometimes, jurors generically referred to the evidence as
"overwhelming, 71 or "flimsy, 7 6 or that the prosecution or defense
"failed to make its case."77 More frequently, jurors identified physical
evidence that they found to be either conclusive or unconvincing. In
the Arthur Andersen trial, jurors said their guilty verdict was based
on one e-mail memo written by an in-house Andersen attorney-
what the jury foreman referred to as "the smoking gun."79 Jurors also
singled out testimony by witnesses or parties that they found to be
either persuasive or far-fetched.'0
Jurors explained not only their verdicts to the press, but also the
sentences they imposed or damages they awarded. In capital cases,
jurors often described why they did, or did not, impose the death
penalty.8" In cases involving co-defendants, jurors detailed the reasons
why they may have decided against awarding identical punishments.
Sometimes, jurors indicated that their verdicts were compromises
panel's likely damage award after case settled before verdict reached). Likewise, I
included articles that quoted dismissed or alternate jurors. See, e.g., David Margolick, Ex-
Juror's Remarks Hint Simpson Case Headed for Mistrial, Houston Chron. A2 (Apr. 9,
1995) (quoting dismissed juror who predicted hung jury).
75. See, e.g., Associated Press, Man Sentenced to Die for Murdering Girl, I], Houston
Chron. A30 (May 29, 1998) (quoting juror who described prosecution's evidence as
overwhelming).
76. See, e.g., Robert L. Jackson, Starr Will Press on With Inquiry Despite Criticism
From Jurors, Houston Chron. A10 (Aug. 3, 1996) (stating that juror said Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr presented "flimsy" evidence in Whitewater-related case).
77. See, e.g., Andrew Buchanan, Mom Found Guilty in Murder of Three Kids,
Houston Chron. A16 (Dec. 20, 2001) (repeating juror quote to TV station that the defense
attorneys had not established that the defendant was insane at the time of the murders).
78. See, e.g., Associated Press, Jurors Cite Rape Video in Life Term, Houston Chron.
A36 (Aug. 24, 1990) (reporting that videotape of rape "clinched" jury's decision to
sentence defendant to life in prison).
79. Mary Flood, The Andersen Verdict: Decision by Jurors Hinged on Memo,
Houston Chron. Al (June 16, 2002) (quoting jury foreman who described an e-mail memo
as the "smoking gun").
80. See, e.g., Calvin Sims, Keating, Son Found Guilty of Fraud and Racketeering,
Houston Chron. Al (Jan. 7, 1993) (reporting that jurors found a prosecution witness
"highly credible"); David Herszenhorn, Kennedy Cousin Found Guilty of Murder in 27-
Year-Old Case, Houston Chron. A26 (June 8, 2002) (stating jurors said they did not
believe the defendant's alibi, nor his three alibi witnesses).
81. See, e.g., Jim Henderson, Jury Gives Rivas What He Asked For-Death, Houston
Chron. Al (Aug. 30, 2001) (quoting juror who said death penalty was appropriate
punishment for killing of police officer); U.S. Embassy Bomber To Receive Life Sentence,
Houston Chron. A2 (July 11, 2001) (explaining that seven jurors felt executing the
defendant would make him a martyr, and that life in prison was a more stringent penalty).
82. See, e.g., DeSoto Officers Found Guilty of Torturing Boy, Houston Chron. A53
(Nov. 24, 2000) (stating that jurors gave one defendant a stronger sentence because she
was the abuser, while the other defendant merely failed to stop the abuse).
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reached between panel members who wanted either stronger or more
lenient sentences." Jurors at times felt a need to justify those
sentences, explaining to the press why they imposed punishments that
might be criticized as too light or too harsh,' or damage awards that
might be seen as too high or too low.85 In acquittals, jurors sometimes
indicated that although they may not have been convinced that a
defendant was innocent, the evidence created reasonable doubt as to
guilt.' Especially in civil cases, jurors often told the press that they
were trying to "send a message" with their verdicts.87
Jurors occasionally expressed confusion or frustration regarding
sentencing criteria or options when explaining their decisions. In one
Texas death penalty case, for example, jurors told reporters they were
unsure how to determine whether a convicted capital murderer
constituted a "continuing menace to society"-did the defendant
have to pose a risk to society at large or just to the prison
community?" More than one article included comments from jurors
in Texas capital cases who said they wished Texas law provided a life-
83. See, e.g., Jo Ann Zuniga, Man Gets 10 Years for Halloween Hit-and-Run Death,
Houston Chron. A23 (Sept. 28, 2000) (quoting a juror who said the sentence was a
compromise reached to avoid mistrial).
84. See, e.g., Associated Press, Convicted Killer Gets 10 Years of Probation, Houston
Chron. A23 (Mar. 6, 1988) (quoting jurors saying they gave the killer a probated sentence
rather than prison time because they believed he needed counseling); Jennifer Liebrum,
Murderer With AIDS Gets Death, Houston Chron. A27 (May 20, 1994) (citing a juror
group statement explaining why the jury awarded the death penalty to a defendant who
would probably die from AIDS within three years).
85. See, e.g., Associated Press, Jury Awards Widow $29 Million in Death of Oil Patch
Worker, Houston Chron. §1 at 36 (Apr. 19, 1985) (noting juror's description of $29 million
award as "not excessive"); Roy Bragg, Getting Her Goats, Houston Chron. §1 at 29 (July
27, 1985), (quoting juror's explanation about why the defendant was fined only $2 for
keeping goats too close to her home).
86. See, e.g., Stefanie Asin, Poor Recording Created Enough Doubt, Jurors Say,
Houston Chron. A29 (Aug. 13, 1998) (describing two jurors who said scratchy audiotape
created reasonable doubt in murder case).
87. At least twenty-four articles about civil cases and six articles involving criminal
cases included comments from jury members who stated that they intended to "send a
message" with their verdicts. See, e.g., Jim Schutze, Dallas Jury Hits Diocese With Verdict,
Houston Chron. Al (July 25, 1997) (reporting that jurors intended to "send a message"
with $118 million award against Roman Catholic diocese). However, this number must be
regarded as conservative, because jurors made the same substantive comment using
different words in a number of other articles. For example, one article noted that a $20
million punitive award was intended by the jury to make the company "feel the effects of
the award." Associated Press, Woman Wins $23 Million in Fen-Phen Case, Houston
Chron. Al (Aug. 7, 1999).
88. John Makeig, Coke Addict Gets Death for Killing, Houston Chron. A25 (Mar. 24,
1989), (including comment from juror regarding uncertainty about the meaning of
"continuing menace to society").
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without-parole option.8 9 In other cases, jurors told reporters they
would have preferred to award a harsher penalty than the maximum
sentence allowed by law.' Jurors also expressed frustration to the
press when they felt bound by the law to convict or acquit a
defendant, even though they personally disagreed with the result.9'
Jurors also explained to the press why their deliberations
resulted in a mistrial. Out of the seventy-seven articles where jurors
were interviewed following a mistrial, jurors sought to explain why
the panel deadlocked 74 percent of the time (57 out of 77 articles).
These were often brief remarks to the effect that a certain number of
jurors disagreed with the majority and stood their ground.' Jurors in
about one-half of the seventy-seven interview articles (50 percent)
pointed to specific evidence that they considered important in the
case, sometimes describing it as troubling or contradictory.93 Jurors
also explained how mistrials resulted because of circumstances
unrelated to the merits of the case. For example, in a four-month libel
trial, jurors told the press that the judge declared a mistrial because
jurors complained of physical and mental stress stemming from the
length of their jury service.' Additionally, jurors in cases that settled
or were dismissed occasionally explained their preliminary thoughts
regarding what the verdict might have been.95
89. See, e.g., Claudia Feldman, Issues of Life and Death, Houston Chron. 1 (Lifestyle)
(Jan. 6, 2002) (quoting a juror who wanted to give the defendant life without parole, but
could not under Texas law); Kathryn A. Wolfe, Life Without Parole is Debated, Houston
Chron. A19 (Feb. 2, 2001) (describing juror's testimony to Texas legislature regarding life
without parole option).
90. See, e.g., Richard Stewart, King Gets Life Term in Sikes Case, Houston Chron. §1
at 1 (Apr. 12, 1988) (stating that jurors wished they could have sentenced kidnapper to
death rather than life in prison).
91. See, e.g., Pete Slover, Jury Blames Rumbaut in Wife's Death, Strips Insurance
Benefits, Houston Chron. §1 at 1 (May 28, 1988) (quoting a juror who said that although
the court's definition of "willfully causing" did not match the jury's definition, the jury had
to apply the law).
92. See, e.g., Steve Brewer, Local Man to Receive New Trial in Stabbing Death of His
Mother, Houston Chron. A19 (Nov. 16, 1999) (explaining that two jurors who believed the
defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity forced a mistrial).
93. See, e.g., David Barron, Murder Retrial Ends in Mistrial, Houston Chron. A29
(Dec. 19, 1992) (quoting juror as saying that mistrial resulted because jurors were puzzled
by "dozens of little things").
94. Raymond Hernandez, For Many, It's A Case of Civic Distress, Houston Chron.
Al (Dec. 25, 1994).
95. See, e.g., Maryann Hudson, A Never Ending Story, Houston Chron. Sports at 1
(Oct. 11, 1992) (Sports) (stating that eight jurors interviewed after the case was dismissed
favored the defendant); Pete Slover, Accord Averts Rebuff by Jury in AIDS Suit, Houston
Chron. A25 (Mar. 18, 1989) (reporting that jurors were twenty minutes away from finding
for the defendant when case settled).
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Sometimes explanations given to the media revealed that jurors
misunderstood or misapplied the law in reaching a verdict. The
presumption of innocence was apparently ignored in one case where a
juror later told the press that members convicted the defendant
"because there was nothing to convince them otherwise." 9' Similarly,
in a North Carolina murder case, a juror told the press that if the state
had proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury
would have awarded the death penalty rather than life in prison.97 In a
civil antitrust case against the National Football League, a juror told
the press that she agreed to a three-dollar damage award because she
mistakenly believed the judge could increase the amount at his
discretion.98
Jurors also blamed unclear jury instructions or verdict forms
when explaining incongruous or unexpected results. Jurors in a
murder case later told the press (but not the judge or prosecution)
that they accidentally awarded a probated sentence rather than a
prison term to a convicted killer because they were confused by the
jury form.99 In another case, jurors informed reporters that they
inadvertently freed the guilty defendant because they did not
understand the legal terms used in the court's jury instructions. 0
Post-verdict juror interviews also revealed that a felony theft case
resulted in a mistrial when a juror brought a legal dictionary into
deliberations because jurors could not comprehend the jury charge.1"1
And in the John DeLorean criminal fraud case, jurors stated in post-
verdict interviews that they interpreted the judge's instructions to
mean that if they could not all agree that DeLorean was guilty, they
were required to acquit.0"
Finally, in explaining their decisions, jurors referred to race,
gender, fame, class or sexual orientation in forty-four of the 696
96. Mike Tolson, Reasonable Doubt: Death Row Inmate's Trial May Have Had Fatal
Flaw, Houston Chron. Al (Apr. 21, 2002).
97. Sullivan, supra n.72, at A46.
98. USFL Vows Not to Toss in Legal Towel, Houston Chron. Sports at 2 (July 31,
1986).
99. Associated Press, Jury Forms Revised After Confusion Over Supremacist's
Sentence, Houston Chron. State at 4 (Apr. 25, 1993).
100. Associated Press, Confused Jurors Free Juvenile Convicted of Murder, Houston
Chron. A20 (Apr. 18, 1992).
101. Tom Moran & Rebecca Trounson, Jury's Misdoings Lead to Eckels Mistrial,
Houston Chron. §1 at 1 (Feb. 28, 1987).
102. DeLorean Not Guilty: Jurors May Have Misunderstood Judge, Houston Chron. §1
at 1, (Dec. 18, 1986).
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articles in which jurors commented to the press (6 percent). 3 Of the
thirty-six articles where jurors mentioned race, twenty-one quoted
jurors who said race played no part (58 percent) in their decisions or
deliberations."l Thirteen articles out of the thirty-six (36 percent)
contained juror's comments to the effect that race did, in fact, play a
role. ' Not included in these percentages are two articles that quoted
panelists on the same jury who contradicted each other, both
affirming and denying that race was a factor in the case."
Jurors mentioned sexual orientation in three articles, two in
which it was described as determinative"° and another in which it was
not.10 8 Jurors pointed to gender as an issue in three articles, two about
the Erik Menendez trial,"°6 and one about the O.J. Simpson case."1
Three articles about cases involving celebrities quoted jurors who
insisted that the defendant's fame played no role in their decisions."'
Of the forty-four articles where jurors mentioned race, gender, fame,
103. Articles where alternate or dismissed jurors made these types of comments are
included in this total. See e.g., Lorraine Adams, Dismissed Juror Calls Simpson Judge
Unfair, Houston Chron. Al (June 1, 1995) (stating that dismissed juror described jury
panel as fraught with racial tensions).
104. See, e.g., Associated Press, Race Wasn't an Issue in Their Deliberations, Jurors
Say, Houston Chron. A5 (Feb. 28, 2000) (repeating juror's comment that deliberations
"had nothing to do with race").
105. See, e.g., John Makeig, Judge Sends Cebula to Jail, Houston Chron. Al (Aug. 12,
1989) (stating that juror described defendant's probated sentence as resulting from racial
bigotry on the panel).
106. See Michael D. Oeser, Juror Denies Simms' Race Led to Mistrial, Houston Chron.
A17 (Mar. 25, 1993) (reporting holdout juror's denial that race influenced his decision, and
other panelists' assertions to the contrary); Woes of a Jury Under Pressure Send Simpson
Trial Into Turmoil, Houston Chron. Al (Apr. 7, 1995) (quoting one dismissed juror who
said that the panel was divided along racial lines, and two dismissed jurors who said they
were unaware of any racial tensions).
107. Associated Press, It Was Hostile in There, Houston Chron. A5 (Jan. 30, 1994)
(noting female jurors' comment that homophobia was a factor in the panel's deadlock);
Associated Press, Elected Officials Join Attack Against Judge, Houston Chron. §1 at 1
(Dec. 21, 1988) (citing juror who described four unnamed panelists as "anti-gay").
108. James Robinson, AIDS, Gays Not Issue for Jury, Houston Chron. Al (Apr. 9,
1994) (quoting jurors who stated that the plaintiff's sexual orientation was not a factor in
their decision).
109. Associated Press, It Was Hostile in There, Houston Chron. A5 (Jan. 1, 1994)
(stating that group of female jurors suggested sexism as well as homophobia influenced
the outcome); 2nd Jury Deadlocks in Menendez Case, Houston Chron. A2 (Jan. 29, 1994)
(reporting that jurors described their deliberations as a battle of the sexes).
110. National Briefs: Simpson Juror "Never Saw Racial Attacks," Houston Chron. A2
(June 26, 1995) (describing remarks made by dismissed juror that jury relations in O.J.
Simpson case were complicated by gender, class and personality clashes).
111. See, e.g., Andrea D. Greene, Barkley Holds Court In Losing Cause, Houston
Chron. A14 (July 20, 1993) (noting juror's conclusion that defendant's fame as an NBA
basketball player did not affect the panel).
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sexual orientation or class to the press, thirty-five of those articles
involved clearly high profile cases (80 percent).
2. Providing a Peek Behind Closed Doors
For reasons that are undoubtedly related to their penchant for
providing explanations, jurors also talked to the press about their
deliberations. In 253 of the 696 articles (36 percent) where jurors
granted post-verdict interviews, jurors gave newspaper readers some
insight into what went on in the jury room. Not surprisingly, most of
the articles where jurors discussed their deliberations related to
criminal trials; only 66 of the 253 articles (26 percent) were about civil
proceedings. Jurors also appeared much more likely to talk about
their deliberations after a mistrial; of the 78 articles where jurors
granted interviews following a mistrial, 51 (65 percent) contained
such discussions.
Jurors' statements about their deliberations could be quite
general. For example, jurors commonly reported that during
deliberations, they went over evidence repeatedly,12 or that they were
leaning towards a particular outcome from the beginning of
deliberations.1 3 Likewise, jurors in a number of articles revealed that
their panels either agreed on a verdict or sentence unanimously, 4 or
were divided,"5 on the first ballot. These kinds of statements, standing
alone, provide readers with just a glimpse of what went on in the jury
room.
Jurors' discussions of the actual mechanics of jury deliberations
were usually more meaty. For example, the jury foreman in the
conspiracy and obstruction of justice trial of former national security
adviser John M. Poindexter gave a detailed account in a post-verdict
interview of how the jurors had approached their task."6 Jurors
carefully read each count of the indictment, referred to the judge's
instructions on how to interpret the indictment, and gathered and
analyzed the applicable evidence before voting on each specific
112. See, e.g., Mark Toohey & Tom Moran, Asphalt Firm Guilty; Owner Earns
Acquittal, Houston Chron. §1 at 15 (Oct. 4, 1986) (reporting juror's comments that jury
went over evidence "again and again").
113. See, e.g., Hazelwood Acquitted of Major Spill Charges, Houston Chron. Al (Mar.
23, 1990) (stating that panel was leaning toward acquittal from the first ballot).
114. See, e.g., Evan Moore, Guilty Verdict For Separatists, Houston Chron. Al (Nov. 1,
1997) (noting jury foreman's remark that panel reached its decision on one ballot).
115. See, e.g., William C. Crum, Jurors Help Man They Convicted, Houston Chron. A3
(Jan. 21, 1991) (reporting that panel was divided on its first ballot).
116. Juror: Reagan Testimony Had Little Impact, Houston Chron. A13 (Apr. 8, 1990).
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charge."7 In other cases, jurors also pointed out gadgets-e.g.,
clipboards and calculators-or other techniques that helped them
evaluate or keep track of evidence."' Some jurors indicated in post-
verdict interviews their practice of asking for divine guidance during
or at the beginning of deliberations.
Frequently, jurors' remarks about deliberations concerned some
issue or piece of evidence that jurors found to be pivotal in their
discussions. In the 2002 San Francisco dog-mauling case, a named
juror reported that during deliberations, the jury "repeatedly
reviewed" a tape of a TV interview where one of the defendants
denied any responsibility for the incident.2° In situations where jury
deliberations were lengthy, jurors sometimes revealed the issue or
concern that kept the panel from reaching a swifter decision.2
In talking about their deliberations with the press, jurors were
also sometimes willing to disclose their preliminary votes. Jurors
revealed one or a series of interim votes, 22 or noted how many ballots
they took before reaching a decision, 3 in 88 of the 253 articles where
deliberations were discussed. Criminal cases in which jurors described
their initial votes with respect to either guilt or sentencing accounted
for the great majority (90 percent) of these articles. 24 Forty-one out of
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Patricia Davis & Jane Seaberry, In Lorena's Shoes, Houston Chron. A8
(Jan. 23, 1994) (stating that jurors re-enacted the crime during deliberations in the Lorena
Bobbitt trial); Constance L. Hays, Myerson Jury Not Convinced of Trio's Innocence but
Didn't Trust Witnesses, Houston Chron. A4 (Dec. 24, 1988) (noting that jurors used
clipboard to keep track of thirty-seven witnesses); Jury Sought Answers Bakker Didn't
Have, Houston Chron. A2 (Oct. 8, 1989) (explaining that one juror added figures by hand
and two jurors used calculators to analyze financial evidence).
119. See, e.g., Reed Karaim, The Oliver North Verdict, Houston Chron. A4 (May 5,
1989) (stating that jury began most sessions with a prayer).
120. Associated Press, Dog Mauling Jurors Didn't Believe Couple, Houston Chron. A2
(Mar. 22, 2002).
121. See, e.g., Associated Press, Carpenter Convicted of Abducting Woman, Houston
Chron. §2 at 18 (Mar. 30, 1986) (stating that juror reported deliberations bogged down
over conflicting descriptions of assailant's hair color).
122. See, e.g., Mary Flood, The Andersen Verdict: Decision By Jury Hinged on Memo,
Houston Chron. 1A (June 16, 2002) (listing series of panel's votes, showing how jury
moved from six-six split, to votes of nine-three, eleven-one, and finally a unanimous guilty
verdict); Dirk Johnson, Emotional Stress Hit Dahmer Jury, Houston Chron. A2 (Feb. 17,
1992) (revealing jury's initial split vote regarding the defendant's sanity).
123. See, e.g., Cindy Horswell, Fontenot Found Not Guilty in Coach's Slaying, Houston
Chron. § 1 at 1 (Feb. 27, 1986) (reporting jury foreman as saying the jury took "as many as
seven votes before reaching its decision"). This total does not include articles where jurors
revealed that they reached a unanimous decision on the first ballot.
124. See, e.g., Jennifer Liebrum, Jurors Sentence Coulson to Death, Houston Chron.
A29 (June 23, 1994) (reporting panel's initial sentencing vote).
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88 articles (47 percent) involved mistrials where jurors shared either
their "deadlock" vote, or series of votes, with reporters. 125
Along with disclosing their preliminary votes, jurors on occasion
also referred to the role holdout jurors played in their deliberations.
Out of the 696 articles where jurors spoke to the press, 95 (14
percent) included references to holdout or dissenting jurors. Most of
the holdout references were made in criminal cases; only 27 of the 95
(28 percent) articles where dissenters were discussed involved civil
trials. Fewer than half (37) of these 95 articles concerned cases that I
classified as high profile. Mistrials accounted for 26 of the articles
where holdout jurors were mentioned in post-verdict interviews (27
percent).
Generally, jurors mentioned holdouts to the press either to
explain how conflicting panel viewpoints were resolved,26 or to show
how irreconcilable disagreements resulted in a mistrial.27 Most juror
references to panel holdouts were brief and fairly innocuous, and
focused on the jury's ability or inability to compromise.28 Jurors often
told the press that one or two unnamed panelists argued for a
different verdict or penalty before being swayed to the majority
position. 29 For example, a juror discussing the Susan Smith murder
case seven years after the verdict told reporters that on the first
ballot, the panel voted eleven-to-one to sentence Smith to life in
prison, with one holdout who favored the death penalty.' The
unnamed holdout changed his mind, the juror said, after the others
explained their reasons for favoring a life sentence.'
125. See, e.g., Kevin Moran, Guard Receives Mistrial on Brutality Allegations, Houston
Chron. A23 (July 21, 1999) (stating that jurors were split six-six, after a series of votes that
"varied widely").
126. See, e.g., Mike Tolson, A Matter of Proof, Houston Chron. Al (Oct. 26, 1997)
(describing how two holdouts in products liability case switched sides after ten hours of
deliberations).
127. See, e.g., Another Trial Possible in Rowan Weapons Case. Houston Chron. A30
(Sept. 30, 1988) (quoting jury foreman who "saw barrels of reasonable doubt" and "would
have waded through hell barefoot from now until Christmas" before changing his vote in
mistrial).
128. See, e.g., Steinberg Convicted of Manslaughter in Beating Death of Adopted
Daughter, Houston Chron. Al (Jan. 31, 1989) (including jurors' comments that
manslaughter verdict was compromise reached among holdouts to prevent mistrial).
129. See Karaim, supra n. 119, at A4 (stating that three holdout jurors were convinced
to vote with the majority after juror gave an inspiring prayer and panel resolved to work
out differences).
130. Lisa Teachey, Deciding Fate Takes Heavy Toll, Houston Chron. Al (Mar. 10,
2002).
131. Id.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [25:499
A few post-verdict interviews went further, however, to portray
holdout jurors as either powerful or powerless. Some panelists
expressed their frustration with holdouts in instances where holdouts
stuck to their guns to force a mistrial,132 an acquittal133 or a different
penalty than that favored by the majority. ' By the same token, post-
verdict interviews revealed that despite their doubts, holdout jurors
sometimes knuckled under to pressure from other panelists... or even
from outside influences. 36 Most frequently, holdout or dissenting
jurors told the press why they hesitated or refused to go along with
the majority,"' or why they eventually gave in.
In several instances, jurors who spoke to the press found fault
with the holdouts' reasoning39 or questioned their motives, °
especially in mistrial situations. One article about a murder case that
involved four trials and three hung juries quoted jurors who
insinuated that unnamed holdouts on two of those juries had acted
improperly to block a conviction.' Again, however, it was not just
132. See, e.g., Steve Brewer, Mistrial is Declared in 4
'h Beating Death Trial, Houston
Chron. A36 (June 12, 1999) (quoting jury foreman that holdouts' refusal to evaluate
evidence was "frustrating").
133. See, e.g., Associated Press, Insanity Finding Forces Acquittal in Slaying Case,
Houston Chron. A8 (Feb. 23, 1991) (citing jurors who said holdout juror forced panel to
find defendant not guilty by reason of mental disease).
134. See, e.g., Mark Toohey, 80-Year Term May Spell 1994 Release for Cross, Houston
Chron. §1 at 1 (July 3, 1987) (reporting that eighty-year prison term was compromise
between two holdouts who wanted to award life in prison, and two others who wanted to
let the defendant go).
135. See, e.g., Associated Press, Death Row Inmate Pins Hope for Freedom on Lowly
Maggots, Houston Chron. A7 (June 18, 2000) (reporting that jury foreman voted to
convict because she was "beat up mentally" by other jurors, even though she was
unconvinced regarding the defendant's guilt).
136. See, e.g., Kathy Fair, Juror Denies Panel Pushed for Verdict, Houston Chron. §1 at
13 (July 19, 1988) (revealing that holdout juror told panel she was being pressured to
convict by her family and friends).
137. See, e.g., Paul McKay, Airline, Pilot Lose in Sex Suit, Houston Chron. A25 (June
12, 1998) (quoting named dissenting juror who refused to go along with panel because he
considered the defendant's conduct "a joke").
138. See, e.g., Jane Baird, Juror Says She Thought American Airlines Wrong, Houston
Chron. Bus. at 1 (Aug. 19, 1993) (quoting lone holdout as having changed her mind
because "I was the only one that felt the way I did").
139. See, e.g., William Booth & Michael Isikoff, Noriega Juror Cites Lone Holdout,
Battle of Wills Over Verdict, Houston Chron. A16 (Apr. 11, 1992) (noting juror's opinion
that case almost resulted in a mistrial because holdout jurors "had trouble understanding
what was going on with the law" and were "confused").
140. See, e.g., Associated Press, Insanity Finding Forces Acquittal in Slaying Case,
Houston Chron. A8 (Feb. 23, 1991) (quoting juror who said unemployed holdout wanted
to keep deliberating to get the $15-a-day juror fee).
141. John Makeig, Simms Sent to Death Row, Houston Chron. A41 (Mar. 8, 1996).
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jurors who talked to the press following a trial. In the same article,
the district attorney told the press about his interview with a holdout
juror on the third deadlocked jury, who said she had not voted to
convict because she knew the defendant's family and feared
reprisals.'43
Holdout jurors acknowledged themselves as such to the press in
fifty-one articles,'43 although they sometimes requested that their
names not be printed.1" Only five articles contained clear references
to other panelists who divulged the names of holdout jurors to
reporters.'45 Jurors were not the only sources for reporters seeking to
identify holdout jurors: in at least two articles where jurors spoke to
the press, names of holdout jurors were provided by "court
personnel" or "trial sources." ' 6
In 40 of the 253 articles (16 percent) where jurors spoke to the
press about their deliberations (but only 6 percent of the total articles
where jurors spoke to the press), jurors described the tone of their
jury room discussions. In 21 articles, jurors characterized their
142. Id. This same case was the subject of at least three other articles where jurors in
post-mistrial interviews lodged complaints against holdout panelists. See John Makeig,
Some Jurors Support 4 h Simms Murder Trial-at Any Cost, Houston Chron, A25 (Sept.
28, 1995) (reporting that jurors said holdout was not honest during jury selection); John
Makeig, Tearful Mistrial in Murder Case, Houston Chron. Al (Mar. 21, 1993) (disclosing
that jurors blamed deadlock on holdout who they believed intentionally provoked
mistrial); Michael D. Oeser, Juror Denies Simms' Race Led to Mistrial, Houston Chron.
A17 (Mar. 25, 1993) (quoting jurors who said holdout used jury service to get back at
system, which holdout denied).
143. See, e.g., Patty Reinert, Selena Jury Gives Killer Life Sentence, Houston Chron.
Al (Oct. 27, 1995) (quoting named jury foreman's statement that he was one of th-ee
initial holdouts who wanted a more lenient sentence). Included in this number is one
article where the holdout juror identified herself to the press through her daughter. Julia
Campbell, Hispanic Simpson Juror Says Race Not Issue, Houston Chron. A3 (Oct. 10,
1995) (reporting that daughter of named holdout juror did TV interview explaining why
her mother changed her vote).
144. See, e.g., Paul Lieberman & Stuart Silverstein, Bush Orders U.S. Forces to LA,
Houston Chron. Al (May 1, 1992) (noting that juror who requested anonymity was one of
"last holdouts" in Rodney King case).
145. See, e.g., Paul Reyes & Kevin Moran, Nursing Home Jury Criticizes Mistrial,
Houston Chron. §1 at 1 (Mar 26, 1986) (quoting juror who identified three initial holdouts
by name; two of the holdouts also spoke to the press). In more than one article where a
holdout juror was named, reporters did not specify the source of their information. See,
e.g., John Makeig, Woman Whose Children Burned to Death Gets Probation, Houston
Chron. §1 at 23 (Oct. 1, 1986) (reporting that one, named juror favored a prison sentence
for the defendant).
146. See Roy Bragg & Ross Ramsey, Cop Killer's Attorney Predicts a Reversal,
Houston Chron. A20 (July 15, 1993) (citing "trial sources" as identifying one of two
holdouts by race, gender and occupation, but not name); John Makeig, Gonzales Gets
Probation in Delaney Death, Houston Chron. Al (June 30, 1994) (listing "court
personnel" as source for lone holdout's name in capital murder case).
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deliberations as hostile or discordant,' 7 while in eight articles, jurors
said their deliberations were harmonious, polite or respectful.'48 Two
articles that each contained juror interviews from more than one jury
quoted jurors who described deliberations in their respective cases as
both cordial and unpleasant.49 The other articles contained juror
remarks that did not fit neatly into these classifications: jurors
depicted deliberations in terms such as "highly charged,' ' 0
"intense, ' . . "deliberate,"'52 and "emotional."'53 Related but not
included in these totals were a few articles where jurors indicated that
the panel got along well or became friendly. 4 For example, a juror in
a murder case described how the jury "grew close," with eleven
members signing over their $100 paychecks for jury service to the
remaining panelist whose employer refused to pay him during the
trial.'55
3. Expressing Emotions Relating to Jury Service
Including their occasional descriptions of "painful" or
"agonizing" deliberations,156 jurors revealed their emotional responses
to jury service in 114 of the 696 articles (16 percent) where they spoke
to the press. In criminal cases, jurors often told reporters that they
147. See, e.g., Steve Brewer, Man Gets Death Penalty a Second Time in Woman's
Slaying, Houston Chron. A17 (Nov. 23, 1998) (describing jury room proceedings as
including both crying and shouting).
148. See, e.g., Rad Sallee, Juror Sees Verdict as a Message to Business, Houston Chron.
§1 at 20 (Nov. 20, 1985) (quoting foreman who described respectful tone of deliberations).
149. See, e.g., Bill Murphy & Claudia Feldman, When Jurors Can't Agree, Houston
Chron. A29 (June 13, 2002) (quoting jurors from three panels, one who said panel
members "tried to recognize each other's point of view," one who said that she feared
jurors would resort to violence against holdouts and a third who said deliberations got
"out of hand" with yelling and name-calling).
150. Paul Lieberman & Stuart Silverstein, Bush Orders U.S. Forces to LA, Houston
Chron. Al (May 1, 1992).
151. Ex-White House Aide Deaver is Convicted in Perjury Trial, Houston Chron. Al
(Dec. 17, 1987).
152. Richard Stewart, Teen Found Guilty in Parents' Deaths, Houston Chron. A29
(Sept. 1, 1994).
153. David Gonzalez, Salvadoran Generals Cleared in Deaths of 4 Churchwomen,
Houston Chron. A27 (Nov. 4, 2000).
154. See, e.g., Richard Stewart, Jury Unable to Settle All Verdicts in Racketeering Trial,
Houston Chron. §1 at 18 (Feb. 5, 1987) (stating that panelists became good friends, but
nevertheless could not agree on all trial issues).
155. Cindy Horswell, Grim Coincidence for Juror, Houston Chron. A33 (Nov. 5,
1994).
156. See, e.g., Kin of KAL Victims Deserve Unlimited Damages, Jury Says, Houston
Chron. A2 (Aug. 3, 1989) (stating that jurors "were agonizing... about everything").
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had been emotionally affected by the evidence they viewed,157 or by
the vicious nature of the crime itself. 158 Jurors sometimes cried as they
talked to the press,5 9 and expressed grief or sympathy for the
defendants,'" the victims 6' and their families. 16 2 In civil cases, jurors
occasionally voiced regret on behalf of unsuccessful plaintiffs who
suffered injuries but were not awarded damages by the jury.163 The
stress of being on a civil or criminal jury was often described in
emotional terms;16 jurors occasionally reported that they lost sleep or
were unable to eat during the proceedings,65 or complained that jury
service took an emotional and physical toll.166 In mistrials, jurors
frequently expressed frustration about failing to reach a verdict.'67
Serving on a jury in a gruesome criminal case also created fears
among some jurors." One juror reported that he became "leery of
157. See, e.g., Patty Reinert, Allan Turner, & Richard Stewart, Jasper Killer Gets
Death Penalty, Houston Chron. Al (Feb. 26, 1999) (noting many jurors had trouble
dealing with color photographs of dragging victim's body).
158. See, e.g., Steve Brewer, Killer Given Life But May Be Out in 4 Years, Houston
Chron. A13 (July 13, 1999) (stating that juror was "shaken by the brutality of the
murders").
159. See, e.g., Patti Muck & Terry Kliewer, Jury Gives Maximum 20 Years in 'Road
Rage' Slaying, Houston Chron. A29 (Oct. 31, 1998) (reporting that many jurors wept after
court dismissed).
160. See, e.g., Associated Press, Jury Torn Between Outrage, Compassion for Killer of
5-Year-Old, Houston Chron. A13 (Jan. 28, 1991) (explaining that jurors' compassion for
defendant led them to award a probated sentence).
161. See, e.g., Associated Press, Compassionate Jury, Houston Chron. §1 at 2 (Mar. 17,
1987) (reporting that jurors used their court pay to take child molestation victim out for
lunch and shopping trip).
162. See, e.g., Associated Press, Denver Jury Acquits Ex-Lawman of Murdering Four
Bank Guards, Houston Chron. A18 (June 18, 1992) (describing juror's grief for victims'
relatives).
163. See, e.g., Jury Finds Honda Blameless for Youth's A TV Injuries, Houston Chron.
§1 at 4 (Jan. 20, 1988) (stating that although jurors felt "terrible" about the plaintiff's
injuries, the defendant had acted without fault).
164. See, e.g., Tobacco Attorneys Call Judge Biased. Houston Chron. §1 at I (June 14,
1988) (citing juror comments that trial was "emotional" and "nerve wracking").
165. See, e.g., Montoya Convicted in Extortion, Houston Chron. A23 (Feb. 4, 1990)
(quoting juror saying that panelists were unable to sleep or eat while debating defendant's
guilt).
166. See, e.g., Dale Lezon, Forshee Jurors Doubted Child Witness, Houston Chron.
A29 (Oct. 4, 2002) (stating that jurors were "emotionally exhausted" after murder trial).
167. See, e.g., Patricia Timpanaro, Mistrial Left Void for Juror, Houston Chron.
Lifestyle at 1 (Jan. 18, 1998) (expressing disappointment, in juror's personal essay, that
case resulted in mistrial).
168. See, e.g., Patti Muck, Bus Driver Cleared in 6-Year-Old's Death, Houston Chron.
A25 (June 10, 1989) (noting juror's fear of letting her son ride the school bus after serving
on jury in case where girl was crushed by the wheels of a school bus).
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strangers" during the trial of a mass murderer;'69 another noted her
concern that another child might be "out there" suffering abuse like
the victim whose parents starved him to death. "' Jurors in a case
involving a racially motivated murder by two teenage skinheads
reported that they feared reprisals from racist groups, although
lawyers in the case told the jury they were unaware of any such
threats.' In a case concerning the attempted murder of a police
officer, jurors told the press they feared retaliation from police
officers who muttered insulting remarks after the jury found the
defendant guilty of a lesser charge.'
Often, jurors shared their emotions regarding sentencing with
reporters, stating, for example, that awarding the maximum penalty
to a defendant was "gut-wrenching."' 73 Capital cases where jurors
sentenced the defendant to death drew expressions of emotion and
sometimes regret from jurors, even years after the trial.'74 Cases
involving juvenile offenders could also be especially troubling for
jurors. For example, after recommending that a teenager serve a
fourteen-year prison term for the smothering deaths of two young
children, the jury released a statement describing the case as "tragic
and heart-wrenching."'75 The jurors wrote, "In our minds we had to
deal with the law. In our hearts we were dealing with a thirteen-year-
old girl."'
76
Jurors also described their emotional reactions when they
learned something after trial of which they had been unaware during
deliberations. In an arson case where the jury sentenced the
defendant to five years in prison, a juror reported being distraught
after learning that under the Texas parole system, the defendant
169. Man Who Killed 7 Co-Workers Faces California Gas Chamber, Houston Chron.
A20 (Nov. 3, 1991).
170. Kevin Moran, Parents Get 99 Years in Starvation Death, Houston Chron. Al
(Aug. 14, 1992).
171. Rad Sallee, Skinheads Get Prison, Fines in Killing, Houston Chron. A25 (Jan. 25,
1991).
172. Stephen Johnson, Jurors Say They Were Afraid After Police Insults in Court,
Houston Chron. §1 at 1 (Feb. 13, 1987).
173. Jo Ann Zuniga, Katy Babysitter Gets 20 Years in Prison, Houston Chron. A30
(Feb. 28, 1998).
174. See, e.g., Claudia Feldman, Issues of Life and Death, Houston Chron. Lifestyle at
1 (Jan.16, 2002) (quoting jurors' emotional responses in capital murder cases where death
penalty was awarded).
175. Associated Press, Teen Given 14-Year Term, Houston Chron. A35 (Nov. 11,
1995).
176. Id.
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would probably serve only five months in jail.' In a civil case, a juror
wrote a letter to the editor indicating that panel members were
emotionally upset after learning, post-verdict, that state law imposed
a cap on punitive damages.'78 Similarly, some jurors lashed out when
their verdicts were overturned on appeal. '79 In a case where the
defendant's death penalty murder conviction was reversed by the
state supreme court, several jurors expressed indignation with the
criminal justice system, stating that they would never again serve on a
jury.
Post-verdict interviews sometimes revealed other lasting
emotional effects that jurors attributed to their jury service. Some
jurors described the strong emotional bonds they made with other
panelists ' or noted that they kept in touch with their fellow jurors
following the trial.'2 Other jurors told the press that serving on a jury
had changed their lives forever ' s3 or that "I'll never be the same
person after this."1" Of course, not all these emotional responses to
jury service were critical; jurors also described the experience as
emotionally positive. "This is what it is all about," wrote a juror in a
letter to the editor. "This is why I am proud to be a citizen of the
United States."'185
177. Cindy Horswell, Man Given Prison for Arson at High School, Houston Chron.
A25 (June 16, 1990).
178. Sherri Washburn, Viewpoints: Juror Felt Power Nullified, Houston Chron. A25
(Jan. 26, 2001) (Letter to the Editor).
179. See, e.g., George Flynn, Judge Denies Move to Take Ex-Con's Kids, Houston
Chron. A25 (Dec. 6, 1995) (conveying jury foreman's distress that judge overturned jury
verdict in custody case).
180. Patrick May, Reversal of Murder Conviction Outrages Florida Jurors, Houston
Chron. A9 (Feb. 4, 1990).
181. See, e.g., Amy Stromberg, Long Outlaws Trial Leads to Strong Ties Among
Jurors, Houston Chron. B20 (Feb. 12, 1989) (characterizing friendships made among
jurors as lifelong).
182. See, e.g., Kathy Fair, Foreman at First Penry Trial Defends Death Verdict,
Houston Chron. C1 (July 22, 1990) (reporting that jurors kept in touch ten years after
original trial).
183. See, e.g., Man Who Killed 7 Co-Workers Faces California Gas Chamber, Houston
Chron. A20 (Nov. 3, 1991) (quoting juror as saying that jury service "changed my life
forever").
184. Associated Press, Jurors Apologize for Light Sentence in Killing, Houston Chron.
§3 at 11(Mar. 31, 1985).
185. Connie H. Stone, Viewpoints: One Juror's Perspective, Houston Chron. A35
(Mar. 14, 1998) (Letter to the Editor).
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4. Conveying the Difficulty or Ease of Decision-making
Jurors described to the press the difficulty or, conversely, the
ease, of their decision-making process in seventy-five of the 696
articles where jurors talked to reporters (11 percent). To an extent,
this category overlaps with juror expressions of emotion regarding
their verdicts; articles where jurors described reaching their decision
after "long hours of painful and prayerful deliberations ' '116 or as "the
hardest thing I've ever done"'"7 were categorized as both an
emotional response and a comment on the difficulty of judging.
However, at least 43 articles included jurors' remarks about the effort
expended in reaching a verdict, without an accompanying expression
of emotion.
Many of these articles contained no more than brief statements
from jurors describing their decision in terms such as "tough"'" or
"very hard."'8 9 So, for example, in the 2002 "Hockey Dad" case, the
jury issued a statement following the verdict that simply said it had
reached a "very difficult, but proper, decision."'" In both criminal and
civil cases, jurors sometimes explained that their decision was
difficult, at least in part, because of the complex legal issues they were
required to resolve or the complicated laws they were expected to
apply.'9' Jurors noted generally that they "worked hard,"'" or
commented specifically on the difficulty of keeping up with large
amounts of information or evidence'93 in a number of articles.
186. Patty Reinert & Richard Stewart, 3 Defendant Gets Life Sentence in Jasper
Man's Dragging Death, Houston Chron. Al (Nov. 19, 1999).
187. T. J. Milling, Life Term Handed Man Who Shot Pizza Carrier, Houston Chron.
A33 (Feb. 18, 1996).
188. See, e.g., Patti Muck, Funeral Director Acquitted, A25 (Feb. 10, 1995) (noting jury
foreman's comment that verdict was a "tough call").
189. See, e.g., Teen Convicted of Killing Teacher, Houston Chron. Al (May 17, 2001)
(including statement from jury foreman that decision was "very hard").
190. Pamela Ferdinand, Dad Guilty in Death After Hockey Practice, Houston Chron.
A2 (Jan. 12, 2002).
191. See, e.g., Associated Press, Infertility Specialist Found Guilty of Fraud, Houston
Chron. A3 (Mar. 5, 1992) (stating that jurors were "baffled" by the complexity of the
case); John Makeig, Gonzales Gets Probation in Delaney Death, Al (June 30, 1994)
(characterizing voluntary manslaughter law as "enormously complicated").
192. See, e.g., Jo Ann Zuniga, Saunders is Convicted in Baby's Death, Gets 75 Years,
Houston Chron. §1 at 17 (June 30, 1988) (reporting that jury had to "work hard" to reach
a verdict).
193. See, e.g., Nicholas C. Chriss, Juror Says He Admires Beam's Racist Views,
Houston Chron. §1 at 1 (Apr. 26, 1988) (including juror's comments that trial involved
"too much stuff to keep in your mind").
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Especially in capital cases, jurors stated that while their decision
as to guilt was relatively easy, determining the appropriate sentence
was much more difficult.1 94 In a capital murder case where the
defendant was a juvenile at the time of the crime, the jury foreman
noted that although the jury reached a guilty verdict on one ballot,
the decision to "put a young kid away for the rest of his life" was
"tough., 195 Jurors also explained to the press that while they may have
reached a verdict quickly, their underlying decision was difficult
nonetheless.' 6 Civil juries often commented about the difficulty of
computing damage amounts; for example, one juror in a wrongful
death action said that calculating the size of the award was
problematical because "it's hard to put a value on human life."'"
Jurors also described their decisions as difficult in instances when
they believed they had to follow the law rather than their convictions.
In a conspiracy trial against eight Christian sanctuary movement
activists, jurors said they found it tough to apply the law.'98 "I just feel
really bad about the whole thing," one anonymous juror said. "I think
it was unanimous that we didn't want to find these people guilty."'9
Similarly, jurors said it was hard to acquit a defendant who they
believed was probably guilty, even though they agreed that the state
failed to prove its case.2"'
In sixty-four of these seventy-five articles (85 percent), jurors
stated that the decision-making process was in some way difficult or
troublesome. Jurors described how they toiled to reach a verdict, and
how seriously they took their responsibilities."' However, in ten
articles, jurors told the press that they reached their decision
194. See, e.g., Cindy Horswell, Dayton Man Gets 20-Year Sentence, Houston Chron.
A17 (Mar. 6, 1996) (noting that jury found "to punish a person is harder" than to
determine guilt).
195. John W. Gonzalez, Jury Finds Ex-Cadet Guilty of Killing Teen Girl in '95,
Houston Chron. Al (July 25, 1998).
196. See, e.g., Associated Press, 3 Life Terms Given in Triple Slaying, Houston Chron.
A26 (Apr. 27, 1989) (noting that although jury deliberated for less than one hour, juror
described decision as "very difficult").
197. Ron Nissimov, 23-Year-Old Suit Settled, But Battle Over Fees Awaits, Houston
Chron. A21 (Mar. 1, 2000).
198. Despite Convictions, Activists Vow to Continue Refugee Aid, Houston Chron. §1
at 14 (May 2,1986).
199. Id.
200. Frank Klimko & Patti Muck, Jurors Still Puzzling Over Fontenot Case, Houston
Chron. §1 at 25 (Mar. 1, 1986).
201. See, e.g., Dianna Hunt & Andrea D. Greene, Moody Jury Spent Most Time
Deciding to Acquit Willis, Houston Chron. §2 at 8 (Dec. 1, 1987) (quoting juror who
emphasized that "[n]one of us took this lightly").
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regarding guilt, damages or sentencing with relative ease.2°2 Jurors in
these articles almost always pointed to evidence that they
characterized as strong or overwhelming,0 emphasizing that although
their decisions were straightforward, they were nevertheless carefully
considered and correct.2 0 Not surprisingly, seven of the ten articles
where jurors said their decisions came easily involved civil rather than
criminal cases.
5. Admitting Doubts, Mistakes, Misconduct
Out of the 696 articles where jurors spoke to the press, only
twenty-nine (4 percent) included statements where jurors expressed
fear that they made a mistake regarding the verdict.2 Almost all of
these articles dealt with criminal cases; jurors reported that they had
erred in civil cases in just six articles, two of which involved the same
defendant. In ten of the twenty-nine articles (34 percent), a significant
period of time ranging from two to twenty years had elapsed between
the verdict and the date of the juror's comment. Fewer than half
(twelve) of these twenty-nine articles involved clearly high profile
cases.
In some instances, jurors told the press they changed their mind
about their decision based on information they learned outside of the
courtroom.2 6 For example, nineteen years after serving as a juror in
the Gary Graham capital murder case, a juror said that although he
always had doubts as to Graham's guilt, those doubts were
strengthened by statements of two witnesses who never testified at
trial. 27 The juror's change of heart was reported in an article printed
202. Not included in these numbers is one article that involved jurors from more than
one jury, who characterized their decisions as both hard and easy. See Claudia Feldman,
Issues of Life and Death, Houston Chron. Lifestyle at 1 (Jan. 6,2002).
203. See, e.g., Associated Press, Jurors Cite Rape Video in Life Term, Houston Chron.
A36 (Aug. 24, 1990) (reporting that life sentence "wasn't no hard decision" after jurors
viewed videotaped evidence).
204. See, e.g., Linda Deutsch, Damages Pile Up for Simpson, Houston Chron. Al (Feb.
11, 1997) (noting jurors' statements that decision was easy because of amount of
evidence).
205. Interestingly, although Professor Marder counted juror "comments" rather than
articles and used a smaller sample, she, too, found that only 4 percent of total juror
comments expressed ambivalence or doubt about the verdict. See Marder, supra n. 22, at
485.
206. See, e.g., Associated Press, Juror in Murder Trial of Rowlett Woman Says
Conviction May Have Been Wrong, Houston Chron. A17 (June 29, 1999) (citing juror
saying he regretted his guilty vote because evidence regarding a possible intruder was
suppressed at trial).
207. Salatheia Bryant, Graham Juror Says, 'He Might Be Innocent,' Houston Chron.
A13 (June 20, 2000).
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two days before Graham's scheduled execution. "I don't feel good
about the position I'm in now," the juror said.' In a child murder
case, two jurors said they regretted giving the defendant life in prison
rather than the death penalty upon learning after trial that the
defendant had been accused of abusing another child."
Other jurors reported that they had made a mistake by not
holding out for what they believed was the proper outcome in the
case all along.210 In another murder case, the jury foreman told the
press she voted to convict the defendant despite being unconvinced as
to his guilt because she was "beat up mentally" by the other jurors.'
When she told the judge the next day that she had made a mistake, it
212was too late to change the outcome.
Jurors who tried to undo the effect of their votes, sometimes long
after trial, also garnered press attention. "  Former Arkansas
Governor Mike Huckabee commuted a death sentence to life in
prison after receiving a letter from a juror in the case stating that the
juror had mistakenly voted to convict fourteen years before.14 In
another case, two jurors talked to the press after spending five years
working to uncover new evidence in a murder case in which they had
voted to convict.25 Their efforts were successful; the defendant was
exonerated.216
Jurors also told the press that they made mistakes in rendering
verdicts or sentences because they misunderstood the law or the
judge's instructions. In a sexual assault trial, for example, jurors told
the press they erred in awarding concurrent rather than consecutive
sentences to the defendant. 2 '7 Although jurors asked the judge for
208. Id.
209. Steve Brewer, Having Second Thoughts, Houston Chron. Al (Mar. 11, 2000).
210. See, e.g., Steve Brewer, Doctor Acquitted, But Daughter Claims Own Victory,
Houston Chron. A29 (July 8, 2000) (quoting one juror who said he regretted voting to
acquit defendant; two other panelists defended the verdict).
211. Associated Press, Death Row Inmate Pins Hope for Freedom on Lowly Maggots,
Houston Chron. A7 (June 18, 2000).
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Jurors Ask That Their Verdict Be Set Aside, Houston Chron. A12 (July 2,
1992) (reporting that judge set aside guilty verdict after jurors submitted affidavits that the
verdict resulted from racial prejudice and a botched vote).
214. Associated Press, Juror's Letter Leads Governor to Halt Execution, Houston
Chron. A9 (Feb. 6, 1999).
215. William C. Crum, Jurors Help Man They Convicted, Houston Chron. A3 (Jan. 21,
1991).
216. Id.
217. Steve Brewer, Jurors Shocked by Sentencing in Assault Trial, Houston Chron.
A25 (Oct. 17, 1998).
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clarification, jurors said he refused to help them, telling them only to
reread the charges." 8 Three panelists from another jury told the press
that the panel mistakenly freed a juvenile convicted of murder
because members were confused about the meaning of legal terms in
the jury instructions."9
Eighteen out of 696 articles (3 percent) contained juror
revelations that during their service, jurors may have engaged in
misconduct or behavior that violated the judge's instructions. Seven
years after trial in a high profile murder case where the jurors were
sequestered, for example, a juror told the press that panelists talked
together about the case in the evenings.2 "We weren't supposed to
talk about the trial," he said, "but of course we did."22' In another
case, a sedition trial of thirteen white supremacists, all of whom were
acquitted, two female jurors admitted in a post-verdict interview that
they had been romantically attracted to two of the defendants during
the trial and sought them out afterwards.222 A male juror in the same
case told the Houston Chronicle that he shared similar anti-black
feelings expressed by the defendants, leading to charges that the jury
had been improperly chosen.223 Other types of possible misconduct
that jurors revealed to the press included sequestered jurors who
made unsupervised telephone calls,224 jurors who improperly
discussed potential punishments during deliberations,225 jurors who
slept during trial testimony,"' jurors who considered inadmissible
evidence or applied the wrong standard of proof,227 and jurors who
were swayed by the defendant's failure to testify.2
218. Id.
219. Associated Press, Confused Jurors Free Juvenile Convicted of Murder, Houston
Chron. A20 (Apr. 18, 1992).
220. Lisa Teachey, Deciding Fate Takes Heavy Toll, Houston Chron. Al (Mar. 10,
2002).
221. Id.
222. Nicholas C. Chriss, Sedition Trial Acquittals Ignite Outcry Over Jurors, Houston
Chron. Al (Oct. 9, 1988).
223. Id.
224. Woes of a Jury Under Pressure, Al (Apr. 7, 1995) (reporting that jurors discussed
the case and their personal feelings about the defendant's guilt, and made unsupervised
telephone calls, in violation of the judge's sequestration order.)
225. Sam Howe Verhovek, Davidian Verdict Was Both Compromise and Message,
Juror Says, Houston Chron. A18 (Mar. 1, 1994) (revealing that jurors discussed possible
punishments during deliberations regarding guilt, in violation of judge's instructions).
226. Eric Berger, 2 Jurors May Have Gotten Snooze Warning, Houston Chron. June
22, 2002, at 2 (Bus.) (stating that four jurors tried to send a note to the judge regarding two
jurors who were sleeping during the trial).
227. Improper Juror Conduct Alleged in Davis Mistrial, Houston Chron.§l at 10 (June
23, 1987) (quoting foreman's allegations that panel considered information learned from
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On the other hand, jurors also told the press that they were
careful to follow the judge's orders, even when they were presented
with opportunities to break the rules. In one murder case, the jury
foreman told reporters that although one panelist knew about the
existence of certain inadmissible suicide notes, the foreman had not
allowed any discussion on the subject during deliberations."9 In other
cases, jurors noted that they refused to consider irrelevant factors-
such as their own emotions,23 or a party's wealth,"' fame,232 or past
sexual history-in reaching their decisions."33 Furthermore, jurors
sometimes told reporters that they followed the jury charge even in
those instances when they personally disagreed with the law or the
result.234
Finally, jurors on occasion told the press about potential
misconduct by other court personnel. For example, after the Marion
Barry cocaine possession trial, one juror reported that U.S. Marshals
had told him during deliberations that two excused alternate jurors
had gone on television and pronounced the mayor "guilty, guilty,
guilty. 2 35 In the same article, jurors said that U.S. Marshals misled the
trial judge by telling him that jurors knew nothing about a drug bust
that occurred at the hotel where the panel was sequestered.236 In
actuality, jurors reported seeing the bust to marshals immediately
press coverage of the trial and applied the criminal standard of reasonable doubt in civil
wrongful death trial).
228. Associated Press, Second Trial of Ex-Mayor to be Moved, Houston Chron. A39
(Sept. 7, 1997) (quoting foreman that the defendant's failure to testify influenced some
jurors to convict).
229. Stefanie Asin, Poor Recording Created Enough Doubt, Jurors Say, Houston
Chron. A29 (Aug. 13, 1998).
230. See, e.g., George Flynn, Bittersweet Victory for Woman, 82, Houston Chron. A29
(Sept. 18, 1997) (quoting juror that although "we all have grandmothers," any feelings
panelists had for 82-year-old defendant were not considered).
231. Jo Ann Zuniga, Houston Man Wins Award Against Saudi, Houston Chron. §1 at
18 (Jan. 17, 1987) (noting that although defendant was a "big businessman, a tycoon type,"
the jury considered nothing but the evidence).
232. See, e.g., Ann O'Neill & Joe Mozingo, Jurors Favor Actor in Slander Lawsuit,
Houston Chron. Al (July 26, 1997) (noting that plaintiff's fame did not influence the jury's
decision).
233. United Way Figure Guilty in Fraud Case, Houston Chron. A3 (Apr. 4, 1995)
(noting that panel did not take into account the defendant's "sexual escapades" in
reaching decision).
234. See, e.g., Steven R. Reed, Railey Verdict: Not Guilty, Houston Chron. Al (Apr.
17, 1993) (stating that although jurors believed defendant was guilty, they had to acquit
based on reasonable doubt standard).
235. Barry Wants Cocaine Conviction Tossed Out, Houston Chron. A2 (Oct. 13, 1990).
236. Id.
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after witnessing it through their hotel windows.237 "I read in the paper
afterwards that the judge was told that we didn't know about it, but
that wasn't true," one juror said. "I didn't know who was being
busted, but I knew it was a drug bust."238
6. Appraising the Lawyers, Judges or Justice System
Jurors shared their impressions of the attorneys they observed
during their jury service in forty-four out of the 696 articles where
jurors talked to reporters (6 percent).239 Most of these forty-four
articles were about criminal trials; only nine articles (20 percent)
involved civil suits. Jurors were also much more likely to reveal their
opinions about the attorneys in high profile trials; thirty-two of the
forty-four articles (73 percent) where jurors discussed the lawyers
involved cases that I categorized as high profile.
Juror comments regarding attorneys ranged from substantive
critiques of their legal skills,20  to observations concerning their
mannerisms or style,24' to simple positive or negative evaluations.242 In
the shooting death of Amadou Diallo, jurors who acquitted four New
York City police officers accused in the case faulted the Bronx
District Attorney for what the jurors described as a "lackluster"
prosecution.2 3 One panelist criticized the prosecutor more specifically
for failing to cross-examine a particular defense witness.2" Similarly,
jurors in a perjury/conspiracy case blamed the defendant's conviction
on his attorney for failing to call any character witnesses.245 More
generally, an alternate juror in another police department corruption
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. I included in this total one article where jurors in the 1993 Long Island Rail Road
murder case commended the defendant's competence in representing himself. See John T.
McQuiston, Convicted Train Gunman Asks Lawyers He Fired to File Appeal, Houston
Chron. A14 (Feb. 19, 1995) (quoting foreman that defendant did a "pretty good job for
himself").
240. See, e.g., Kathy Fair, Juror Denies Panel Pushed for Verdict, Houston Chron. §1 at
13 (July 19, 1988) (criticizing defense counsel for raising irrelevant points during trial).
241. See, e.g., George Christian, A View From the Jury Box, Houston Chron. Zest at 20
(July 24, 1988) (describing opposing counsel in Pennzoil-Texaco case in terms of their
demeanors).
242. See, e.g., Ed Asher, Another Mistrial is Declared in Sting Case, Houston Chron.
Al (May 13, 1999) (stating that prosecutors "didn't do a very good job"); Rad Sallee,
Juror Sees Verdict as a Message to Business, Houston Chron. §1 at 20 (Nov. 11, 1985)
(noting that lawyers for both sides in Pennzoil-Texaco case did "fine" or "good" job).
243. Review of Trial is Urged, Houston Chron. A9 (Mar. 3, 2000).
244. Id.
245. Deborah Tedford, Alydar's Guard Convicted of Lying, Houston Chron. Al (July
3, 1998).
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case told the press that panelists "disliked" three of the defense
attorneys and "liked" one defense attorney, without giving any
particular reasons. 246 A voting member of the panel, however, denied
in the same article that the jury's feelings toward the defense
attorneys influenced the outcome of the case.247
Other critical comments about attorneys included statements
that they were arrogant,248 used sexist and racist language,249 and used
tactics that jurors viewed as "insulting""25 or overly aggressive or
emotional.5  Predictably, in two cases where questions were later
raised about a criminal defendant's guilt and where the defendant was
later exonerated, jurors either criticized the state for possible
prosecutorial misconduct,252 or the defense for ineffective assistance of
counsel.253
Jurors also praised the attorneys whose work they viewed first-
hand, both in general and specific terms. In a sexual assault of a
minor case, a juror commended the county prosecutor as "focused
and intense," someone who "let us know what it was like for that little
girl., 254 The jury foreman in a murder case said the panel was
impressed with the "thoroughness" of the defense attorney, who
helped the jury understand the facts by presenting giant, blown-up
photographs of the murder scene.255 Jurors tended to be more
246. Associated Press, Misconduct Claim Threatens L.A. Police Corruption Verdicts,
Houston Chron. A27 (Nov. 18,2000).
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., Associated Press, Prosecutor Loses Again Over McDougal Ruling,
Houston Chron. A3 (Apr. 29, 1999) (quoting foreman as being put off by prosecutors'
"arrogance" in Whitewater case).
249. See Associated Press, California Woman Who Castrated Husband Acquitted on
Two Counts, Houston Chron. A16 (Mar. 19, 1994) (describing deputy district attorney as
using sexist language and language that "verged on racism" during trial).
250. See, e.g., Associated Press, Punitive Damages a Memo to Industry, Houston
Chron. A17 (July 16, 2000) (characterizing defense lawyers' arguments as "insulting").
251. See Jane Baird, Jurors Decide for American in Airline Case, Houston Chron. Al
(Aug. 11, 1993) (criticizing plaintiffs attorney for "wadding up pages and throwing them
down in disgust" during trial); Mike Schneider, Lawyer's Knack Has Big Business Falling
Hard, Houston Chron. Bus. at 3 (Aug. 16, 2001) (portraying plaintiff's lawyer in civil suit
as "trying to disguise the facts with emotions").
252. See Associated Press, 'Thin Blue Line' Jurors Doubted Guilt, Houston Chron.
A22 (Mar. 25, 1989) (quoting jurors who blamed prosecutor for manipulating evidence in
case where convicted murder defendant was later set free).
253. See Harvey Rice, Justice Deferred, Houston Chron. Texas Magazine at 6 (Nov. 26,
2000) (claiming that the defense attorney "had not put forth a strong argument" of
innocence in case where DNA evidence later exonerated defendant).
254. Steve Brewer, Making a Case of It-It's Her Job, Houston Chron. A15 (June 29,
1998).
255. Klimko & Muck, supra n. 200, at 25.
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reluctant to compliment attorneys, however, than to point out their
shortcomings; twenty-four of the forty-four articles (55 percent)
contained critical assessments by jurors. Sixteen of the forty-four
articles (36 percent) reported positive statements made by jurors
about attorneys, while the remaining four articles contained either
neutral comments, or mixed comments of both admiration and
disapprobation.256
An even smaller number of jurors revealed their impressions of
judges to the media. Out of 696 articles where jurors spoke to the
press, twenty-six articles included juror comments about a judge (4
percent). Nineteen of these twenty-six articles (73 percent) involved
criminal cases and twelve (46 percent) came from trials classified as
high profile. Most contained jurors' criticisms of judges' official
actions, especially with respect to sentencing. In the criminal case
against Joseph Hazelwood, captain of the Exxon tanker that spilled
11 million gallons of crude oil into Alaska's Prince William Sound,
the jury foreman told the press that the judge's sentence of a $50,000
fine and 1,000 hours of community service was too harsh.257 "I had
high hopes that [Hazelwood] would walk out of here a free man and
get on with his life," she said.258 Understandably, jurors told the press
of their shock and anger when judges-including appellate judges-
overturned their verdicts,259 or in civil cases, reduced their damage
awards.2'6 For example, several jurors in a breach of contract case said
they were "appalled" after the judge slashed the jury's damage award
by more than two-thirds, including one juror who said the judge's
intervention "made him sick.,
261
A few articles mentioned judges' conduct on the bench that
jurors viewed as inadequate or inappropriate. In one article, a juror
256. Again, I did not include in my totals any articles that reported juror comments
about the trial attorneys that were made to jury consultants or the attorneys themselves
and then repeated second-hand to the press. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Leader of Jury
Defends Verdict in Denny Case, Houston Chron. A4 (Oct. 26, 1993) (quoting jury
consultant who told press that jurors praised one of the defense lawyers).
257. Linda Deutsch, Judge Orders Valdez Skipper to Help Cleanup, Houston Chron.
Al (Mar. 24,1990).
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Patrick May, Reversal of Murder Conviction Outrages Florida Jurors,
Houston Chron. A9 (Feb. 4, 1990) (quoting juror that "blood will be on the hands of those
seven justices" after state supreme court reversed jury's murder conviction).
260. See, e.g., Bob Miller, Jurors, Experts Struggle to Grasp Weight of ABC's Reduced
Penalty, Houston Chron. A16 (Aug. 31, 1997) (describing jurors' shock after judge
reduced damage award).
261. Mark Smith & Steven R. Reed, Public Bids, Hidden Costs, Houston Chron. Al
(Dec. 27, 1992).
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complained that the panel had not been clearly instructed as to the
law,262 and in another, a juror stated that the judge had not
satisfactorily answered a question posed repeatedly by the panel.263
Several articles referred to what might be termed "boorish" behavior
on the part of the judge. In one, a juror complained that both the
judge and the prosecutor smoked in the courtroom even though it
was designated as a non-smoking facility.2" Jurors in another case told
the press that the judge read Penthouse magazine and was inattentive
during a trial.265 Jurors in a third trial noted that the judge made
insensitive courtroom comments about the defendant's illegitimacy.26
Only four articles reported jurors' positive evaluations of judges,
as opposed to either critical, neutral or mixed remarks. In one, a juror
noted that the judge was "just trying to be fair" in dismissing murder-
for-hire charges against the defendant because of insufficient
evidence.267 And in the Timothy McVeigh trial, the press noted that
the jurors praised the manner in which the judge maintained control
over his courtroom. "He was the man," one juror declared.26
By speaking their minds about trial attorneys and judges, jurors
in these articles were actually communicating their complaints and
concerns about the justice system to the press and public. Other
articles without references to trial judges or particular attorneys also
included juror comments about the justice system. So, for example,
jurors in a number of articles criticized the state for bringing
groundless criminal prosecutions,269  or for sloppy, botched
investigations.27 ° One juror complained that although his jury panel
awarded the defendant a 1001-year sentence, the defendant was
paroled thirteen years later.271 "I think there's something seriously
wrong with the judicial system," the juror said. "No matter what, even
262. Jay Jorden, Hundreds Object to Sentence, Houston Chron. A17 (Mar. 25, 1993).
263. Hays, supra n. 118, at A4.
264. Claudia Feldman, Issues of Life and Death, Houston Chron. Al (Jan. 6, 2002).
265. John Makeig, Jury Gets on Judge's Case Over Inattention, Houston Chron. A17
(Aug. 11, 1993).
266. Roy Bragg, Mom Says Judge's Remarks on Illegitimacy 'Insulting', Houston
Chron. §1 at 26 (May 9, 1986).
267. Jerry Urban, Cult's Mixed Verdict, Houston Chron. Al (Jan. 22, 1993).
268. Michael Fleeman, Jurors Say Vote on Guilt Was Harder Than Sentence, Houston
Chron. A16 (June 15, 1997).
269. See, e.g., Juror Rips Gambling Case, Houston Chron. A38 (Nov. 4, 1998) (quoting
jury foreman criticizing state for bringing baseless case).
270. See, e.g., Harvey Rice, Despite Confession, a Mistrial, Houston Chron. A37 (Oct.
14, 2000) (noting jurors faulted police for conducting an inadequate investigation).
271. Associated Press, Record Jail Terms Didn't Really Last, Houston Chron. §1 at 1
(Jan. 27, 1986).
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if we gave him life, he's out. What's the difference?" ' Similarly, in a
case where a defendant was awarded a new trial thirteen years after
confessing on the stand to murder, jurors from the original trial told
the press that any new trial would be a waste of time.273 "It makes me
wonder about our whole judicial system," one juror said. "Sometimes
I wonder if there's an honest lawyer out there." '274
Another relatively common grievance mentioned by jurors
concerned the length of their jury service. Jurors in a four-month libel
suit, for example, complained to the judge about the hardships they
had endured. 5 After the judge declared a mistrial in the case, one
juror insisted that "[t]hey have to tell the new jurors how long they
expect the trial to be next time." '276 A juror in another civil case noted
in a personal essay about her jury experience that she "wondered if
the jury could enter a running objection to the length of this trial.,
27
On a more positive note, jurors sometimes also expressed their
approval of the justice system, in whole or in part. For instance, a
juror in the Timothy McVeigh trial stated that panelists could "all
sleep better at night, knowing that the system does work. 27 8 Jurors
who participated in a New Jersey pilot program that allowed jurors to
take notes and ask questions in civil trials said they liked being able to
question witnesses themselves. 279 "If I couldn't ask questions, I would
have been frustrated," one juror said. "I wouldn't feel as comfortable
making a decision. You felt like you were closer to the truth."2' Even
in a case that settled while the jury deliberated, the foreman (who lost
$700 in pay) admitted the trial was not a total waste of time. "I heard
and saw things I had never heard of in my life," he said about his jury




273. Patti Muck, Admitted Killer's 2 Chance Ignites Fears, Houston Chron. 1C (Mar.
28, 1993).
274. Id.
275. Raymond Hernandez, For Many, It's A Case of Civic Distress, Houston Chron.
Al (Dec. 25, 1994).
276. Id.
277. Patricia Timpanaro, Mistrial Left Void for Juror, Houston Chron. Lifestyle 1 (Jan.
18, 1998).
278. Michael Fleeman, Jurors Say Vote on Guilt Was Harder Than Sentence, Houston
Chron. A16 (June 15, 1997).
279. Jan Hefler, N.J. Court Experiment Allows Jurors to Interact in Civil Trials,
Houston Chron. A22 (July 9, 2000).
280. Id.
281. Judge Spares Jurors News of Accord Reached in Case, Houston Chron. §3 at 14
(Oct. 28, 1985).
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7. Endorsing or Defending Their Decision
While jurors expressed doubts about their decisions to the press
in only 4 percent of 696 articles, 100 articles (14 percent) included
statements of juror support for their verdicts or sentences.2" Sixty-
nine of these articles (69 percent) dealt with criminal cases, while
fifty-two (52 percent) involved cases that I listed as high profile. Most
commonly, jurors told the press that either individually or as a panel,
they had made the right decision. For example, in the Andrea Yates
case, four jurors told Dateline NBC that although panelists had
considered sentencing Yates to death, ultimately the panel correctly
chose to award a life sentence.283 In another murder case, one juror
would say only that the jury had done its duty, and "[i]t all worked
out well. ' 214 Jurors also expressed support for their verdicts in
emotional terms, stating that they felt good... or were comfortable
with or proud of their decisions, or that they could sleep at nighty.
After a jury panel rejected the death penalty and awarded a life
sentence to a defendant, one juror stated that he and his fellow
panelists would "be able to look in the mirror in the morning and feel
satisfied with the decision we made.
288
In forty of these 100 articles, jurors made statements defending
their decisions against real or perceived criticism from trial
participants or members of the public and press. After acquitting an
Egyptian immigrant accused of murdering a rabbi, a juror responded
282. Five articles contained remarks both from jurors who supported and jurors who
doubted their decisions. See, e.g., Steve Brewer, Doctor Acquitted, But Daughter Claims
Own Victory, Houston Chron. A29 (July 8, 2000) (stating that one juror regretted
acquittal, but two others believe jury made the right decision). However, one of these
articles involved comments from jurors who served on different juries in the same case.
Kathy Fair, Foreman at First Penry Trial Defends Death Verdict, Houston Chron. C1 (July
22, 1990).
283. Lisa Teachey, Jurors Say They Believed Yates Knew Right From Wrong, Houston
Chron. Al (Mar. 18, 2002).
284. Steve Brewer, Mother, Son Sentenced for Murder, Houston Chron. A13 (May 11,
1999).
285. See, e.g., Guilty Gabor: 'It's Ridiculous,' Houston Chron. A5 (Sept. 30, 1989)
(noting jury foreman's statement that he felt good about jury's decision).
286. See, e.g., Associated Press, Jury Finds Brenneke Told Truth About CIA Links,
Houston Chron. B8 (May 7, 1990) (quoting foreman that jurors "all came away extremely
comfortable with the verdict"); Kim Cobb, The Sentence: Jury Gives Death to McVeigh,
Houston Chron. Al (June 14, 1997) (stating that jury had "a lot to be proud of").
287. See, e.g., Julia Campbell, Hispanic Simpson Juror Says Race Not Issue, Houston
Chron. A3 (Oct. 10, 1995) (noting juror's confidence in verdict allows him to "sleep at
night, no problem").
288. Cathy Gordon, Jury Hands Mathes Life Term for Killing, Houston Chron. §1 at
22 (May 14, 1986).
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to Jewish leaders who objected to the verdict: "If they [protestors]
want to be angry at someone, I think they can look at the police," the
juror said. "They destroyed evidence. They obliterated fingerprints
. . . They simply didn't give us enough evidence to convict." '289
Occasionally, objections to the verdict came from dismissed or
dissenting members of the panel itself. In the Reginald Denny beating
case, for instance, an alternate juror criticized the verdict acquitting
the defendants of the most serious charges, describing it as "a sad day
in America."2" In the same article, the jury forewoman read a
statement defending the outcome as "the best job possible given the
evidence and the applicable law," and denying that the verdict
resulted from intimidation, race or fear of racial violence.291 Jurors
also justified the speed with which they returned their verdicts. In the
O.J. Simpson criminal case, for example, one juror explained that
after a nine-month trial, the jury didn't need "another nine months"
to reach the proper result.2"
Jurors defended not only the verdicts they reached, but also the
sentences they awarded. The jury foreman in a murder case
responded to anticipated criticism of the panel's decision to grant a
probated sentence to the defendant, stating that "we decided that he
deserved a second chance." '293 In another murder case involving a
convicted cop killer, the jury foreman explained why the jury failed to
reach a sentence after deliberating three days.294 Although the
foreman himself said he favored the death penalty, he told reporters
that several other jurors believed that the defendant's rough
childhood, immaturity, and subnormal IQ were mitigating factors.295
As a result of the jury's failure to agree, the judge was forced to
sentence the defendant to life in prison.296
In civil cases, jurors tended to respond to criticism regarding the
size of their damage awards. After the newspaper published a letter
to the editor objecting to the size of a civil judgment, a juror in the
case replied in her own letter that "the amount we gave at the... trial
289. N.Y. Acquittal Ignites Emotions, Houston Chron. A5 (Dec. 23, 1991).
290. Seth Mydans, Leader of Jury Defends Verdict in Denny Case, Houston Chron. A4
(Oct. 26, 1993).
291. Id.
292. Tony Freemantle, Simpson Acquitted, Houston Chron. Al (Oct. 4, 1995).
293. Associated Press, Jurors Torn Between Outrage, Compassion For Killer of 5-Year-
Old, Houston Chron. A13 (Jan. 28, 1991).
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wouldn't have set [the defendants] back a day and I feel they should
have been forced to pay it." '297 Conversely, a panelist in another case
contacted the newspaper to defend a damage award challenged by
plaintiff's counsel as too small.298 In response, the juror denied that
the panel had been influenced by President George H.W. Bush's 1992
Republican National Convention speech, which accused trial lawyers
of filing frivolous lawsuits.299
8. Divulging the Votes, Remarks, or Opinions of Others
Counting up articles where jurors disclosed the votes of, or
statements or opinions held by, other panelists seemed like a
straightforward task until I tried to do it. This category proved to be
impossible to tally, because it is actually much broader than it
appears. First, jurors who reveal preliminary votes or discuss holdouts
with the press are automatically disclosing the votes or opinions of
panelists other than themselves, even when they do not name names.
Second, any juror who explained why a panel reached a particular
decision, or stated that a jury voted unanimously on the first ballot,
was not just expressing his or her own opinion about the case. These
blanket "we" or "the jury" statements ("[w]e wanted to send a
message out to the world that it shouldn't have happened in the first
place,"3" or "[t]he jury found one person guilty of doctoring a draft
memo,"30 1) were ubiquitous throughout the 696 articles where jurors
spoke with the press.
Third, jurors also frequently referred to views held or opinions
expressed by a portion of the panel-a portion that may or may not
have included the speaker.3 2 Most often, panelists reported that
"some jurors" questioned a piece of evidence, or resisted giving a
certain penalty, or were either convinced or doubtful regarding a
pertinent fact.33 For example, the foreman in the Susan McDougal
297. Sherri Washburn, Viewpoints: Juror Felt Power Nullified, Houston Chron. A25
(Jan. 26, 2001) (Letter to the Editor).
298. Kevin Moran, They Didn't Read His Lips, Houston Chron. A16 (Sept. 29, 1992).
299. Id.
300. Amy Shafer, $2.2 Billion Awarded in Drug-Dilution Suit, Houston Chron. A2
(Oct. 11, 2002).
301. Mary Flood & Tom Fowler, Enron's Auditor is Given the Max, Houston Chron.
Al (Oct. 17, 2002).
302. See, e.g., Bill Murphy, Jury Awards Shopper $35,000 in Randalls Suit, Houston
Chron. A27 (July 27, 2000) (stating that "a majority of jurors" did not believe the
defendants had acted maliciously).
303. See, e.g., Kevin Moran, Man Receives Life Term in Beating Case, Houston Chron.
A17 (Sept. 12, 1990) (reporting that "some jurors" originally wanted to award a fifty-to-
eighty year sentence, rather than a life term).
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obstruction of justice case stated that testimony convinced "some
jurors" that the defendant had good reasons for refusing to testify to
the grand jury.' In another case, a juror said that the panel voted
against the death penalty because "some jurors" believed the
defendant was not the triggerman in the murder.0 5
Occasionally, articles quoted jurors regarding the comments or
views of panelists who were described by gender or race, but not by
name. Several articles contained juror comments that identified views
held by gender-specific portions of the panel.3" One article, published
three years after a mistrial had been declared in a corruption case
against several Houston city officials, identified jurors both by race
and gender, although not by name. °7 In that article, a juror claimed
that an unnamed elderly Hispanic male and an unidentified Anglo
female on the panel had accused each other of racial prejudice during
deliberations.3 08
That said, I found only thirteen articles out of 696 (2 percent)
where jurors pointed the finger at a named panelist and disclosed
remarks made or opinions expressed by that panelist during
deliberations."° Ten of these articles pertained to criminal cases, eight
304. Associated Press, Jury Foreman Remembers Starr Aides' 'Arrogance,' Houston
Chron. A14 (Apr. 17, 1999).
305. Estes Thompson, Man Who Killed Jordan's Father is Given a Life Sentence,
Houston Chron. A6 (Mar. 13, 1996).
306. In one, a breast implant case, a female juror told the press that although the men
on the jury felt sorry for the plaintiffs, they did not really understand the plaintiffs'
suffering. See Mike Tolson, A Matter of Proof, Houston Chron. Al (Oct. 26, 1997).
Following the Menendez murder trial, a number of female jurors accused the male,
unnamed, panelists of making insulting, sexist remarks during deliberations. See
Associated Press, "It Was Hostile in There," Houston Chron. A5 (Jan. 30, 1994). And in
the trial of Oliver North, one juror noted that three female holdouts "still needed a little
convincing" before a verdict could be reached. See Reed Karim, The Oliver North Verdict,
Houston Chron. A4 (May 5, 1989).
307. Bill Murphy & Claudia Feldman, When Jurors Can't Agree, Houston Chron. A29
(June 13, 2002).
308. Id.
309. It is possible that some jurors interviewed in these articles may have been
instructed, or ordered, by the court not to reveal remarks, opinions, or private information
regarding their fellow panelists to the press. None of the articles I reviewed mentioned any
such instruction or order, although I found four cases where judges had either asked jurors
not to discuss, or prohibited jurors from discussing, their verdicts or deliberations with the
press at all. See, e.g., Allan Turner, Slave Trial Jury Sends 2 to Prison, Houston Chron. §1
at 1 (July 19, 1986) (reporting that in organized crime trial, the judge asked the jury not to
talk about their verdicts with the press). Given that the media generally consider gag
orders extremely newsworthy, it seems unlikely that many of the interviewed jurors had
been ordered not to reveal private information about other panelists. Certainly, however,
judges may have suggested to jurors that they should not disclose private information
about their colleagues. Interestingly, in all four instances I found where judges had tried to
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articles involved what I considered to be high profile cases, and six
described cases that ended in a mistrial. All thirteen articles involved
jurors who either identified holdouts by name (six articles), and/or
who accused named panelists of possible misconduct (eight articles).
For example, two jurors in a civil case identified a panelist who they
said "ramrodded" the vote in favor of the defendants, who was
revealed to be the niece of a defendant who had been dropped from
the lawsuit before trial.31° "She said she was going to vote 'no' and
demanded that we all vote the same way," one juror said.31 In
another instance, an alternate juror told the press that the jury
foreman, who she named, had commented before the trial began that
he believed the defendants were guilty."2 The foreman denied the
claim.313
Five of these thirteen articles involved panelists who revealed
specific jurors' comments or votes to "set the record straight" in
response to assertions made to the press by other jurors. After
identifying himself to reporters as the holdout juror, one man claimed
he forced a mistrial in a murder case because he could no longer
tolerate insults and pressure from the rest of the panel.314 The other
panelists then responded, saying that the named holdout juror was
stubborn, ignored the opinions of the others, and had been
improperly influenced by media accounts of the case." In a civil
damage suit, a juror told reporters that during deliberations, she
supported an award of between $200 million to $300 million. '6
Another panelist disputed that assertion, stating that the only dollar
amount discussed was a much lower one suggested by a different
juror, whom she identified.317
prevent jurors from talking to the media, some jurors nonetheless spoke with the press.
See, e.g., Associated Press, Confusion Over Verdict, Houston Chron. §1 at 7 (July 21, 1986)
(reporting comments of three named and two unnamed jurors in organized crime trial
after judge had asked jurors not to speak with press).
310. Richard Stewart, Lawsuit Verdict Upheld Despite Flap Over Juror, Houston
Chron. §1 at 21 (Nov. 20, 1986).
311. Id.
312. Associated Press, Misconduct Claim Threatens L.A. Police Corruption Verdicts,
Houston Chron. A27 (Nov. 18,2000).
313. Id.
314. United Press International, Juror Who Forced Mistrial Says Fellow Jurors
Insulted Him, Houston Chron. §1 at 5 (July 18, 1988).
315. Id.




Very rarely, jurors revealed information about other panelists
that might be considered personal, private, or otherwise
inappropriate. I found only five articles out of 696 (0.7 percent) where
a juror disclosed personal, private, or potentially embarrassing
information about another panelist.3"8 In one, a juror referred to the
unnamed holdout as an unemployed man who wanted to keep
deliberating so he could receive the $15-a-day juror fee.319 Another
article involved a mistrial where one juror told reporters that the son
of the unnamed female holdout had been facing his own legal
problems.32°
Only two of 696 articles (0.3 percent) involved private
information regarding a named panelist: in one, the named panelist
made claims in the press about jury-room pressure that other jurors
disputed, saying that she told them the pressure came from her family
and neighbors;321 in the other, it was unclear whether the panelist was
named by other jurors or if he identified himself to the press. 2 The
second article included the named foreman's response to charges by
other jurors that he refused to convict the defendant because he
wanted to get back at the criminal justice system for "injustices he felt
he had suffered over the years at the hands of authorities.
3 23
Otherwise, the only "inappropriate" behavior disclosed to the press
involved discordant deliberations where jurors accused one another
of bullying or yelling,324 or of racial or other prejudice. 32 For example,
two articles involving the O.J. Simpson criminal murder trial quoted
dismissed jurors who described what they considered to be racially
motivated words or actions by several unnamed black jurors and one
318. This category, of course, does not include articles where jurors reveal personal or
private information about themselves. See, e.g., Robert L. Jackson, Experts See Prison
Time for North, Houston Chron. A16 (May 6, 1989) (stating that named juror admitted to
using cocaine up until a few months before the trial).
319. Associated Press, Insanity Finding Forces Acquittal in Slaying Case, Houston
Chron A8 (Feb. 23, 1991).
320. Steve Brewer, Riley Capital Murder Case Ends in Mistrial, Houston Chron. A25
(July 16, 1999).
321. Kathy Fair, Juror Denies Panel Pushed for Verdict, Houston Chron. A13 (July 19,
1988).
322. Michael D. Oeser, Juror Denies Simms' Race Let to Mistrial, Houston Chron. 17A
(Mar. 25, 1993).
323. Id.
324. See, e.g., Steve Brewer, Mistrial is Declared in 4"h Beating Death Trial, Houston
Chron. A36 (June 12, 1999) (quoting jury foreman that during deliberations, jurors were
yelling and fighting). See supra nn. 147-53 and accompanying text.
325. See, e.g., Associated Press, Elected Officials Join Attack Against Judge, Houston
Chron. Al (Dec. 21, 1988) (reporting juror's statement that "four of the [jurors] were
decided anti-gay"). See supra nn. 103-11 and accompanying text.
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unnamed white juror.326 However, in none of these articles did jurors
reveal personal, private or potentially embarrassing information
about panelists who were identified by name.
In looking again at the eight categories of juror comments listed
above, it becomes apparent that these categories are merely
variations on the same overriding theme: jurors want the public to
understand their decisions. Whether the case ended with a conviction
or an acquittal, a gigantic damage award or a two-dollar fine, a
unanimous verdict or a hung jury, most jurors quoted in these articles
shared the reasons for their decisions with the public. In doing so,
panelists may have revealed their preliminary votes or characterized
jury room dynamics. They may have defended their decisions from
perceived criticism, or explained how it happened that they made a
regrettable mistake. They may have exposed their emotional
reactions to their service, or expressed frustration with holdout jurors
who forced an eventual compromise. In all these instances, post-
verdict juror interviews provided the public with a clearer
understanding of how and why a jury reached a specific result.
Along with this sense of understanding, the juror comments
described above also reflect a desire for accountability, both with
respect to the justice system as a whole and the jury in particular.
Jurors both criticized and praised aspects of the system that they
viewed first-hand, including their own performance, as well as that of
trial attorneys, police investigators, and judges. Jurors reported
possible incidents of jury misconduct, and sometimes attempted to
"set the record straight" when other jurors or court personnel made
comments or took action with which they disagreed. Jurors' desire for
accountability did not necessarily end after they announced their
verdicts; jurors spoke to the press to defend their decisions or to
reveal their doubts many years after they were released from their
service. As will be discussed below, the fact that the content of post-
verdict juror interviews primarily advances public understanding and
accountability refutes the belief that such interviews threaten the
integrity of the jury system.
326. See Lorraine Adams, Dismissed Juror Calls Simpson Judge Unfair, Houston
Chron. Al (June 1, 1995) (reporting comments of one unnamed black juror, and noting
actions of "some" unnamed black jurors); David Margolick, Ex-Juror's Remarks Hint
Simpson Case Headed for Mistrial, Houston Chron. A2 (Apr. 9, 1995) (noting dismissed
juror's claim that one unnamed white juror kicked or stepped on unnamed black jurors).
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III. Who's Afraid of Post-Verdict Juror Interviews? Addressing
the Arguments
Although most appellate courts that have considered the
question allow at least limited contact between jurors and the press
following a verdict,327 recent decisions tend to uphold judicial attempts
to curb post-trial media/juror communications."' Whereas some
courts have struck down blanket orders prohibiting any questioning
of former jurors as impermissibly broad,329 more narrowly tailored
restrictions on post-verdict interviews are generally upheld.33 ° So, for
example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Cleveland upheld a trial judge's order that blocked reporters from
asking former jurors about their deliberations without court
permission, but allowed inquiries regarding "the verdict itself."33 ' The
order was sufficiently narrow, the court said, because it permitted
interviews dealing with former jurors' "general reactions" to the case,
even though discussions about deliberations would be off-limits to the
332press without the court's consent.
327. See, e.g., U.S. v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1364 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that
restrictions on post-trial juror interviews "must reflect an impending threat of jury
harassment" to be permissible); U.S. v. Sherman, 581 F. 2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978)
(holding that trial court order forbidding all post-verdict contact with jurors constituted
unconstitutional prior restraint).
328. See, e.g., State v. Neulander, 173 N.T. 193, 197-198, cert. denied, sub nom
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. N.J., 537 U.S. 1192 (2003) (sustaining gag order
forbidding juror/media contact following mistrial until verdict returned in retrial); U.S. v.
Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 919 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming court order forbidding post-verdict
juror interviews regarding deliberations). See also Bob Van Voris, 5th Circuit OKs
Shielding Jurors, Natl. L. J., A4 (Oct. 15, 2001) (reporting that the 5,h Circuit declined to
overturn a district court order that prohibited the press from contacting jurors in a
Firestone tire lawsuit without first getting the judge's permission).
329. See, e.g., Journal Pub. Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986)
(holding that trial judge's order prohibiting all post-verdict contact between press and
jurors was unconstitutionally overbroad); In re Express News, 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir.
1982) (ruling that district court rule forbidding any person from interviewing former jurors
without leave of court was unconstitutional); State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Court of
Common Pleas, 570 N.E.2d 1101, 1104 (Ohio 1991) (deciding that trial judge's order
disallowing anyone from discussing the case with former jurors was impermissibly broad).
330. See, e.g., U.S. v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1364 (3d Cir. 1994) (upholding provision of
trial judge's order that disallowed press from asking jurors about the votes or opinions of
any other juror, stating that such a restriction is "appropriate in certain specific cases").
331. 128 F.3d 267, 269 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, sub nom In re Capital City Press,
523 U.S. 1075 (1998).
332. Id at 270.
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Despite overbreadth concerns, some trial judges continue to
impose gag orders that entirely forbid post-verdict juror interviews.333
For example, in State v. Neulander, 4 a New Jersey trial judge ordered
the press not to contact or question any jurors for an indefinite time
period after a high-profile murder case ended in a hung jury.33' The
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld most provisions of the order and
even extended it to prevent jurors from initiating contact with the
press themselves;336 however, the court ruled that the order would
terminate after a second jury reached a verdict in the defendant's
retrial.37 As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's refusal to review the
case, more trial judges can be expected to issue similar broad
prohibitions on post-verdict interviews.
Courts have also tried to limit press access to juror names and
addresses as a way to discourage journalists from contacting jurors
after a verdict has been reached. So although the press could
theoretically interview jurors regarding the verdict (although not
deliberations) in United States v. Brown,339 the Fifth Circuit in that
case upheld the trial judge's decision not to release identifying
information regarding any juror without that juror's consent.3'
According to the court, these limitations on post-verdict juror
333. See, e.g., Lisa Teachey, Court Orders Alarm Media Legal Experts, Houston
Chron. A27 (Nov. 20, 2002) (reporting that a state district judge banned all post-verdict
juror interviews in murder case where the defendant was accused of killing her husband by
running him over with her Mercedes). In another example, a California federal judge
barred a ten-member jury from discussing the Earth First civil rights case with news
reporters or attorneys from either side until all appeals in the case were completed-a
condition that could have taken years to fulfill. See Harriet Chiang, Lawyers Frustrated by
Gag Order Following Earth First Verdict, S.F. Chron. June 16, 2002, at A7. The judge
lifted the gag order with respect to the media twenty-two days later, after the press
challenged the order as unconstitutional. See Jim Herron Zamora, Cops, FBI Lied About
Probe, Juror Says, S.F. Chron. A17 (July 3, 2002).
334. 173 N.J. 193 (2002), cert denied sub nom Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. New
Jersey, 537 U.S. 1192 (2003).
335. Id. at 258.
336. Id. at 257.
337. Id. at 274. See infra nn. 426-444 and accompanying text.
338. See, e.g., U.S. v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 725-26 (D. Mass. 1987) (holding that
judge could postpone releasing names of anonymous jury, and forbid any post-verdict
juror interviews, for seven days after verdict entered). See also Adam Liptak, Nameless
Juries are on the Rise in Crime Cases, N.Y. Times Al (Nov. 18, 2002) (reporting an
increase in the routine use of anonymous juries in criminal cases at least in part because
anonymity "prevents jurors from being badgered by reporters after their verdicts").
339. 250 F. 3d 907, 920-21 (5th Cir. 2001).
340. Id. at 918-19, 920 n. 20, (affirming trial court decision to withhold juror identities
from the press after verdict to protect juror privacy and prevent harassment, while noting
that post-verdict interviews would necessarily be more difficult for the press to conduct).
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interviews were necessary "to prevent real threats to the
administration of justice." ' A number of commentators, too, have
decried post-verdict juror interviews as a growing trend that they fear
could destroy the integrity of the American jury system.342
Judicial and scholarly critics of post-verdict juror interviews
generally rely on three arguments to support their position: first, that
post-verdict juror interviews jeopardize defendants' fair trial rights;
second, that post-verdict interviews invade jurors' privacy; and third,
that post-verdict interviews distort public perception of and
confidence in jury verdicts. Supporters of post-verdict juror
interviews counter that post-verdict interviews enhance jury
accountability, advance First Amendment interests belonging to both
jurors and the press, and increase community trust in the integrity of
jury verdicts by furthering public understanding of the justice system.
This section of the article examines these major arguments against
and in favor of post-verdict juror interviews in light of the content
analysis presented in Part II above.
A. Fair Trial Implications of Post-Verdict Interviews: Do They Distort or
Enhance the Deliberative Process?
One obvious way to gauge the value of post-verdict juror
interviews is to examine what effect, if any, they have on the
deliberative process, and ultimately, on trial outcomes. According to
critics, post-verdict juror interviews threaten defendants' fair trial
rights in a number of ways. For one, it has been argued that jurors
may be too afraid of community censure to vote their convictions in
the jury room if they must then defend unpopular decisions in the
press." Second, it has been suggested that in high-profile cases,
media-savvy jurors might vote to ensure a dramatic final outcome,
thus creating the most lucrative opportunity to market their own
articles, books, or screenplays about the case.' A third, related,
341. Id. at 921.
342. See Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 296 (stating that the traditional policies underlying
secret jury deliberations are "seriously threatened" by post-verdict juror interviews);
Marder, supra n. 22, at 470 (describing post-verdict juror interviews as threatening to
"undermine a critical role of the jury, which is to engage in a deliberative process to reach
a collective judgment as a single body"); Nunn, supra n. 20, at 410 (noting that post-verdict
media interviews may "fundamentally transform the jury's institutional character" because
jurors in high-profile cases are now expected to defend their verdicts to the community
through the press).
343. See infra nn. 348-49 and accompanying text.
344. See Nunn, supra n. 20, at 433 (asserting that jurors who desire to sell their stories
to the press may intentionally alter their votes "for monetary or publicity-seeking
reasons").
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argument states that post-verdict interviews diminish defendants' fair
trial rights by stifling free debate during deliberations.345 In response,
it has been suggested that post-verdict interviews may strengthen fair
trial rights by encouraging jurors to act more responsibly in the jury
room. 
346
1. Will Post- Verdict Interviews Cause Jurors to Conform to Public Opinion?
Some commentators believe that jurors may be intimidated by
the prospect of post-trial media questioning, and as a result change
their votes to match public expectations.3 7 Particularly in criminal
cases, it is feared that jurors might succumb to public pressure to
convict rather than face the media spotlight generated by an
unexpected acquittal.3 8 However, proponents of this view cite no
examples where jurors actually have altered their votes in deference
to community pressures because they feared being questioned by the
media. In fact, in my study of eighteen years of post-verdict juror
interviews published in the Houston Chronicle, out of 696 articles
where jurors spoke to the press, no juror mentioned that he or she, or
any other panelist, voted differently because media attention
345. See Goldstein, supra n.19, at 307-08 (stating that a defendant's right to a fair trial
is seriously threatened if the jury is not confident that deliberations will remain secret
following the verdict); Marder, supra n. 22, at 473 (claiming that post-verdict juror
interviews have a chilling effect on deliberations because jurors fear their comments will
be revealed to the press by other panelists).
346. See Marder, supra n. 22, at 498-501 (acknowledging that post-verdict interviews
could enhance juror accountability); Christine J. Iversen, Student Author, Post-Verdict
Interviews: The Key to Understanding the Decision Behind the Verdict, 30 J. Marshall L.
Rev. 507, 528 (1997) (noting that instead of stifling jury room debate, post-verdict
interviews may cause jurors to "take the responsibility of jury duty more seriously"); but
see Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 313 (describing argument that post-verdict interviews
increase juror accountability as "the grossest of speculations").
347. See Marder, supra n. 22, at 526 (suggesting that the prospect of post-verdict
interviews may cause jurors to "give more weight to how their views will play out in the
community rather than to what has transpired in the courtroom"); Nunn, supra n. 20, at
431 (contending that the public attention associated with post-verdict interviews "creates a
risk that jurors will render decisions based on community desires and not the facts of the
case in order to avoid public vilification"); Daniel Aaron, Student Author, The First
Amendment and Post-Verdict Interviews, 20 Colum. J.L Law & Soc. Probs. 203, 204 (1986)
(stating that post-verdict juror interviews pose a danger that jurors will "conform to public
opinion in sensational cases and not independently decide the merits of each case").
348. See Marder, supra n. 22, at 504 (suggesting that for jurors to withstand "public
pressure for convictions," jurors need to know that their comments during deliberations
will not be made public via post-verdict juror interviews); Symposium, The Appearance of
Justice: Juries, Judges and the Media Transcript, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1096, 1102
(1996) (quoting criminal defense attorney stating that jurors know they will be subjected
to media criticism if they fail to convict a criminal defendant) [hereinafter Symposium].
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surrounding the case had created an unbearable fear of community
criticism.
Only nine articles in my study contained juror references to
community pressure or criticism at all, and only two of those articles
also mentioned the media. Explaining the jury's decision to acquit all
defendants of murder and conspiracy charges in the Branch Davidian
case, a juror noted that his close friends were already asking him,
"What'd you let those people off so easy for?" 349 Although neither the
opinion of his friends nor the fear of media commentary had affected
his vote, the juror asked that his name not be published, saying that
he wanted to avoid any additional disapproval in the press.35° In the
other article, a juror in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial refused to
provide details regarding how he arrived at his decision in the case,
stating that he feared public or media ridicule.35' However, the juror
nevertheless described the mechanics of jury deliberations to
reporters and said the decision was based on the evidence and not on
race.352 He gave no indication that fear of public or media pressure
had in any way influenced his vote.353 Similarly, a juror who was
dismissed from the O.J. Simpson criminal trial speculated in an earlier
article that the remaining panelists might fear community pressure
resulting from their verdict.54 However, the juror did not intimate
that any panelist would change his or her vote to assure a popular
verdict, or that fear of facing the media could exacerbate pressure on
the jurors to an intolerable level.
Just one of the nine articles where jurors mentioned public
opinion involved a juror who admitted changing his vote because of
it. In that instance, a juror in an Arkansas murder case confessed, in a
letter to the governor fourteen years after trial, that the juror had
agreed to impose the death penalty for fear of being treated as a
community outcast."' Again, the juror did not mention media
pressure as a contributing factor in his decision to go along with the
majority, nor was there any indication that he or any other panelist
349. Sam Howe Verhovek, Davidian Verdict Was Both Compromise and Message,
Juror Says, Houston Chron. A18 (Mar. 1, 1994).
350. Id.




354. Woes of a Jury Under Pressure Send Simpson Trial into Turmoil, Houston Chron.
Al (Apr. 7, 1995).
355. Associated Press, Juror's Letter Leads Governor to Halt Execution, Houston
Chron. A9 (Feb. 6, 1999).
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spoke to the media after trial. As anyone who has lived in a small
town can appreciate, had the juror held out for life in prison, his
identity would have been common knowledge regardless of whether
panelists in the case had spoken with the press following the verdict.
Not only did my study fail to identify any instance where jurors
identified media pressure as a factor in their verdicts, four of the nine
articles where jurors mentioned public opinion indicated that while
jurors were aware of possible community reaction, this knowledge did
not affect their decisions. In the Reginald Denny case, for example, a
female panelist told the press that the fear of rioting did not influence
the jury.356 "That was the last thing on our minds," the juror said. "If a
riot occurred, it would occur." '357 And after the high-profile trial of
four Los Angeles police officers accused of beating Rodney King,
jurors admitted that they feared retaliation by members of the public
who were angered by the verdicts.5 Nevertheless, one juror
speculated that riots would have taken place even had the panel
convicted the officers.59 "It looks to me as though the people that are
involved with all the beatings and the killings and the marauding, I
believe they would be incited to riot had we voted the policemen
guilty," she told the Cable News Network.3"
Because solid evidence is lacking, critics take it as a given that
the possibility of post-verdict media interviews will cause jurors to
become so hyper-sensitive to potential community criticism that they
will sacrifice their scruples to escape it. This conclusion overlooks the
obvious fact that any community dissatisfaction that results following
an unpopular verdict stems from the verdict itself."' Especially with
respect to high-profile criminal trials, public interest and emotions
regarding jury verdicts inevitably run high. As long as verdicts remain
public information, prohibiting post-verdict interviews will do nothing
356. Associated Press, Juror: Fear of Riot was not a Factor, Houston Chron. A17 (Oct.
23, 1993).
357. Id.
358. Paul Lieberman, Stuart Silverstein, Bush Orders U.S. Forces to LA, Houston
Chron. Al (May 1, 1992).
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. See Robert Lloyd Raskopf, A First Amendment Right of Access to a Juror's
Identity: Toward a Fuller Understanding of the Jury's Deliberative Process, 17 Pepp. L.
Rev. 357, 371 n. 105 (1990) (noting that "[i]t is... the verdict itself which serves as the
primary focus of the public's attention and emotions"); Markovitz, supra n. 26, at 1513
(observing that "protecting the secrecy of deliberations does not conceal how jurors
ultimately vote").
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to eliminate the threat that jurors could be influenced by community
sentiments.
If anything, post-verdict interviews may lessen the frequency or
intensity of public outrage following an unexpected verdict because
jurors who speak to the press often explain the reasoning behind their
decisions.362 As described in Part II of this article, 556 out of 696
articles studied where jurors talked to the media following a verdict
contained juror explanations of the case result (80 percent).363
Members of the public who are upset about a verdict may be less
likely to vilify the jury if jury members are allowed to justify their
decisions.3" In a related context, the Supreme Court ruled in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia that the public has a right to
attend criminal trials, in part because "results alone" will not satisfy
the public's desire to understand the criminal justice system.365
"[W]here the trial has been concealed from public view an
unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has
failed and at worst has been corrupted," Justice Burger wrote for the
plurality.36 Similarly, post-verdict interviews may actually defuse the
effects of negative public opinion by increasing public understanding
of unpopular jury verdicts.
2. Will Post-Verdict Interviews Cause Jurors to Put Fame Before Justice?
Critics have also raised concerns that post-verdict interviews
encourage jurors to change their votes or otherwise alter their
behavior during deliberations to attract media attention or create a
marketable story.3 67 This argument postulates that outcomes in high-
profile cases could be affected by jurors who desire to turn the
attendant media attention into a profitable book, story, or
screenplay.368 Even if profit-seeking jurors do not change their votes
362. See, e.g., Symposium, supra n. 348, at 1144 (quoting trial consultant as describing
how post-verdict interviews can increase public understanding of previously
incomprehensible verdict).
363. See supra nn. 74-111 and accompanying text.
364. See infra nn. 625-29 and accompanying text.
365. 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (Burger, C.J., plurality).
366. Id.
367. See David A. Andersen, Democracy and the Demystification of Courts: An Essay,
14 Rev. Litg. 627, 650 (1995) (claiming that a juror "who believes that he or she will be
rewarded by the media, financially or psychologically, by a particular outcome is not an
impartial juror"); Nunn, supra n. 20, at 433-34 (stating reasons why post-verdict interviews
may result in unfair trials).
368. See The Great Debate V: A Debate on Judicial Reform, England v. U.S., 38 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 321, 348 (2001) [hereinafter The Great Debate] (citing English judge stating
that post-verdict juror interviews should be eliminated to assure jurors do not approach
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to ensure a dramatic trial finish, it is feared that they may at least
concentrate more on maximizing media interest in their jury
experience than on the evidence.369 Additionally, it has been
suggested that by placing jurors in the media spotlight, post-verdict
interviews encourage publicity-hounds and gold-diggers to seek out
jury service in high-profile trials, thus exacerbating the possible risks
associated with juror journalism and destroying the jury's
representative composition.37°
It is undeniable that some jurors have written books about their
jury service, or have been paid by news outlets for first-hand accounts
of prominent trials.37" ' For example, in 1986, The New York Post and
The Daily News bought juror accounts of the Bernard Goetz trial for
$2,500 and "under $5,000," respectively.372 It may also be true that
post-verdict interviews make potential jurors more aware of media
interest in high-profile cases. However I have found no evidence, nor
do critics provide any, that a juror has ever changed the outcome of a
case, disregarded probative evidence, or successfully arranged to be
chosen for jury service to further his or her commercial interests.373
jury service with profit motive); Nunn, supra n. 20, at 433 (arguing that the jury's fact-
finding role may be compromised if jurors are attempted to return verdicts that maximize
their ability to gain "fame or fortune").
369. See Nunn, supra n. 20, at 433 (asserting that post-verdict interviews might cause
jurors to focus more at trial on what would interest the media, or their own celebrity
status, rather than the evidence); Strauss, supra n. 23, at 399-401 (outlining argument that
a profit motive might distort a juror's perception of evidence at trial, but concluding that
no evidence exists to prove that such distortion has actually occurred).
370. See Nunn, supra n. 20, at 434 (claiming that post-verdict interviews will encourage
celebrity-seekers to serve on high-profile juries); Strauss, supra n. 23, at 398 (concluding
that while profiteers could lie during voir dire in an attempt to be chosen for a jury, their
ability to "win" a panel seat depends on many assumptions).
371. See, e.g., D. Graham Burnett, A Trial By Jury (1st ed., Knopf 2001); William
Finnegan, Doubt, The New Yorker 48 (Jan. 31, 1994).
372. See Bids to Buy Juror's Trial Account Pose Legal, Ethical Questions, Houston
Chron. 21 (Dec. 25, 1987).
373. See Elizabeth Amon, When Jurors Decide to Write Books, Natl. L.J. A6 (July 8,
2002) (stating that there are no known cases where jurors' publication ambitions have
changed a case result); Strauss, supra n. 23, at 403 (stating that "the effect of juror
profiteering on the ultimate verdict remains speculative at best; it is grounded in
theoretical logic yet remains unproven ... in any empirical sense"). Professor Strauss
noted that during voir dire, a juror in the Bernard Goetz case who was considering writing
an article about the case failed to give a complete answer to one of the attorney's
questions. See id. at 396. However, Professor Strauss concluded that whether the panelist's
response was an intentional ploy to ensure he would be chosen for the jury, or whether it
was a subconscious omission, could not be determined. Id. at n. 41.
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In my study of post-verdict interviews in the Houston Chronicle,
I found only six articles that mentioned "juror journalism," '374 all of
which involved high-profile cases. Two articles involved jurors or
dismissed jurors who had written books about their experiences, "'
and the other articles contained juror references to possible plans to
write books or screenplays.376 Naturally, none of these jurors
volunteered that profit motivated their behavior in any way, but
neither did their fellow jurors report that the outcomes in these cases
were skewed by the presence of a juror journalist on the panel.
It cannot be assumed, of course, that a juror who writes a book
or article about a case must necessarily have been a "bad" juror, or
have even entertained thoughts of profiting from his or her
experience during the trial. For example, following the Eric
Menendez trial, juror Hazel Thornton denied in a post-verdict
interview that panelists in that case were influenced by financial
incentives:
There was no talk among any of the jurors in my presence of, we
are going to be famous, we are going to make money, we are going
to be on TV. There was none of that. Everyone took their
responsibility very7 seriously. Nobody was out to get rich being on a
high profile jury.
Ironically, Ms. Thornton later wrote a book about her experience
as a Menendez juror.3 7' Her subsequent decision to write about her
jury service, however, does not logically disprove her contention that
the jury was unaffected by financial considerations during
deliberations. In fact, out of the sixteen articles in my study where
jurors revealed potential juror misconduct or failure to follow the
374. See Kenneth Jost, The Dawn of Big Bucks Juror Journalism, Legal Times 15 (July
20, 1987) (defining "juror journalism" as referring to "a variety of practices by which the
juror might sell a story").
375. National Briefs: Simpson Juror 'Never Saw Racial Attacks', Houston Chron. A2
(June 26, 1995) (interviewing dismissed juror in O.J. Simpson murder trial who published
book before verdict returned); George Christian, A View From the Jury Box, Houston
Chron. (Zest) 20 (July 24, 1988) (reviewing book written by juror in Pennzoil-Texaco
breach of contract suit).
376. See, e.g., Steve Brewer, Andersen Verdict: 'I Wanted to See Andersen Win',
Houston Chron. A33 (June 16, 2002) (noting that foreman was considering writing a book
about the case); Julia Campbell, Hispanic Simpson Juror Says Race Not Issue, Houston
Chron. A3 (Nov. 10, 1995) (containing references by O.J. Simpson juror that he had kept a
diary during the trial that could be made into a book or film).
377. See Symposium, supra n. 348, at 1104.
378. Hazel Thornton, Hung Jury: The Diary of a Menendez Juror (Temple U. Press,
1995).
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judge's instructions, none involved juror journalism-related
incidents.379
The only instance I found where jurors complained about the
actions of a panelist who entertained literary ambitions came from
the Arthur Andersen trial.3" Jurors in that case grumbled that the
foreman's desire to write a book caused him to pay too much-rather
than too little-attention to the evidence. 8' His voluminous note-
taking and hand-drawing of exhibits, they said, may have slowed
down their deliberations by three or four days.382 Apparently, the
foreman's efforts were all for naught; to date, publishers have shown
little interest in his proposed book.383 Given what publishers have
described as the disappointing sales history of books by jurors" the
notion that jurors can make easy money from the sale of their
memoirs in high-profile cases may well be overblown.
All this discussion overlooks the real question of whether
prohibiting post-verdict juror interviews would have any affect on the
potential, although unproven, risks associated with juror journalism.
Because jurors have a First Amendment right to express themselves,
for profit or otherwise, about their jury experiences,"' forbidding the
press from conducting post-verdict interviews would not curb juror
journalism in any significant way. In fact, because most mainstream
press outlets do not pay jurors for their post-trial remarks,3" limiting
post-verdict interviews would have the anomalous result of increasing
demand for juror-authored accounts of trial experiences.
Furthermore, only jurors in notorious cases can realistically expect
379. See supra nn. 220-28 and accompanying text.
380. See Amon, supra n. 373. Because this article was not printed in the Houston
Chronicle, it was not included in my study.
381. Id. The foreman claimed, however, that he took notes to manage the large
amounts of evidence in the case, not as material for a book. Id.
382. See Jonathan D. Glater, Jury Member Wants to Tell All, But Publishers Aren't
Lining Up, N.Y. Times C1 (June 19, 2002).
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. See infra nn. 547-81 and accompanying text.
386. See Bids to Buy Juror's Trial Account Pose Legal, Ethical Questions, Houston
Chron. A21 (Dec. 25, 1987) (quoting several newspaper editors stating that although they
might consider purchasing an article written by a juror giving a first-hand account of a
trial, they would not pay solely for an interview with the juror); Bruce Selcraig, Buying
News, Columbia Journalism Review <http://www.cjr.org/year/94/4/buying.asp> (July/Aug.
1994) (stating that certain jurors in the Rodney King trial would not talk to Los Angeles
Times reporters because the reporters refused to pay for the interviews). At the Houston
Chronicle, reporters do not pay jurors for post-verdict comments. E-mail interview from
Author to Carol Christian, courthouse reporter, (June 17, 2003).
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any chance to profit from their experiences. 3 7 In my study of post-
verdict juror interviews in the Houston Chronicle, however, almost 60
percent of the articles where jurors spoke to the press involved cases
that I did not consider clearly high profile.3" Therefore, in the
majority of the juror interviews studied, the risk of juror journalism
could not have played a significant role in the outcome of the case.
3. Will Post-Verdict Interviews Discourage Free Debate During Jury
Deliberations?
Critics of post-verdict juror interviews also contend that to
ensure fair trials, we must do more than just maintain the long
tradition of secret jury deliberations. The inviolability of the jury
room should be extended to prohibit post-verdict juror interviews,
according to this view, so that jurors can deliberate without fear of
later exposure.389 Otherwise, shy or sensitive jurors may prefer to
keep their opinions, prejudices, and feelings about a case to
themselves rather than risk that another juror may reveal these
confidences to the media.3" It is feared that post-verdict media
interviews could result in future deliberations that are less spirited
and not as candid, to the detriment of prospective defendants.39'
Specifically, it has been argued that holdout jurors may prefer to go
387. See, e.g., Glater, supra n. 382 (stating that books by jurors are most marketable
when they concern trials that involve "salacious elements").
388. See supra nn. 62-63 and accompanying text.
389. See Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 307-08 (stating that fair trial rights are "seriously
threatened when jurors expect that they will have to face the media or that their fellow
jurors will talk to the media").
390. See Marder, supra n. 22, at 500, 524 (noting that the possibility of post-verdict
interviews might intimidate some jurors, or encourage biased jurors to vote according to
their prejudices without first discussing their "mistaken notions" with the panel, for fear of
being considered racist or sexist if their views were later repeated to the media); Nunn,
supra n. 20, at 432 (hypothesizing that the possibility of post-verdict interviews could
encourage racially prejudiced jurors to keep their intolerant views to themselves during
deliberations).
391. This argument relies on the prediction that past post-verdict interviews create a
future negative effect, because deliberations obviously have been completed in any case
where a post-verdict interview is granted. See, e.g., U.S. v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 724
(D. Mass. 1987) (ordering jurors' names to be withheld from the press for seven days after
verdict announced, stating that post-verdict interviews "will 'chill' the free flowing process
that our system encourages, especially if other jurors come to believe that it is the
accepted practice for jury deliberations to be freely discussed once the verdict is
returned."); Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 296-97 (asserting that post-verdict interviews teach
potential jurors "that their deliberations will not be secret at all").
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along with the majority rather than be publicly criticized as the lone
obstacle to j ustice.3 92
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals used this fair trial rationale in
United States v. Cleveland to uphold a district judge's post-verdict
order, which held that no juror could be interviewed by anyone
regarding jury deliberations in a high-profile criminal racketeering
case.3 93 The court found that the order was narrowly tailored to
address what it called "a substantial threat to the administration of
justice-namely, the threat presented to freedom of speech within the
jury room by the possibility of post-verdict interviews."'3 9' The court
cited no evidence to support its view that post-verdict juror interviews
regarding jury deliberations could compromise the integrity of those
deliberations, but offered a quote from Justice Cardozo's statement in
Clark v. United States that "freedom of debate might be stifled and
independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that
their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the
world."3 95
Critics of post-verdict juror interviews rely on Justice Cardozo's
quote or other conclusory statements quite frequently to advance the
fair-trial rationale,396 no doubt because more substantial evidence to
support these arguments is lacking.397 For example, in United States v.
Harrelson, the Fifth Circuit repeated the above-quoted line from
Justice Cardozo to uphold a district court order forbidding any
interviewer to ask a juror about the specific votes of other jurors.
Similarly, in United States v. Brown, the Fifth Circuit justified a
district court order that prevented interviewers from asking jurors
392. Marder, supra n. 22, at 500 (suggesting that holdout jurors may prefer to give in to
the majority rather than be revealed as the hold-out through post-verdict interviews).
393. Cleveland, 128 F. 3d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom In Re Capital
City Press, 523 U.S. 1075 (1998).
394. Id. at 269.
395. Id. at 270 (citing Clark v. U.S.. 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933)).
396. See, e.g., U.S. v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 619 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Justice Cardozo's
comment to bolster claim that that "the mere suggestion that the views of jurors may be
conveyed to the parties and the public, even after the trial is over, understandably may...
distort the process by which a verdict is reached"); Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 325
(concluding, after quoting Justice Cardozo, that the secrecy of jury deliberations and the
integrity of jury verdicts are "seriously threatened by interviewing jurors after a trial");
Nunn, supra n. 20, at 431 (citing Justice Cardozo's quote to support the proposition that
"when jurors are aware that they will be thrust into the public eye at the end of their
service, there is a great danger that their ability to exercise their own independent
judgment may be affected").
397. See, e.g., The Great Debate, supra n. 368, at 349 (quoting comments supporting
observation that critics have offered no evidence to indicate that post-verdict interviews
chill jury deliberations).
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about their deliberations because "compelling governmental interests
in the integrity of jury deliberations require that the privacy of such
deliberations and communications dealing with them be preserved." '398
In neither case did the court provide any data or examples to support
its underlying assumption that post-verdict interviews interfere with
the frankness or vigor of jury deliberations.
Given the rest of the Clark opinion, reliance on Justice
Cardozo's quote to justify prohibiting post-verdict juror interviews
appears misplaced.'" Clark involved a criminal contempt proceeding
against a juror who had deliberately lied about her employment
history to gain a place on the jury panel.' The Court held that in such
circumstances, remarks made by the juror during deliberations were
admissible as evidence of juror misconduct.4"' Justice Cardozo's
statement about the importance of confidential jury deliberations was
merely the set-up to the punch line: although deliberative secrecy is
an important jury characteristic, it is not absolute and should not be
used as an excuse to shield juror misconduct from public scrutiny.' 2
According to Justice Cardozo, jurors of "integrity and reasonable
firmness" will not need assurances of complete confidentiality to
speak their minds in the jury room, and guarding against juror
misconduct outweighs any need to shelter reticent jurors who might
fear disclosure of their deliberations. 3 Accordingly, he concluded:
The chance that now and then there may be found some timid soul
who will take counsel of his fears and give way to their repressive
power is too remote and shadowy to shape the course of justice. It
must yield to the overmastering need, so vital in our polity, of
preserving trial by jury in its purity against the inroads ofcorruption.40
In her research, Professor Marder opined that examining the
content of post-verdict interviews would probably not be helpful in
determining whether such interviews actually inhibit open debate
during deliberations.!5 Certainly, empirical studies regarding the
deliberative effects of post-verdict interviews-could they be devised
and implemented-would yield the most conclusive data on the
398. U.S. v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 921 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting U.S. v. Gurney, 558 F.2d
1202, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1977).
399. For a similar reading of Clark, see Markovitz, supra n. 26, at 1511-12.
400. Clark v. U.S., 289 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1933).
401. Id. at 13-14.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 16.
404. Id.
405. Marder, supra n. 22, at 501.
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question. In fact, in 1996, a fifteen-member panel of Connecticut
judges, lawyers, and media representatives studied the question for
six months, and concluded that post-verdict juror interviewing "does
not cast a shadow on the jury deliberation process in Connecticut."
' °
However, in the absence of similar studies and after reading 696
articles that included post-verdict juror comments, I believe a
content-analysis of what jurors tell the press is also quite revealing on
this point.
Logic dictates that for post-verdict interviews to stifle jury room
debate, interviewed jurors must expose highly personal, unflattering,
or embarrassing comments made by other panelists, or must reveal
statements that would subject other panelists to discomfiture, ridicule
or derision, on a relatively regular basis. Those talkative panelists
must also sufficiently identify the jurors who are the subjects of these
disturbing statements, so as to create a reasonable fear in other jurors
of similar treatment in the press. Furthermore, to create a "chilling
effect" in the jury room, jurors who reveal the votes of other
panelists, or discuss panel holdouts, in post-verdict interviews must
also somehow distinguish to whom they are referring.
My review of juror interviews published by the Houston
Chronicle found little evidence that jurors who talk to reporters do
any of these things. As discussed in Part II of this Article, out of 696
articles where jurors consented to be interviewed following a verdict,
I found only five articles where a juror disclosed potentially
embarrassing or inappropriate information about another panelist. °
In only two of these five articles were panelists named, and in one of
those articles it was clear that the panelist had identified herself to the
press.4 8
In fact, interviewees very rarely disclosed the opinions or
statements of other, named jurors at all. In eighteen years' worth of
interviews, jurors disclosed remarks, opinions, or votes of other,
named panelists in thirteen out of 696 articles (2 percent). More than
half of these disclosures involved allegations of juror misconduct' -
the very situation where Justice Cardozo in Clark stated that absolute
confidentiality of juror deliberations should yield to assure the proper
administration of justice."' Reasonable jurors will not be afraid to
406. See Paul Frisman, The Verdict on Post-Verdict Interviews, Conn. L. Trib. 3 (July
22, 1996).
407. See supra nn. 318-20 and accompanying text.
408. See supra nn. 321-26 and accompanying text.
409. See supra nn. 309-13 and accompanying text.
410. See supra nn. 401-06 and accompanying text.
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deliberate freely, I suggest, just because a panelist in a previous case
stated that "one juror thought we should acquit the defendant"
without giving significant clues as to who that one juror might be.
Much more typically, jurors mentioned the opinions or votes of
other panelists in post-verdict interviews by making comprehensive
"we" statements explaining the case result.4" For example, in a civil
conspiracy case against PTL founder Jim Bakker, the jury forewoman
stated that although the panelists believed that Bakker defrauded his
former contributors, "we didn't feel he was a racketeer." '412 Similarly,
after a trial in which a businessman was acquitted of murdering a co-
worker by pushing her off a hotel balcony, a juror stated that "we
believe it was a tragic accident.""4 3 As noted in Part II,1' when
discussing views not held by the entire jury, jurors interviewed by the
press almost always referred to the views of "some" jurors rather than
singling out particular individuals, regardless of whether or not the
interviewee was part of the referenced group.4 5 For example, in a
child custody case where the jury deadlocked seven-to-five, a juror
explained that the father's religious beliefs were crucial to the
majority's decision, whereas the minority group of jurors felt it was
unconstitutional to take a child away from his father for religious
reasons. 4 6 The juror did not indicate, or at least the reporter did not
include in the story, to which group the juror belonged.417 Moreover,
in a murder case involving the death of a Houston police officer, the
jury foreman explained after the punishment phase that the jury
deadlocked regarding the sentence because five unnamed panelists
believed that the defendant was too immature to be executed for the
crime. ' The foreman indicated that he was personally disappointedwith and ashamed of the result in the case. Nevertheless, neither he
411. See supra nn. 300-01 and accompanying text.
412. PTL's Founder Told to Pay $130 Million, Houston Chron. A3 (Dec. 15, 1990).
413. Tom Harrigan, Baytown Man Acquitted of Calif. Murder Charges, Houston
Chron. A35 (Nov. 6, 2002).
414. See supra nn. 302-05 and accompanying text.
415. See, e.g., Ron Nissimov, Arson Investigator Awarded $920,000, Houston Chron.
A25 (Aug. 18, 1999) (reporting that named panelist and several other, unnamed, jurors
believed "there was wrongdoing" by the defendants).
416. Associated Press, Man to Keep Custody of Son, Houston Chron. Cl (Feb. 19,
1989).
417. Id.




nor the reporter named the five panelists who had stood firm against
the death penalty.4 9
Likewise, the argument that holdout jurors will prefer to vote
with the majority rather than be exposed through post-verdict
interviews assumes that press-friendly panelists actually name
holdouts with some regularity, and that reporters include that
information in their stories.4 0 As I mentioned in Part II of this
Article, however, my review of post-verdict interviews in the Houston
Chronicle found few instances where this has occurred. Whereas
holdout jurors identified themselves to the press in fifty-one articles,
other jurors clearly named holdouts to the media in only five articles
during the same eighteen-year period.421 In one additional article, two
jurors identified the lone holdout as the jury foreman, but the
foreman's name was not revealed.422 Nor did jurors often refer to
holdout panelists by identifying characteristics other than their
names. In fact, the only article I found where a holdout juror was
identified by gender, race, and occupation listed "trial sources," not
other panelists, as the informant.23
It is hard to believe that a juror's bare listing of the panel's
interim vote-with no names or identifying data attached-in a post-
verdict interview would jeopardize the fair trial rights of the parties or
have an inhibiting effect on current or future panelists.424 Whenever a
jury deliberates for any length of time, surely the public already
assumes that the panelists were not in full agreement about the case.
If anything, a juror who reveals an interim vote assures the public that
the panel did indeed engage in at least some serious discussion before
reaching its ultimate verdict.
419. Id.
420. Both reportorial and editorial discretion also play a role in how often holdout
jurors are identified in the press. Although the Houston Chronicle has no official policy on
this point, in practice, the paper would be unlikely to print the names of holdout jurors
unless they identified themselves as such to the reporter. E-mail interview with Carol
Christian, courthouse reporter, Houston Chronicle (Nov. 14, 2003).
421. See supra nn. 143-45 and accompanying text. In one of these five articles, it was
impossible to determine whether the holdout juror or another panelist actually named the
holdout to the press. See Cosby Killer Receives Life Sentence, Houston Chron. All (Aug.
12, 1998).
422. John Makeig, Some Jurors Support 4th Simms Trial-At Any Cost, Houston
Chron. A25 (Sept. 28, 1995) (quoting two named panelists as describing lone hold-out as
the jury foreman).
423. Roy Bragg & Ross Ramsey, Cop Killer's Attorney Predicts a Reversal, Houston
Chron. A20 (July 15, 1993) (citing "trial sources" to characterize one of two holdout jurors
as "the panel's only black member, a retired male military officer").
424. But see Marder, supra n. 22, at 500 (stating that reporting of interim votes to the
public "may be harmful to both jurors and parties to the suit").
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In a troubling new twist on the fair trial argument, the New
Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Neulander recently upheld a gag
order prohibiting juror/media contact following a murder mistrial
until a verdict in the retrial; a decision that the U.S. Supreme Court
unfortunately elected not to review.425 In that case, the trial court had
ordered media representatives to refrain from contacting or
interviewing jurors prior to the entry of a verdict in the case.426 After
the original jury deadlocked, the trial court kept the order in effect
indefinitely, claiming that post-verdict interviews might chill jury
deliberations at retrial, and might taint the retrial jury pool. '27 On
appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that insufficient
evidence existed to prohibit post-verdict juror interviews on either of
these grounds.2 The state high court called the argument that media
interviews inhibit jury room speech "too speculative a basis on which
to justify restricting the media's right of access to consenting
jurors." '429 The court also said it doubted that post-verdict interviews
would appreciably interfere with the defendant's ability to select an
impartial jury on retrial.43°
Nevertheless, the court not only upheld the trial court's order
preventing the press from contacting jurors, but also extended the
order to prohibit members of the deadlocked jury from voluntarily
contacting the media themselves to be effective until a verdict was
reached in a second trial.43 The court justified its holding on the basis
that juror interviews might provide prosecutors with a "significant
advantage" in the defendant's retrial.432 According to the court, post-
verdict interviews were likely to focus on the jurors' observations
regarding the evidence, particularly the strengths and weaknesses of
the state's case.433 By reading juror interviews, the court said,
prosecutors might gain otherwise unavailable insights to help them
readjust their trial strategies." While admitting that it had no way to
know whether this was a probable, or even possible, result of post-
verdict interviews, the court noted that it had to be "extremely
425. 173 N.J. 193, 274-75 (N.J. 2002), cert. denied sub nom Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. New Jersey, 537 U.S. 1192 (2003).
426. Id. at 258.
427. Id. at 258-59.
428. Id. at 272.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 257.
432. Id. at 272.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 272-73.
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cautious concerning juror interviews" in death penalty cases.435 "In
our view.. .," the court concluded, "the risk that such disclosures
could provide the prosecution with an undue advantage in the retrial
proceeding is sufficiently substantial to persuade us that the safer
course is to disallow the interviews despite the attendant limitation on
the media's First Amendment rights." '436
Ironically, although the Neulander court rejected the trial court's
original rationale for the gag order as unsupported by evidence, the
court's new justification for upholding and extending the order was
every bit as speculative. The court tried to buttress its conclusion by
citing Professor Marder's research finding that "when jurors consent
to media interviews 'the largest percentage (32 percent) of comments
pertained to the evidentiary basis for the jury's decision."'437 This
enabled the court to "reasonably ... infer" that juror interviews
would lead to prosecutorial epiphanies that would put the defendant's
fair trial rights at risk. 38 The court either failed to realize or ignored
the possibility that if post-verdict media interviews could provide the
prosecution with a hitherto unknown perspective regarding its case,
these same interviews might also reveal significant new strategies for
the defense.439 Therefore, if the "new insight" theory is to be believed,
it could be argued that the order prohibiting post-verdict interviews
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by improperly
withholding juror revelations from the defense-certainly an
important consideration of fairness in a capital case.
Furthermore, the odds that post-verdict juror interviews could
provide valuable knowledge about the case to either the prosecution
or the defense seem exceptionally slim, especially considering that the
trial had been televised in its entirety by Court TV.' As pointed out
in a forceful dissent by Judge Long, scholarly commentary and press
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the case were available to
both the prosecution and the defense in daily news reports and on
Internet websites." Thus, Judge Long correctly recognized that "it is
extremely unlikely that any comments made by former jurors would
435. Id. at 272.
436. Id. at 272-73.
437. Id. at 272 (citing Marder, supra n. 22, at 479).
438. Id.
439. Although the court mentions that juror interviews could affect the retrial
strategies of both "the prosecution and defense," it places significance only on the
potential risk that such interviews could provide an "undue advantage" to the prosecution.
Id. at 272.
440. Id. at 257.
441. Id. at 277 (Long, J., dissenting).
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give even a crumb of new insight to a moderately competent
prosecutorial team.""' 2
As described in Part II below, my study of juror interviews in the
Houston Chronicle uncovered seventy-seven articles that involved
mistrials out of 696 articles where jurors talked to the press (11
percent)."3 The great majority of those articles-sixty-seven (86
percent)-concerned criminal cases; only ten articles involved civil
cases. Most commonly, juror comments sought to explain why the
jury deadlocked (57 out of 77 articles, or 74 percent), and jurors in
one-half of those articles (39 out of 77) identified evidence that
factored into their views of the case or the resulting deadlock. In
reviewing these thirty-nine articles, I found that the jurors'
evidentiary statements were generally just as likely to help the
defense as the prosecution on retrial. For example, in a murder trial
involving a woman accused of shaking her baby goddaughter to
death, one of the two holdout jurors said she voted to acquit because
the defendant's mother appeared and stood by her in court." If the
defendant is tried again, I expect that defense counsel will be sure
that the defendant's mother again shows her support in front of the
jury. However, obviously there is no guarantee that family support-
or any other factor identified by a previous panel-will be a
significant consideration for a new jury on retrial.
I discovered only one article where a post-verdict juror comment
arguably may have made a difference in the prosecution's trial tactics.
In that case, the defendant was charged with choking and raping a
woman in the cargo area of a Jeep."5 During the first trial, the victim
testified that the defendant kept one hand on her throat during the
attack, even while he reached around her to lower the Jeep's rear
seat."6 Following the trial, several jurors said they could not
understand how the defendant could lower the seat with only one
hand."7 In the retrial, however, the victim testified that the defendant
took his hand off her throat long enough to lower the seat with both
hands.' " Even in this instance, however, it cannot be assumed that the
442. Id.
443. See supra nn. 92-95 and accompanying text.
444. Bill Murphy & Claudia Feldman, When Jurors Can't Agree, Houston Chron. A29
(June 13, 2002).
445. Associated Press, Fugitive Convicted of Rape After 8 Years Skiing at Parents'
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post-verdict interview alerted the prosecution to the apparent
inconsistency in the victim's testimony. Any capable defense counsel
would have emphasized the logistical problem presented by the
victim's original version of events to the jury in open court, assuring
that the prosecution would be fully aware of the resulting weakness in
its case without having to rely on post-verdict juror interviews.
4 Do Post-Verdict Interviews Encourage Accountability?
Social scientists have defined accountability as "the implicit or
explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one's beliefs,
feelings, and actions to others.""9 In our justice system, jurors
traditionally have not been held accountable in this way to the public.
After deliberating in secret, jurors announce their decisions with no
words of explanation. ' This characteristic inscrutability has been
both lauded and criticized. In early common law tradition, the
mysterious nature of jury verdicts comported with the belief that they
were divinely inspired; therefore, to suggest that jurors be required to
justify their decisions would have bordered on sacrilege.451 Today,
some scholars insist that to function properly, jurors must remain
independent and free from public oversight;452 others have noted
widespread concerns regarding this lack of accountability.4 As
expressed by one commentator, "If mystery is all that jury verdicts
have going for them, the jury system is surely in deep trouble. 454
Jurors, of course, are not elected officials and cannot be held
accountable to society in the same way that an errant lawmaker can
be removed from office. As Professor King has noted, "jury verdicts
are not subject to voter review., 45  However, "softer" measures of
449. See Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 Psychol. Bull. 255 (1999).
450. Although deliberating jurors argue their positions with each other in the jury
room, it has been disputed whether this limited form of accountability to each other is
sufficient to ensure well-reasoned decisions that inspire public confidence. See John D.
Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 477, 482 (2002).
451. See Markovitz, supra n. 26, at 1505.
452. See King, supra n. 38, at 140-41 (arguing that jurors should be insulated from
public pressures because "[p]romoting community control or influence over jurors would
be as foreign to our jury system as holding individual voters accountable for their votes
would be to our democracy").
453. See, e.g., Jackson, supra n. 450, at 486 (noting concerns about jury accountability
expressed in both the United States and Europe); Clifford Holt Ruprecht, Comment, Are
Verdicts, Too, Like Sausages?: Lifting the Cloak of Jury Secrecy, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 217,
219 (1997) (stating that current jury practices do not "properly balance the pragmatic
tolerance of imperfection and the public's demand for accountability").
454. Adler, supra n. 14, at 206.
455. King, supra n. 38, at 141.
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achieving accountability, such as requiring jurors to provide
explanations when they convict a criminal defendant, have been
suggested as a way to improve the quality of jury verdicts and make
the justice system more transparent to the community. 6 These
suggestions are premised on the belief that jurors who know they will
have to justify their decisions to the public will engage in more
thoughtful deliberations to ensure a defensible verdict. '57
Indeed, social science research supports this claim, at least to a
point. When decisionmakers know they must justify their choice to an
audience, and the views of that audience are unknown, researchers
have found that decision-makers are more likely to engage in what is
termed "preemptive self-criticism. 4 5 8 In other words, under those
circumstances, decision-makers are more likely to think in complex,
self-critical ways and consider different perspectives as a way to
anticipate reasonable objections to their position. However,
accountability does not appear to improve the sophistication of
people's judgments if the task itself is too complex for those people to
carry out.459 As explained in one study, "If the only tool at a person's
disposal is a hammer, convincing the person to work harder can only
lead to more vigorous hammering.
46
1
Assuming that most jurors have the mental capacity to decide the
cases for which they are chosen, 4" some basis exists to believe that
post-verdict juror interviews can promote accountability in the
judicial process. Certainly many commentators have also drawn the
same conclusion. 62 Mindful that reporters might ask them for post-
trial explanations, it has been suggested that jurors will respond by
paying more careful attention than they otherwise would to the
456. See Jackson, supra n. 450, at 483, 522.
457. See id. at 486-87; Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension
and Public Policy: Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L.
788, 801 (2000) (citing study holding that accountability can "improve the quality of
information processing").
458. Lerner & Tetlock, supra n. 449, at 255.
459. See Brett W. Pelham & Efrat Neter, The Effect of Motivation of Judgment
Depends on the Difficulty of the Judgment, 68 J. Personality and Soc. Psychol. 581, 591
(1995).
460. The researchers explain that "when people's cognitive resources are heavily
taxed, their attempts to make especially accurate judgments may backfire." Id. at 590.
461. Obviously, this assumption forms the basis of our jury system.
462. See, e.g., The Great Debate, supra n. 368, at 339 (quoting Judge Kenneth Starr
stating that jurors' ability to speak about their deliberations following a verdict "promotes
a reasonable and responsible exercise of power").
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evidence and arguments. '63 As a result, some jurors may take their
jury service more seriously, which should promote more reasoned
judgments-what Professor Jackson has termed "cognitive
accountability."4" Because no juror can be forced to answer reporters'
questions, post-verdict interviews create this public accountability
without undue interference with juror independence. Requiring jury
members to draft a jury opinion or issue a statement explaining their
reasoning after a verdict would be both substantively and
administratively more difficult to implement.465
Post-verdict juror interviews may serve not only to improve the
substantive quality of jurors' decisions, but also to advance what has
been called "due process accountability," by ensuring that jurors
follow proper procedures in reaching a verdict.6 Although judges can
remove jurors who engage in misconduct,467 jury room secrecy makes
it difficult for judges to discover instances of rule breaking, and
procedural rules limit judges' abilities to make post-verdict inquiries
regarding jurors' deliberations.' Post-verdict juror interviews can
alert citizens that if they act inappropriately during jury service, such
misbehavior may well come to public attention even if it escapes
judicial notice.
463. See, e.g., Marder, supra n. 22, at 498-99 (acknowledging that post-verdict
interviews may encourage jurors to be more responsible in the jury room); Strauss, supra
n. 23, at 404 (asserting that "a juror who knows or suspects that the jury deliberations may
become public will be more conscientious, thoughtful, and challenging of others").
464. Jackson, supra n. 450, at 488 (describing cognitive accountability as the disclosure
of thought processes and reasons resulting in a decision).
465. See id. at 521 (acknowledging that getting twelve persons to agree as to the
reasons for their verdict may "prove very difficult"); Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing
Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1169, 1187 (1995) (suggesting courts
employ "jury clerks" to help jurors compose statements justifying their decisions).
466. Jackson, supra n. 450, at 488.
467. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) (allowing judge to dismiss a juror "for just
cause").
468. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides as follows:
Upon inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify
as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the deliberations or
to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or
concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a
juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).
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My Houston Chronicle study also revealed that post-verdict
interviews can expose, and thereby discourage, misconduct by trial
participants other than jurors. For example, after the trial of a
garbage collector on public lewdness charges resulted in a hung jury,
the foreman complained to reporters that the judge had been too
preoccupied reading an issue of Penthouse magazine on the bench to
pay attention to the proceeding. 69 According to the foreman, the
judge "was taking calls, reading things and talking to people, and the
attorneys had to keep repeating their objections. ' ' 7° The jurors'
remarks inspired an editorial two days later, castigating the judge for
behavior that most likely would not have been revealed to the citizens
who elected him had a juror not spoken to the press. '
B. Juror Implications of Post-Verdict Interviews: Do They Violate Privacy
or Advance Free Speech?
Some critics of post-verdict juror interviews contend that such
interviews unjustifiably intrude upon panelists' privacy rights by
exposing jurors to invasive and unwanted questioning.472 Especially in
high-profile cases, members of the press may contact jurors
repeatedly for interviews, possibly to the point of harassment.47 As a
result, potential jurors may be discouraged from jury service for fear
that their privacy, too, will be disregarded by the press.474 The flip side
of this argument posits that jurors have a First Amendment right to
speak about their experiences after a verdict is delivered,4 75 and the
469. See John Makeig, Jury Gets on Judge's Case Over Inattention, Houston Chron.
A17 (Aug. 11, 1993).
470. Id.
471. See Listen, Please: Judge Leal Should Give His Full Attention to a Trial, Houston
Chron. B14 (Aug. 13, 1993).
472. See, e.g., David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror's Right to Privacy: Constitutional
Constraints and Policy Options, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 38 (1997) (noting that reporters in
high-profile cases subject jurors' "deliberations and personal lives to intense scrutiny").
473. See, e.g., id. (stating that in high-profile cases, reporters "spare no effort in
contacting members of the jury").
474. See, e.g., King, supra n. 38, at 129-30 (asserting that privacy concerns resulting
from media coverage may discourage prospective jurors from jury service); Note, Public
Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 886, 889 (1983) [hereinafter Public
Disclosures] (stating that "failure to shield current jurors from unwanted scrutiny will
cause other citizens to shun jury duty in the future").
475. See, e.g., In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that
"[a]bsent good cause for restraint, petit jurors are free to discuss their service if they
choose to do so"); Marder, supra n. 22, at 519 (stating that post-verdict juror interviews
constitute "speech that the First Amendment is designed to protect because it is speech
that could be described as necessary for self government").
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476press has a First Amendment right to report what jurors elect to say.
While recognizing that jurors should not be exposed to post-trial
harassment, proponents of this view argue that jurors have the right
47to decide for themselves whether to talk to the press.
1. Do Post-Verdict Interviews Unreasonably Intrude on Juror Privacy?
Although the Supreme Court has never considered juror privacy
rights in connection with post-verdict interviews, it has addressed
juror privacy in the context of public access to voir dire proceedings.
In Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,478 the Court rejected the
argument that jurors have an absolute constitutional right to avoid
public disclosure of their answers on voir dire.479 Applying an access
analysis, the Court recognized that in some circumstances, juror
privacy could rise to the level of a compelling interest that could
outweigh the qualified presumption of openness attached to voir dire
proceedings.4" For example, the Court agreed that prospective jurors
could have a valid interest in not wanting to disclose "deeply personal
matters" that they have "legitimate reasons for keeping out of the
public domain.""4 ' Even in this event, however, the Court emphasized
that jurors' privacy interests must be balanced against the need for
open trial proceedings, which ensures fairness and encourages public
confidence in the jury system.4"2 The trial judge's order in Press
Enterprise violated the First Amendment, according to the Court,
because it was based on general concerns for juror privacy that were
unsupported by specific findings. 3 Furthermore, the trial judge failed
to consider less restrictive alternatives, such as sealing only a portion
of the transcript or withholding a juror's name, before resorting to full
closure of the proceeding.
476. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment protects
publication of truthful information that is lawfully obtained, absent a "need... of the
highest order." Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979). See infra nn.
585-87 and accompanying text.
477. See, e.g., Raskopf, supra n. 361, at 376-77 (concluding that the press has a limited
First Amendment right to juror names and addresses to facilitate post-verdict interviews,
despite privacy concerns).
478. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
479. Id. at 510.
480. Id. at 511.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 512.
483. Id. at 513.
484. Id.
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Under the rationale announced in Press Enterprise, if prospective
jurors have no absolute privacy right permitting judges to close or
seal panelists' answers to voir dire questioning, neither should judges
be allowed to issue blanket prohibitions on post-verdict media
interviews based on a mere recital of jurors' privacy interests.485 If
anything, privacy concerns are stronger in the voir dire context, where
jurors are generally required by law to answer most, if not all,
questions,486 than in the post-verdict interview context, where jurors
are free to respond or not as they see fit. Obviously, jurors can
protect their privacy from media intrusion after trial by refusing to
discuss certain topics or by declining to submit to interviews at all."
No juror can be forced either to speak with the press or to answer
every question posed by the media, and many judges explain this to
jurors before discharging them." My study of juror interviews
published by the Houston Chronicle confirms that many jurors know
how to say "no" to the press. Out of 761 articles where jurors were
contacted by the media following a verdict, jurors declined to
485. This assumes, of course, that restrictions on post-verdict interviews of former
jurors present a question of access governed by Press Enterprise, rather than a problem of
prior restraint to which an even more stringent strict scrutiny test would apply. At least
one commentator has argued that orders limiting the media's ability to interview jurors
should be treated as access limitations. See Aaron, supra n. 347, at 214-15. Although I
believe that after jurors have completed their service, the constitutionality of forbidding
juror interviews is no longer properly treated as an access problem, the bottom line
remains the same. Blanket or overbroad prohibitions on post-verdict interviews that do
not survive the Press Enterprise test necessarily will also fail the strict scrutiny test. See
infra nn. 682-87 and accompanying text.
486. A few courts have limited permissible voir dire questioning on the grounds that
irrelevant questions constitute an unwarranted encroachment of juror privacy. See, e.g.,
U.S. v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 143 (2d Cir. 1979) (upholding trial court's refusal to inquire
into prospective jurors' religious or ethnic backgrounds on privacy grounds); Brandborg v.
Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 360 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (overturning contempt conviction of venire
member who refused to answer eleven of 110 questions on juror questionnaire, stating that
state trial court should have considered juror privacy in its decision). However, one
commentator has noted that despite these decisions, "courts continue to permit open-
ended voir dire questions of marginal relevance." See Weinstein, supra n. 472, at 19.
487. See, e.g., In re Globe Newspaper v. Hurley, 920 F. 2d 88, 97 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting
that jurors may avoid many privacy problems "by flatly refusing press interviews when
approached").
488. See, e.g., U.S. v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1355 (3d Cir. 1994) (describing judge's
instruction that jurors were not obliged, nor could be compelled, to grant post-verdict
interviews as "consistent with the routine instructions customarily given to jurors in the
federal court system"); Globe Newspaper, supra n. 487, at 93 (noting that trial judges
customarily advise jurors that they are "free to refuse to disclose what went on in the jury
room"); Frisman, supra n. 406, at 3 (reporting that most judges in Connecticut tell jurors
they are free to grant or withhold post-verdict interviews); but see Marder, supra n. 22, at
546 (stating that most judges give jurors no guidance regarding how to deal with the
press).
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comment, at least initially, in approximately 9 percent of those
articles."9 If anything, this number is probably artificially low because
reporters may not always choose to report the fact that they received
a "no comment" from jury members following a trial.
Juror privacy interests also appear to be stronger in the voir dire
rather than the post-verdict interview context because voir dire
questioning is more likely to disclose private information about
jurors, including their personal characteristics and beliefs."9
According to Professor King, during voir dire, jurors may be forced to
reveal "intimate, embarrassing, or damning information about
themselves and their families that they would not voluntarily choose
to reveal.,491 Post-verdict questioning by the media, on the other
hand, tends to focus more on jurors' reasons for their verdict.4' As
described in Part II of this Article, I found that jurors most often
spoke to the media to clarify the case result,493 not to discuss their
personal attributes or those of fellow panelists.
My research also reflected that many jurors do not object to
answering at least some questions posed by reporters. In 91 percent of
the articles included in my study (696 out of 761), at least one panelist
spoke to the press.494 In fact, numerous jurors respond to the media
quite willingly.495 For example, when journalist Stephen J. Adler
interviewed jurors, lawyers, and judges for a book about the jury
system, he found to his surprise that most participated
enthusiastically.96 He reported that jurors invited him into their
homes, sat through numerous interviews, and gave him access to their
489. See supra nn. 58-60 and accompanying text.
490. See, e.g., Bellas v. Super. Ct. of Alameda County, 85 Cal. App. 4th 380, 391 (1st
Dist. 2000) (noting that voir dire often "compels jurors to recall their darkest moments,
which they may have struggled for years to forget, and then be required to recount them in
public"); Karen Monsen, Privacy for Prospective Jurors at What Price? Distinguishing
Privacy Rights from Privacy Interests; Rethinking Procedures to Protect Privacy in Civil
and Criminal Cases, 21 Rev. Litig. 285, 286 (2002) (stating that during the jury selection
process, prospective jurors "must submit personal information about themselves, which
sometimes includes completing lengthy questionnaires"); Weinstein, supra n. 472, at 3
(noting that the prevalent use of jury consultants has resulted in "a more extensive and
invasive voir dire").
491. King, supra n. 38, at 124.
492. At least, these are the questions that jurors tend to answer.
493. See supra nn. 74-111 and accompanying text.
494. See supra n. 58 and accompanying text.
495. See, e.g., U.S. v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978) (maintaining that
individual jurors may not "regard media interviews as harassing"); Iversen, supra n. 346, at
527 (stating that "[s]ome jurors even enjoy the media's attention").
496. Adler, supra n. 14, at vii.
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diaries and notes regarding deliberations.4 ' All but two of the jurors
he interviewed agreed to be identified in the book by their real
names.4 98 Adler attributed this display of cooperation to the jurors'
desire to "contribute to public understanding of what they had just
been through. '4 99 Not only do many panelists speak freely to the press
when asked, sometimes jurors themselves initiate contact with the
press. My study of juror interviews in the Houston Chronicle found
twelve instances where jurors telephoned reporters or wrote letters or
essays for publication to share thoughts, feelings, or concerns about
their jury service with the public."°
It has been asserted, however, that jurors really do not have
control over their dealings with the press because the media may
refuse to take "no" for an answer. ' In her content analysis of juror
interviews, Professor Marder reported that at least 25 percent of the
jurors interviewed in the fifty-two articles she reviewed "believed
they could not avoid the press."" To prove her point, Professor
Marder cited examples from high-profile cases where jurors fled their
homes, called the authorities, or otherwise complained about media
hounding."0 3 My study, however, did not yield comparable results: Out
of the 696 articles where jurors spoke with the press, I found only
seven (1 percent) where jurors objected, or even referred, to being
under intense media scrutiny."°' A possible explanation of this
discrepancy may be that Professor Marder chose articles involving
497. Id.
498. Id. at ix.
499. Id. at vii.
500. See, e.g., Steve Brewer, Having Second Thoughts, Houston Chron. Al (Mar. 11,
2000) (reporting that two jurors contacted newspaper to express regrets regarding
sentencing); John C. Stansbury, Viewpoints: Juror's Ideals Gone Now, Houston Chron.
(Outlook) 3 (Aug. 4, 1996) (juror's letter to editor regarding jury service). Also included
in this number is a review of a book written by a juror in the Pennzoil-Texaco civil case.
See George Christian, A View From the Jury Box, Houston Chron. (Zest) 20 (July 24,
1988).
501. Marder, supra n. 22, at 505 (stating that "jurors sometimes feel compelled to talk
to the press about their jury experience").
502. Id.
503. Id. at 488-89.
504. See, e.g., New Yorkers Protest Cops' Acquittals, Houston Chron. A10 (Feb. 27,
2000) (quoting juror's statement that post-verdict media pressure after Amadou Diallo
trial was "hell"); Whether Helmsley Gets Prison Uncertain, Houston Chron. A7 (Aug. 31,
1989) (noting that juror who went on ABC's Nightline called media hoopla surrounding
the trial "sickening"). This number also includes an article where a woman with the same
name as a juror in a high-profile criminal case pretended to be a juror and spoke to the
press. See Associated Press, Woman Now Says She Was Never a Whitewater Juror,
Houston Chron. A6 (June 3, 1996). When her deception was discovered, she explained
that she gave the interview because she was tired of being called by reporters. Id.
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only high-profile cases for her content-analysis,"'5 whereas I included
articles concerning both high- and low-profile cases in my research.5"
The media's tendency to engage in relentless pursuit of jurors is
undoubtedly more common in high-profile cases where the
newsworthiness of juror comments is at a premium."'
Regardless of the degree of media interest in a case, judges
clearly have the power to protect jurors from media harassment such
as that detailed by Professor Marder.5° Post-verdict interviews cannot
be prohibited in advance, however, simply because a possibility exists
that a media representative might engage in inappropriate or
unethical behavior. Under Press Enterprise, bans on post-verdict
interviews to protect former jurors from potential media harassment
are clearly overbroad unless a clear danger of such harassment can be
shown.5 ° In other words, protecting jurors from media harassment
only serves as an overriding interest sufficient to limit post-verdict
interviews if instances of harassment have occurred or are
threatened.51° So, for example, in United States v. Antar,11 the Third
505. While it is not completely clear that Professor Marder limited her study to high-
profile cases, she indicated that she searched major newspapers and magazines and
retrieved cases that received national attention. See Marder, supra n. 22, at 470-73, 476 and
n. 30 (noting that her research yielded "numerous high-profile cases" and was intended to
"provide a sampling of national coverage of post-verdict interviews.")
506. According to my study, jurors were significantly more likely to refuse press
comment in low-profile cases. Out of the sixty-five articles where jurors refused to
comment, only fifteen (23 percent) involved cases that I characterized as high profile.
507. Six of the seven articles I found where jurors referred to "press hounding"
involved cases that I considered to be clearly high profile. See, e.g., Julia Campbell,
Hispanic Simpson Juror Says Race Not Issue, Houston Chron. A3 (Nov. 10, 1995) (noting
that juror in O.J. Simpson case spoke to the media after spending "six days dodging
reporters").
508. See, e.g., Journal Publ'g Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986)
(asserting that trial courts have the power to shield jurors from post-trial harassment); U.S.
v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1041 (1984)
(upholding court order forbidding media to make "repeated" requests for post-verdict
juror interviews as necessary to prevent juror harassment); In re Express News Corp., 695
F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that jurors are entitled to protection against
harassment even after their jury service is complete).
509. See, e.g., U.S. v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1363 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a limitation
on post-verdict juror interviews must be based on particularized findings of "a probability
of harassment," and not just the judge's "personal assessment of generalized, societal
concerns"); U.S. v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1978) (striking trial court
order that forbid post-verdict access to jurors based on privacy concerns as "clearly
erroneous" because no "clear and present danger of such intrusion" had been
established); but see Harrelson, 713 F.2d at 1117 (upholding limitations on post-verdict
interviews without requiring specific findings as to harassment, on the ground that the
persistency and tenaciousness of reporters is "common knowledge").
510. Press Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510.
511. 38 F. 3d 1348 (3d Cir. 1994).
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Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a trial court order limiting the
media's ability to conduct post-verdict interviews ostensibly to
prevent juror harassment because the court made no findings that
media harassment had taken place or was intended.12 According to
the court, "restrictions on post-trial interviews must reflect an
impending threat of jury harassment rather than a generalized
misgiving about the wisdom of such interviews." '513 Similarly, in In re
Express-News Corp.,514 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
district court order forbidding any person from interviewing
discharged jurors regarding their deliberations or verdict was
unconstitutionally overbroad because the order prohibited "both
courteous as well as uncivil communications. '515
Another related argument posed by critics claims that each
individual juror's power to assent or decline to be interviewed by the
press does not adequately protect juror privacy rights because jurors
who refuse to talk to the press may find their private thoughts or
opinions revealed by more loquacious panelists. 16 This argument
recalls the allegation that jurors will be afraid to deliberate freely in
the jury room for fear another panel member will disclose
confidential matters to the media,517 and suffers from the same
inherent weakness: lack of proof. Before the privacy rights of timid
jurors can be considered a compelling state interest sufficient to
overcome the First Amendment rights of both the media and other
panelists,"' it must be demonstrated that post-verdict interviews
constitute a real threat to juror privacy. For this to be plausible, jurors
must at least tend to reveal private, personal, or embarrassing
comments or facts about, or opinions held by, other panelists in post-
verdict interviews. As shown in Part II of this Article, my study does
not support this conclusion. I found only five articles out of 696 where
it might be said that jurors disclosed private or embarrassing
information about other panelists, and in only two of those articles
512. Id. at 1364.
513. Id.
514. 695 F.2d 807.
515. Id. at 810.
516. See, e.g., U.S. v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133, 1142 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (stating in
reference to post-verdict interviews that one juror "can engage in post-trial violation of
the privacy of another"); Bagley, supra n. 25, at 501 (opining that post-verdict media
interviews send a "message to potential jurors that even if they do not want to express
their opinion to the general public, another member of the panel may do so for them.")
517. See supra nn. 390-97 and accompanying text.
518. See infra nn. 556-84, 651-83 and accompanying text.
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were the panelists identified by name." 9 Furthermore, in only thirteen
out of 696 articles did jurors divulge the remarks, opinions or votes of
other named panelists. 2 ' According to the rationale announced in
Press Enterprise, post-verdict juror interviews cannot be curtailed on
the mere speculation that they may pose a general threat to other
panelists' privacy. 2'
Nonetheless, some courts and commentators have gone so far as
to advocate that to protect jurors' privacy, their names and addresses
should be withheld from the press and public after a verdict has been
entered, even in cases that do not present a continuing threat to juror
safety.22 Obviously, this would reduce the media's ability to locate
panelists to conduct post-verdict interviews. The Fifth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Brown presents an alarming example of
this approach in action. 23 An anonymous but nonsequestered jury
had been empanelled in the case, which involved federal racketeering
and bribery charges against Louisiana Insurance Commissioner
James Harvey "Jim" Brown and co-defendant Edwin Edwards, the
former four-term state governor.524 The anonymous jury was proper,
the trial court said, because of allegations that the defendants had
engaged in witness tampering and had attempted to bribe a judge.
Furthermore, the court said that because of the extensive publicity
surrounding the case, it was foreseeable that jurors could be subject
to harassment by the media or the public during the trial if panelists'
identities were known.'
Just before the jury returned its verdict convicting Brown on
seven counts and acquitting Edwards of all charges, the trial judge
519. See supra nn. 318-26 and accompanying text.
520. See supra nn. 309-17 and accompanying text.
521. As noted in Part II above, it is possible that some of the interviewed jurors may
have been instructed or ordered not to reveal personal or private information about other
panelists. I believe it is unlikely that many interviewed jurors were subject to gag orders of
this sort because none of the articles I reviewed made mention of such a specific order. See
supra n. 309. Of course, judicial suggestions that jurors refrain from revealing private
information about other panelists would not pose First Amendment problems and are
within the discretion of the judge.
522. See, e.g., King, supra n. 38, at 129 (recommending that judges empanel
anonymous juries in all criminal cases, in part to protect jurors from the media);
Weinstein, supra n. 472, at 31-32 (asserting that "powerful concerns," including juror
privacy considerations, support limiting press access to juror names).
523. 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2001).
524. Id. at 910.




asked the jurors if they wanted their names made public . 27 All jurors
indicated they did not, and the trial judge then extended the panelists'
anonymity indefinitely, denying media access to juror names,
addresses, places of employment or questionnaires even after the trial
was over. 28 The judge noted that if any juror later desired to waive his
or her anonymity, the judge would release the name."'
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the order, stating that it
served to protect juror privacy and to protect jurors from media
harassment.3 The court rejected the media's First Amendment
argument that no compelling reason justified continuing juror
anonymity after the verdict was issued, stating that "[e]nsuring that
jurors are entitled to privacy and protection against harassment, even
after their jury duty has ended, qualifies as a such an interest in this
circuit." 3 ' It did not matter to the appellate court that the trial judge
had neither identified any specific media threat to juror privacy nor
had made any findings justifying the order; according to the Fifth
Circuit, "[s]pecific findings are not required... where the reasons for
the court's decision are obvious and compelling.
5 32
The empanelment of an anonymous jury may or may not have
been justified in Brown to protect jurors from prejudicial outside
influences during trial.533 However, the court should have recognized
that those fair trial interests diminished to the point of insignificance
once the verdict was announced.34 The court's order clearly did not
satisfy the Press-Enterprise test:535 it was not based on a showing of
527. Id. at 910, 912.
528. Id. at 912.
529. Id.
530. Id. at 918-19.
531. Id. at 918.
532. Id. at 919.
533. A discussion of the propriety of anonymous juries, in Brown or in any case, is
beyond the scope of this Article. See, generally, Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I.
Edelstein, Anonymous Juries: In Exigent Circumstances Only, 13 St. John's J. L. Comm.
457 (1999); King, supra n. 38; Robert M. Anselmo, Recent Development: The Decision in
United States v. Brown: The Fifth Circuit Interprets "Justice is Blind" Literally, 33 St.
Mary's L.J. 469 (2002).
534. See, e.g., U.S. v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that after a
verdict is announced, post-verdict interviews cannot interfere with a defendant's right to a
fair trial).
535. See supra nn. 478-89 and accompanying text. When a court refuses to release
juror identities following a trial, the issue presented may be correctly characterized as one
of access to which the Press Enterprise test would properly apply. See, e.g., In re Globe
Newsp. Co., 920 F.2d 88, 97 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that the public has a First Amendment
right of access to juror identities that could not be overcome based on "mere personal
preferences or views of the judge or jurors").
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past or probable inappropriate behavior by any media
representative,536 nor was it narrowly tailored to restrain objectionable
harassment without unjustifiably impeding the press's First
Amendment right to gather news. The court should have recognized
that the jurors' initial preferences not to be contacted by the media537
were outweighed by the public's interest in being informed, through
voluntary post-verdict interviews, about the operation of the criminal
justice system. Given that Brown involved federal prosecutions of
current and former state officials, this public interest deserved more
than the token acknowledgement provided by the court.538
A California appellate court reached a better result in a 1998
criminal case that also involved allegations of abuse of public office
by a state official. In that case, Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc. v.
Superior Court,539 the court invalidated a trial judge's order
prohibiting all press communication with former jurors despite their
indicated preference not to be contacted by the media.4' On appeal,
the California attorney general argued that members of the public
would be unwilling to serve on juries if their privacy was not
assured.541 The court disagreed, holding that the government had not
shown a compelling need to protect jurors' privacy sufficient to
encroach on the constitutional rights of both the jurors to speak and
the media to gather news.542 Here, the court correctly characterized
the order as "impermissibly overbroad," noting that "it was not based
on any showing of unreasonable behavior by anyone, and it was not
536. The trial court in Brown cited instances where members of the press had followed
and identified anonymous jurors in a prior, related trial as justification for ordering the
press in Brown "not to attempt to circumvent this Court's ruling preserving the jury's
anonymity." 250 F.3d at 911. Although the Fifth Circuit overturned this "non-
circumvention order" as a prior restraint to the extent it disallowed independent reporting
about the jury based on non-confidential sources, id. at 915, the appellate court seemed to
rely on these same examples of media misconduct to justify continued juror anonymity
after trial. Id. at 922. However, the fact that certain media representatives had engaged in
aggressive reporting in a previous case should not be sufficient evidence under Press
Enterprise to create a presumption that the media would harass jurors following a verdict
in a different prosecution.
537. At least one juror changed his or her mind about talking to the press after the
trial was over. Brown, 250 F.3d at 920.
538. The court disingenuously claimed that continued juror anonymity had not
harmed the public's perception of the trial's fairness because (1) the trial had been
covered by the media and (2) the jury had returned split verdicts, which showed the public
that the jurors had not been co-opted by either party. Id. at 922.
539. 61 Cal. App. 4th 862 (1998).
540. Id. at 864.
541. Id. at 867.
542. Id. at 868.
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carefully crafted to restrain conduct while preserving the
constitutional rights of those interested in the trial.1
5 43
2. Do Jurors Have a First Amendment Right to Speak to the Press?
Upon leaving the secrecy of the jury room, jurors return to the
world of private citizens and resume their normal activities. They
engage in conversations with family, friends, and colleagues about
their lives and feelings, including, should they so desire, their jury
service. In fact, some jurors may feel an intense need to share their
jury experiences with others, especially those panelists who reacted
emotionally to the case, the participants, or their responsibilities as
jurors.5" This "freedom to speak one's mind" has always been a
cherished aspect of American liberty,545 as reflected in the established
First Amendment value of individual self-actualization. 46  To
paraphrase Professor Baker, when a former juror tells the press that
"this was the hardest thing I have ever done," she is defining herself
publicly as a certain type of juror, at least in part for reasons of self-
realization or self-fulfillment. 7
543. Id.
544. See, e.g., Strauss, supra n. 23, at 408 (asserting that juror speech can serve as a
catharsis).
Journalist Stephen J. Adler, in his book about the jury system, described his post-
verdict interviews with jurors in a Texas murder case as follows:
The verdict ended the jurors' active role in the trial, but it didn't stop affecting
their lives. Talking to them after the trial was like having a conversation with
someone who was just back from Nepal or who'd just had sex for the first time.
They betrayed the same sense of wonder at having been to a new place and
having seen life differently. There was enormous excitement, an eagerness to talk
about the experience at the slightest provocation, and a great deal of worry about
the consequences of their actions.
Adler, supra n. 14, at 36.
545. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539. 559 (1985)
(stating that the "essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper
restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to
speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet" (quoting Estate of Hemingway v.
Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (Ct. App. 1968)); Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984) (explaining that "the freedom to speak one's mind is
not only an aspect of individual liberty-and thus a good unto itself-but also is essential
to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole").
546. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
3-7 (1966) (contending that individual self-fulfillment is a primary value served by freedom
of expression).
547. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. Rev. 964, 990-96 (1978) (explaining that a war protestor's speech is not just an act of
self-expression, but also of self-definition).
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In describing the difficulty of judging, our ex-juror is also
contributing to public debate about the jury system in general. When
former jurors share their experiences with the press, they provide
other members of the community with information about how the
court system operates. Juror speech, therefore, promotes democracy
and informed self-government by enlightening citizens about the
judicial branch .1 8 Ensuring "free discussion of governmental affairs"
is a particularly strong First Amendment interest,5 49 and the judicial
system has been described by the U.S. Supreme Court as a matter of
"utmost public concern." ' According to Justice Blackmun, the public
has "an intense need and a deserved right to know about the
administration of justice in general; about the prosecution of local
crime in particular; about the conduct of the judge, the prosecutor,
defense counsel ... and all the actors in the judicial arena; and about
the trial itself.,
551
Although the First Amendment has never been interpreted to
forbid all limitations on expression, speech about court operations
clearly falls into a protected category. 52 Any law or judicial order that
prohibits jurors from speaking about their jury experiences would be
a content-based restriction that pertains to a core governmental
function-the judicial system-to which the strict scrutiny standard
would apply. 53 Under strict scrutiny, jurors' speech cannot be
restricted without proof that the regulation was necessary to serve a
548. See Marder, supra n. 22, at 520 (stating that juror speech "could be described as
necessary for self-government"); Strauss, supra n. 23, at 407 (concluding that juror speech
"serves an essential function in a democracy by revealing flaws, inconsistencies, or
unfairness in the juridical process").
549. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (stating that "[wihatever difference
may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs"); see also Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576
(1980) (concluding that the "core purpose" of the First Amendment is to "assur[e]
freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government").
550. Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978); see also Gentile
v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1035 (1991) (noting that "the judicial system, and in
particular our criminal justice courts, play a vital part in a democratic state and the public
has a legitimate interest in their operations"); Richmond, 448 U.S. at 555 (stating that "it
would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and
importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are conducted").
551. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
552. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1034-35 (1991) (describing speech critical of the judicial
system as being "at the very center of the First Amendment").
553. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims, 502 U.S.
105, 116, 123 (1991) (overturning state law that required profits from books written by
criminals be made available to crime victims as an impermissible content-based restriction
on speech).
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compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.114 Content-based speech limitations pursuant to which the
state attempts to regulate or prohibit an entire category of expression
are rarely justifiable under this test. Writing for the majority in Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, Justice Marshall explained that
"above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content." '555
Nevertheless, some scholars have argued that that restrictions on
post-verdict interviews are necessary to protect the fair trial rights of
criminal defendants and jurors' privacy rights, and that these concerns
are sufficient to overcome jurors' First Amendment right to speak.56
For example, Professor Goldstein used the fair trial/privacy rationale
to advocate the passage of federal or state statutes making it a crime
for jurors to discuss their deliberations and for anyone to ask jurors
about their deliberations without court permission.57 According to
Professor Goldstein, such statutes "would serve the most compelling
of state interests.
558
Although both fair trial and privacy rights may indeed constitute
compelling state interests, interference with those interests cannot be
established by speculation or surmise. 59 So, for example, in
Landmark Communications v. Virginia," the Supreme Court held
that the news media could not be punished for publishing truthful
information about confidential proceedings of a judicial review
commission. 56' Although the Court assumed that the state interest
offered to support the statute-the orderly administration of justice-
was legitimate, the Court objected that the state had offered no proof
that confidentiality was needed to achieve that interest.5 62 According
554. Id. at 116.
555. 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
556. See, Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 309 (supporting the adoption of federal or state
statutes forbidding jurors from disclosing their deliberations); Marder, supra n. 22, at 522
(asserting that "the First Amendment may be most fully realized when individual juror
speech is curtailed" because jurors may debate more freely in the jury room if they are
forbidden from speaking to the press following the verdict).
557. Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 307, 310.
558. Id. at 310.
559. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 (2001) (stating that to pass the
strict scrutiny test, the justification for burdening otherwise protected expression "must be
'far stronger than mere speculation about serious harms') (citing U.S. v. National
Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995)).
560. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
561. Id. at 837-38.
562. Id. at 841.
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to the Court, the statute could not withstand First Amendment
scrutiny because the state had "offered little more than assertion and
conjecture to support its claim that without criminal sanctions the
objectives of the statutory scheme would be seriously undermined." '563
Similarly, insufficient evidence exists to show that post-verdict
juror interviews distort the deliberative process. As shown in Part
III(A) above, critics cite no proof beyond their own assumptions, nor
did my Houston Chronicle study indicate, that post-verdict interviews
cause jurors to make decisions in accordance with community
sentiments, to seek fame or profit instead of justice, or to deliberate
less freely in the jury room." In fact, if anything, at least some
evidence exists to support the claim that post-verdict interviews may
improve juror accountability, which actually would work to
strengthen fair trial rights .
Assuming for argument's sake that jurors' speech about their
deliberations might chill debate in a future jury room, any restriction
on post-verdict interviews would also have to be narrowly tailored so
as to prohibit just the chilling speech. For example, if it is feared that
jurors will deliberate less freely knowing that a panelist might reveal
jurors' personal opinions to the press, then any restriction on post-
verdict interviews should encompass no more than juror statements
that reveal personal opinions of other panelists who are somehow
identified, whether by name, gender, occupation or other
combination of characteristics. Judicial orders that forbid jurors from
discussing their deliberations at all, such as that upheld by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Cleveland,5" would not
qualify as narrowly tailored because they restrict both the arguably
dangerous speech as well as innocuous expression that serves to
educate the public about the jury system. In my study of post-verdict
interviews, jurors often talked to reporters about the mechanics or
tone of their deliberations, or focused on evidence they found
particularly important in the jury room.5 67 These kinds of explanatory
statements could hardly be considered intimidating to future jurors.
563. Id.
564. See supra nn. 347-66, 367-88, 389-430 and accompanying text.
565. See supra nn. 455-68 and accompanying text.
566. 128 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom In Re Capital City Press, 523
U.S. 1075 (1998). The judicial order upheld in Cleveland actually prohibited the press
from asking jurors about their deliberations, and did not limit jurors regarding what they
could say. This related question of whether members of the press have First Amendment
rights to question jurors is discussed in Part C below. See infra nn. 651-83 and
accompanying text.
567. See supra nn. 112-21 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, all questions about jury deliberations would have been
off-limits under the judge's order in Cleveland.
By the same token, restrictions on post-verdict interviews cannot
be justified on privacy grounds unless such interviews are shown to
present a real danger to juror privacy. As discussed above, my study
of post-verdict interviews shows that jurors very rarely disclose
personal or private matters regarding other panelists to the press."6
Assuming that in a particular context a court could show that juror
interviews did threaten panelists' privacy, a narrowly tailored order
prohibiting jurors from disclosing those particular personal,
embarrassing, or inappropriate matters might be justifiable. Certainly
a judge has the ability to suggest that jurors not discuss private
matters with the press. However, the First Amendment does not
allow a judge to limit a juror's right to speak about jury service just to
enforce the judge's notion of good manners.
To avoid the application of strict scrutiny to juror speech, some
commentators have argued that jurors should be considered
government employees or court officials, whose speech could be
limited under a lesser standard as disruptive to the workplace or
prejudicial to future defendants.569 In an example of this approach, the
Supreme Court in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada5 7" endorsed what
appeared to be a less demanding standard with respect to regulations
limiting the ability of attorneys to make extrajudicial statements
about pending cases. 571 The state rule at issue prohibited attorney
statements that had a "substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing" a court proceeding, rather than just those resulting in
"actual prejudice or a substantial and imminent threat to fair trial. 57 1
According to the Court, the rule's lower level of speech protection
satisfied the First Amendment with respect to such extrajudicial
remarks made by participating attorneys given their special status as
officers of the court.573 The Court also noted that the restriction was
568. See supra nn. 318-26 and accompanying text.
569. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 309 (suggesting that jurors be regarded as
"court officials," who can subject to special limitations on speech about their
deliberations); Marder, supra n. 22, at 520-21 (arguing that jurors are analogous to
government employees and judges, both of whose speech can be limited in certain
circumstances).
570. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
571. For a well-reasoned argument that the "substantial likelihood of material
prejudice" standard is really just the strict scrutiny standard applied to a trial setting, see
Strauss, supra n. 23, at 415.
572. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1062-63.
573. Id. at 1074-75.
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narrowly tailored because it applied equally to all participant
attorneys, and merely postponed their ability to speak out until after
trial;57 however, the Court ultimately held that the rule was
unconstitutionally vague as applied.575
The analogy critics draw between former jurors and court
personnel, however, does not ring true. One cannot make a living as a
juror, and most jurors serve in only one case. Once jurors have
completed their service, they can no longer logically be considered
court officials or government employees. Otherwise, jurors could
never regain their private status. This raises one obvious problem
with the suggestion that jurors be considered court officials whose
speech about deliberations could be limited by statute.76 The statute
would only apply after jurors' service had ended, and therefore could
arguably remain in effect for an unlimited period of time. This would
burden much more speech than the regulation at issue in Gentile,
which restricted attorney speech only during trial. It is hard to
imagine that such an open-ended speech restriction would be upheld
under any standard of First Amendment review. In any event, it
appears that even with respect to court officials, strict scrutiny is the
appropriate standard to evaluate content-based restrictions on
political speech. In the recent case of Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White,577 the Supreme Court used a strict scrutiny analysis to
invalidate a state rule that prohibited judicial candidates, including
incumbent judges, from stating their views on legal and political
questions.7 Surely former jurors are no more court personnel than
judicial candidates or incumbent judges, and are no less deserving of
full First Amendment protection against content-based restrictions on
speech that concerns a core governmental function.
In my study of post-verdict juror interviews, I found several
instances where jurors spoke to the press despite court-imposed gag
orders. For example, in a civil suit involving American Airlines, the
judge prohibited jurors from discussing the case with anyone except
their immediate families for forty-five days.579 Nevertheless, two jurors
talked to reporters on the day of the verdict on condition of
574. Id. at 1076.
575. Id. at 1048.
576. See Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 308 (urging passage of federal or state statutes
prohibiting jurors from disclosing their deliberations).
577. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
578. Id. at 768, 774.
579. Jane Baird, Jurors Decide for American in Airline Case, Houston Chron. Al
(Aug. 11, 1993).
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anonymity."8 Although the judge lifted the gag order one week later,
after the media challenged its constitutionality, 8' the press did not
wait until the order was dissolved before publishing the jurors'
comments. Even when jurors' First Amendment rights to speak are
not immediately recognized, does the press nevertheless have a First
Amendment right to publish what jurors say? Clearly, any attempt by
a judge to prevent the media from disseminating the jurors'
comments would constitute a prior restraint, which are almost never
upheld against the media barring extraordinary circumstances.5 The
Supreme Court has long recognized that members of the press have a
First Amendment right to publish information that they lawfully
obtain. 83 The media, therefore, have a constitutional right to publish
what jurors tell them, even if the jurors themselves have been
gagged." The related question of whether the press has a First
Amendment right to question jurors about their verdicts will be
considered in Part III.C.2 below.
C. Systemic Implications of Post-Verdict Interviews: Do They Undermine
or Strengthen Public Confidence in the Jury System?
A third reason advanced by critics to limit or eliminate post-
verdict juror interviews is the fear that they seriously threaten the
integrity and essential nature of the jury system."' This argument
contends not only that juries must deliberate in secret, but that those
deliberations must also remain free from public scrutiny to preserve
580. Id.
581. Jane Baird, Juror Says She Thought American Airlines Wrong, Houston Chron.
(Bus.) 1 (Aug. 19, 1993).
582. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (stating that "the
barriers to prior restraint remain high and the presumption against its use continues
intact"); New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding that the
government had not met "heavy burden" required to justify prior restraint against the
media on national security grounds).
583. See, e.g., Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535 (holding that press could not be punished for
broadcasting a tape legally in its possession, even though it had reason to believe the tape
had been illegally intercepted by a third party); Smith v. Daily Mail Pubg. Co., 443 U.S.
97, 103 (1979) (holding that the First Amendment protects publication of truthful
information that is lawfully obtained, absent a "need of the highest order"); Landmark
Commun., 435 U.S. at 833 (overturning conviction of newspaper publisher for printing an
accurate report of a confidential judicial disciplinary proceeding).
584. See also Marder, supra n. 22, at 520 (acknowledging that the press "can claim a
right under the First Amendment to publish what it hears when jurors choose to speak").
585. See, e.g., id. at 471 (asserting that post-verdict interviews "threaten to undermine
the jury's role both as symbol for community judgment and in its ritual function of
shouldering the community's most burdensome decisions").
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public acceptance of jury verdicts. 86 Post-verdict interviews may
endanger public confidence in the jury system by revealing
imperfections that could negatively skew the public's view of juries,5s
or by supplying more reasons for the public to disagree with their
decisions." Others argue that post-verdict interviews work to
increase public confidence in, and understanding of, jury verdicts by
providing insight into how juries work .5 " According to this point of
view, by publishing juror interviews, the press educates the public
about the justice system and acts as a watchdog to identify areas
where reform is needed.5"
1. Do Post-Verdict Juror Interviews Erode Public Trust in the Judicial
Process?
Some scholars believe that public trust in the jury system
depends on blind faith; therefore, jury verdicts must remain as
inscrutable as the secret deliberations that precede them.9 According
to this argument, post-verdict interviews damage community
confidence in the jury system because interviews open up the
otherwise impenetrable deliberative process to general observation,
and thus to possible criticism and/or doubt.5" Members of the public
are less likely to oppose a verdict, under this view, if they see only the
586. See, e.g., Nunn, supra n. 20, at 437 (arguing that post-verdict juror interviews may
"ultimately reduce respect for jury verdicts and contribute to the decline of the dignity of
the criminal justice system").
587. See, e.g., Marder, supra n. 22, at 496 (stating that post-verdict interviews can
reduce public confidence in jury verdicts by revealing jurors' "bias, ignorance or
irresponsibility").
588. See, e.g., Public Disclosures, supra n. 474, at 891 (arguing that public acceptance
of verdicts may be undermined when jurors reveal "decisional premises with which various
members of the public are bound to disagree").
589. See, e.g., Iversen, supra n. 346, at 523 (1997) (concluding that post-verdict
interviews increase public confidence in jury verdicts by "allowing the public, vis-A-vis the
press, to access jurors").
590. See, e.g., Strauss, supra n. 23, at 407 (noting that post-verdict juror speech assists
in creating public understanding of, and devising improvements to, the justice system).
591. See, e.g., Markovitz, supra n. 26, at 508 (listing as a justification for jury secrecy
the idea that the public's trust in jury verdicts must be unquestioning); Public Disclosures,
supra n. 474, at 892 (asserting that faith in the justice system must be "blind, but
purposefully and not irrationally so").
592. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 297 (stating that "if the media continue to
reveal the contents of jury deliberations, there is a genuine risk that the authority of jury
verdicts will decline"); Nunn, supra n. 20, at 437 (claiming that post-verdict interviews may
encourage "second guessing" of jury findings, which "may ultimately reduce respect for
jury verdicts"); Gaza, supra n. 40, at 338 (asserting that by exposing jury deliberations to
public view, post-verdict media interviews "chip[ ] away at the respect that jury verdicts
should be afforded").
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end product of the jury's labors, without any whys or wherefores. 93
By shining a light on the jury's inner processes, it is feared that post-
verdict interviews may give the public more to disagree with, thereby
"unravel[ing] the distinctive nonrational and intuitive 'genius' of this
lay tribunal.
5 94
The most striking characteristic of this argument has to be its
pessimism-a pessimism not only about the quality of jury
deliberations themselves, but also with respect to the justice system's
ability to address or correct its imperfections, and the public's ability
to exercise practical reason. This position assumes that post-verdict
interviews will expose something that is better kept under wraps; that
jurors will tell the media about some shameful, irresponsible, or at
least inexplicable conduct in the jury room that must be kept from
public view. 95 In effect, this line of reasoning implies that, at least in
high-profile cases, jury deliberations are so defective that were the
public to know more about them, the very survival of the jury system
would be imperiled.596 After all, if most jurors conduct themselves in a
rational manner, post-verdict interviews should more properly be
seen as a method to strengthen, rather than to threaten, community
faith in, and respect for, jury verdicts.
In a related vein, critics theorize that post-verdict interviews may
make jury verdicts more difficult for the public to accept, or may even
jeopardize the finality of verdicts, because jurors could divulge second
thoughts or regrets about their decisions.97 To avoid this predicted
loss in public confidence, Professor Marder has suggested that if
jurors are allowed to discuss their trial experiences, they "may have a
duty to appear more certain than they feel so that the parties and the
public will accept the decision." '598 This argument presupposes that
jurors regularly experience qualms about their verdicts, which they
then communicate to the press. My study, however, confirms
593. See, e.g., Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The
Value of Complexity, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1187, 1195 (1979) (noting that a jury verdict can be
"difficult to disagree with because the secrecy of the jurors' deliberations and the general
nature of the verdict make it hard to know precisely on what it was based").
594. Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 314.
595. See Marder, supra n. 22, at 496 (stating that "the real danger of jurors revealing
their bias, ignorance or irresponsibility to the press is the potential of shaking public
confidence in the verdict").
596. See Goldstein, supra n. 19, at 314 (arguing that press interviewing of jurors in
"high visibility cases" will ultimately destroy the jury system by exposing to public view
the inner workings of the jury).
597. See, e.g., Marder, supra n. 22, at 495 (theorizing that if jurors express misgivings to
the press, public confidence in the verdict will be impaired).
598. Id. at 498.
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Professor Marder's finding that jurors who talk to the media rarely
expressed doubts or concerns regarding the outcome of the
deliberative process."9 In my review of eighteen years worth of post-
verdict interviews, jurors talked to the press mainly to explain their
verdicts, not to attack the jury system or cast doubt on their
decisions.' In only twenty-nine articles out of 696 where jurors spoke
to the press (4 percent) did jurors indicate that their verdicts may
have been in error."° In a substantial percentage of these twenty-nine
articles (34 percent), jurors communicated their concerns to the press
after a significant passage of time, reducing the threat that juror
interviews constitute an immediate threat to either public acceptance,
or the finality, of verdicts."2 In fact, jurors were much more likely to
confirm or defend their decisions in post-verdict interviews than to
criticize them.63 My study revealed that in one hundred articles out of
696 (14 percent), jurors who spoke with the press expressed support
for their verdicts.' Jurors who commented to the press regarding the
jury system appeared to be more satisfied with the results of that
system than post-verdict interview critics have predicted.
Admittedly, sometimes jurors use post-verdict interviews to
reveal improprieties in the jury room or to express uncertainty about
their verdicts. However, attributing any loss of public confidence in
the judicial process on the interviews themselves is a quintessential
example of blaming the messenger. Outlawing post-verdict juror
interviews because they may expose flaws in either the jury system as
a whole or the procedures followed in a specific case makes about as
much sense as a doctor refusing to take an X-ray of a patient's leg for
fear it may reveal a broken bone. A prohibition on juror interviews
will indeed stifle juror criticisms of a verdict or the justice system in
the short term, but at a terrible long-term cost. Any resulting public
confidence in that verdict will be a hollow shell, based on ignorance,
while the systemic failures that post-verdict interviews could have
599. Although she used a different methodology, Professor Marder in her study of
post-verdict interviews also found that only 4 percent of total juror comments expressed
ambivalence or doubt about the verdict. Id. at 485.
600. See supra nn. 74-111 and accompanying text.
601. See supra nn. 205-06 and accompanying text.
602. See id.
603. This finding casts doubt on the notion that dissatisfied jurors are most likely to
engage in post-verdict interviews. But see Symposium, The Appearance of Justice: Juries,
Judges and the Media Transcript, supra n. 348, at 346 (discounting value of post-verdict
interviews because "research has shown" that jurors who have a grudge or grievance
against the jury system are most likely to talk to the press).
604. See supra nn. 282-99 and accompanying text.
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revealed remain unchecked and liable to be repeated. 5 Good faith
reports by jurors regarding specific or system-wide problems should
be welcomed not only as information of interest to the public, but
also as a necessary first step in any attempt to reform the judicial
process.6 Although change usually takes time, my study revealed at
least one instance where jurors' post-verdict comments to the press
resulted in quick action. Within a month after jurors complained to
reporters that the jury form was so confusing that they had
accidentally awarded a probated sentence rather than a prison term
to a convicted killer, several county judges revised their jury forms to
clarify sentencing choices. 7
To allow for redress in specific instances of jury misconduct while
still preserving at least superficial public confidence in the jury
system, it has been suggested that jurors should communicate any
complaints or doubts regarding their verdicts not to the press, but
rather to judges or attorneys who can determine whether the case
result should be re-examined.' Although jurors do bring these
concerns to attorneys and judges from time to time,' it is unrealistic
to believe that jurors would always be willing to discuss such matters
with authority figures who are clearly part of the existing system and
who would expect full disclosures. A panelist who may be reluctant
either to come clean or to "snitch" on a fellow juror to the judge may
be willing to give the press a more general statement about
questionable jury room behavior. My study revealed at least four sets
of circumstances where jurors told the press about mistakes or
misconduct where I believe they would have been less likely to make
the same revelations to the court: first, where the behavior in
question expressly violated the judge's instructions;610 second, where
605. See, e.g., Adler, supra n. 14, at 206 (stating that "if mystery is all that jury verdicts
have going for them, the jury system is in deep trouble").
606. See, e.g., Strauss, supra n. 23, at 407 (indicating that juror speech "plays an
essential role in any attempt to better the justice system"); but see Goldstein, supra n. 19,
at 313 (describing the claim that jury interviews help identify needed reforms as the
"grossest of speculations").
607. Jury Forms Revised After Confusion Over Supremacist's Sentence, Houston
Chron. 4 (State) (Apr. 25, 1993).
608. Marder, supra n. 22, at 495.
609. See, e.g., Bob Sablatura, Woman Awarded $43,579, Houston Chron. A22 (May 20,
1988) (noting that judge let jurors recast their ballots in civil case after jurors told the
judge that they had misinterpreted the law).
610. See, e.g., Second Trial of Ex-Mayor to be Moved, Houston Chron. A39 (Sept. 7,
1997) (reporting juror's comment that some jurors were swayed to find the defendant
guilty because he did not testify on his own behalf, even though jurors had been told by
the judge not to consider his failure to testify).
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the jurors themselves did not recognize the behavior as constituting
misconduct;61' third, where the questionable behavior was performed
by the specific juror making the statement;112 and fourth, where court
officials themselves were accused of making a mistake6. 3 or engaging
in misconduct.6"4
Furthermore, juror regrets regarding a verdict sometimes reveal
complaints that require legislative, rather than judicial, action to
resolve. My study revealed several instances where jurors' misgivings
about their verdicts centered on state laws they felt needed to be
changed.615 In this situation, it makes much more sense for jurors to
communicate their concerns to the media, which can raise public
awareness about the issue, than to judges or lawyers whose hands are
tied.
Finally, it has been asserted that by inquiring into individual
jurors' rationales for their decisions, post-verdict juror interviews
undermine the essential nature of the jury as a single, unified body
that speaks with only one voice.6"6 According to Professor Marder, the
jury "acquires its power and meaning as a group, and post-verdict
interviews threaten that group aspect., 617 Under this view, jurors
should present their individual opinions about a case only during
deliberations, and not after a verdict is announced.6 8 In this respect,
Professor Marder has suggested that petit juries follow the practice of
611. See, e.g., Christopher Sullivan, Convicted Killer or Political Prisoner? Houston
Chron. A46 (Feb. 19, 1995) (quoting juror who told press that the panel sentenced the
defendant to life in prison rather than to death because jurors believed the state had not
proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt).
612. See, e.g., Nicholas C. Chriss, Sedition Trial Acquittals Ignite Outcry Over Jurors,
Houston Chron. Al (Oct. 9, 1988) (reporting that female juror admitted she was physically
attracted to male defendant during the trial).
613. See, e.g., Steve Brewer, Jurors Shocked by Sentencing in Assault Trial, Houston
Chron. A25 (Oct. 17, 1998) (containing juror statement that panel incorrectly assumed
prison terms would be consecutive rather than concurrent after judge refused to answer
panel's question during deliberations).
614. See, e.g., Juror Says Tampering Led to Huge Award in Galveston Trial, Houston
Chron. 3 (Bus.) (Apr. 25, 1992) (stating that juror told reporter that the court bailiff
pressured the jury to award high damages to the plaintiffs in a civil case).
615. See, e.g., John Makeig, Gonzales Gets Probation in Delaney Death, Houston
Chron. Al (June 30, 1994) (reporting jury foreman's comment that the state's involuntary
manslaughter law was so complicated that it was unreasonable to expect jurors to
understand it).
616. Marder, supra n. 22, at 470.
617. Id. at 473.
618. Id. at 471.
[25:499
the U.S. Supreme Court, whose members do not speak to the press
after issuing a ruling, in part to preserve the Court's mystique.6"9
This single voice argument assumes that the content of jurors'
post-verdict revelations actually undercuts the collective nature of
their decisions. A juror's statement explaining what the panel
considered to be the most convincing evidence, for example, would
not interfere with the public's view of the verdict as a group
decision.62 Even if post-verdict juror interviews indicate that panelists
disagreed about an aspect of the case, would this admission really be
so startling to the public as to make it lose respect for the verdict or
the jury? Community members expect and, indeed, want jury
deliberations to include serious reflection and debate. If deliberations
extend for any amount of time before a verdict is announced, the
public has already guessed that jurors may have experienced some
disagreements. Eliminating post-verdict interviews will not make
difficult jury verdicts appear more like group decisions, but rather will
only make the public wonder more about how those group decisions
were reached. Furthermore, the Supreme Court analogy overlooks an
extremely important difference between the Court and a regular jury:
Supreme Court Justices write opinions explaining their rulings,
opinions in which they state their own positions and do not
necessarily speak with one voice. So, too, should jurors be allowed to
participate in post-verdict interviews to express their individual views
about a case, without fear that they will somehow damage the "power
and meaning"62' of their decisions.
2. Do Post-Verdict Juror Interviews Promote Public Confidence in the
Justice System by Educating the Public and Encouraging Reform?
In my study of post-verdict juror interviews described in Part II
of this Article, I identified the two most common subjects for post-
trial juror disclosures as (1) explanations of verdicts, which were
included in 80 percent of the articles where jurors spoke to the
press;... and (2) descriptions of, or insights, into deliberations, which
were contained in 36 percent of the articles. 623 Looking for the
619. Id. at 507-12.
620. As described in Part II of this Article, my study of post-verdict interviews showed
that in 63 percent of articles studied where jurors explained their case result to the media,
panelists pointed to some evidentiary reason for the verdict. See supra nn. 74-80 and
accompanying text.
621. Marder, supra n. 22, at 473.
622. See supra n. 74 and accompanying text.
623. See supra nn. 111-12 and accompanying text.
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moment just at these topics, it seems clear that post-verdict interviews
educate the public and thereby can increase public confidence in the
justice system in at least two ways.
First, by providing jurors' interpretation of the facts and evidence
in specific cases, post-verdict interviews advance public
understanding, which makes it easier for the community to accept
unexpected or potentially unpopular verdicts. Human nature dictates
that people have difficulty accepting what they cannot understand ,
and bare announcements regarding guilt or liability without an
indication of the supporting reasons may be hard in certain instances
for the public to swallow. For example, a symposium panelist gave the
following description of how juror interviews helped her comprehend
the $2.7 million punitive damage verdict in the famous 1994
McDonald's case where an elderly woman was scalded opening a hot
cup of coffee.625 "When you hear about somebody spilling coffee and
recouping millions of dollars, you think that's crazy," she said. "How
can anybody do that? If you read the Wall Street Journal describing
the juror interviews about that case, you begin to wonder [if] maybe
they were right. It's possible., 626 Although some citizens may
nonetheless disagree with the result, post-verdict interviews allow
jurors to show the community that their verdicts at the very least were
not arbitrary or baseless-and thus worthy of respect, even if not
universal acclaim.
Second, jurors who describe their deliberative process in post-
verdict interviews also give the public an appreciation of how the jury
system actually functions. We provide few opportunities for our
citizens to learn about the mechanics of jury duty until they are
chosen to serve on a panel, leading one jury researcher to conclude
that "[w]hen we serve on a jury, power and responsibility are thrust
upon us without our expecting it, without our seeking it, and without
our being prepared to handle it."627 When jurors talk to the press
about what it was like to serve on a jury-how long they deliberated
624. In a related context, the Supreme Court held that criminal trials must be open to
the press and public, noting that "it is difficult for [people] to accept what they are
prohibited from observing." Richmond Newsp., Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980)
(plurality). See also E. B. White, Charlotte's Web 110 (1952) ("'Still, I don't understand
how those words got into the web. I don't understand it, and I don't like what I can't
understand [,' said Mrs. Arable.] 'None of us do,' said Dr. Dorian."')
625. See Damage Award Cut in McDonald's Case, Houston Chron. A4 (Sept. 15,
1994). The punitive award was later reduced to $480,000. Id.
626. Symposium, supra n. 348, at 1144.
627. Godfrey D. Lehman, We the Jury: The Impact of Jurors on Our Basic Freedoms
11 (Prometheus Books, Amherst, NY 1997).
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regarding certain issues,628 how they got along,69 how they chose the
foreman,63" how they dealt with their emotions631 or the stresses of a
long trial1632 -the resulting articles paint a picture for other citizens
about what to expect when their turn comes to perform this civic
duty. Post-juror interviews may enlighten readers regarding
deliberative strategies that helped a jury evaluate voluminous
evidence,633  reach agreement regarding punishment options,63
maintain harmony in the jury room,635 or feel confident about a
verdict.636 By the same token, former jurors' accounts of their trial
experiences can inform the public about juror conduct that could
result in a mistrial637 or a juror's dismissal.638 In either event, post-
628. See, e.g., Mike Synder, Man Receives 50-Year Term, Fine for Killing 2-Year-Old
With Pepper, Houston Chron. §1 at 20 (Oct. 22, 1986) (noting that jurors deliberated four
hours regarding punishment).
629. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, Emotional Stress Hit Dahmer Jury, Houston Chron. A2
(Feb. 17, 1992) (stating that despite jurors' differences, deliberations were not
confrontational and panelists did not "exchange harsh words"); Associated Press, Racial-
Attack Defendant is Acquitted of Murder, Houston Chron. A4 (July 4, 1990) (quoting
juror's comments that deliberations were "not very nice" and involved "a lot of yelling and
screaming").
630. See, e.g., George Flynn, Quick on the Draw, Houston Chron. A24 (Jan. 25, 1996)
(describing how juror volunteered to be foreman and other panelists did not object).
631. See, e.g., 10 Neo-Nazis Guilty in Racketeering Trial, Houston Chron. §1 at 1 (Dec.
31, 1985) (quoting juror that although panelists cried in the jury room, they were able to
disregard their personal beliefs to reach a verdict).
632. See, e.g., Nancy Stancill, Marathon Trial an Experience for Jurors, Houston
Chron. §2 at 11 (Mar. 30, 1985) (noting that jurors became fascinated with complex case
although they made personal sacrifices during lengthy trial).
633. See, e.g., Questions Remain in Child-Abuse Case, Houston Chron. A14 (Jan. 19,
1990) (explaining how jurors "methodically addressed" sixty-five charges in case after
hearing 124 witnesses testify in two-and-a-half-year trial).
634. See, e.g., Mary Curtius, Jury Sentences Killer to Death for Murder of Polly Klaas,
Houston Chron. A8 (Aug. 6, 1996) (describing how jury spent twenty-one hours
deliberating before sentencing the defendant to death).
635. See, e.g., Mary Flood, The Andersen Verdict: Decision by Jurors Hinged on
Memo, Houston Chron. Al (June 16, 2002) (noting that jury set ground rules for
deliberations: one person spoke at a time, all panelists' views were respected, and no
personal attacks were allowed).
636. See, e.g., John W. Gonzalez & Nelson Antosh, Winfrey Bests the Beef Barons in
Court Battle, Houston Chron. §1 (Feb. 27, 1998) (revealing that jurors reflected on the
meaning of the First Amendment, prayed, and slept on their decision before reporting
their verdict).
637. See, e.g., Jim Zook, Juror's Query Bags Mistrial, Houston Chron. A27 (Nov. 18,
1989) (reporting that mistrial was declared after juror conducted independent research to
learn the potential penalties that would result from a conviction).
638. See, e.g., Tony Freemantle, Juror Who Ogled Photos at Simpson House Dismissed
From Panel, Houston Chron. A5 (Mar. 20, 1995) (noting that dismissed juror admitted
spending more time than other panelists looking at pictures of the defendant, in violation
of judge's order).
verdict interviews help push aside what has been called "the curtain
of ignorance."639 that obscures the public's perception of juries. By
educating the public about the jury system, post-verdict interviews
increase public understanding of that system and thereby help
preserve its legitimacy.
To a lesser extent, my study also showed that jurors sometimes
use post-verdict interviews to admit mistakes, reveal
misunderstandings, and expose misconduct, 64 as well as to voice their
opinions regarding the operations of the judicial system.64' The claim
that jurors' critical statements weaken public trust in the jury system
has already been discussed in Part III.C.1 above; however, it bears
repeating that true public confidence can only be achieved if flaws are
admitted and addressed, rather than hidden from public view via
enforced silence.642 As Professor Andersen has noted, community
faith in the justice system depends on how well it actually performs in
reaching proper results, and not on a superficial, manufactured, or
manipulated vision of the jury.643
By pursuing and publishing post-verdict juror interviews, the
press plays a crucial role both in educating the public about the justice
system and in shining a light on any imperfections within it. Two
primary functions of the press in a democracy are to inform citizens
about the operations of government,64 as well as to oversee those
operations and bring any malfeasance to public attention.5 The
Supreme Court has recognized the media's importance in promoting
the effective administration of justice, both by disseminating
639. Michael J. Saks, Blaming the Jury, 75 Geo. L.J. 693, 698 (1986) (reviewing Valerie
P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury (1986)).
640. See supra nn. 205-38 and accompanying text.
641. See supra nn. 239-81 and accompanying text.
642. See supra nn. 605-07 and accompanying text.
643. Andersen, supra n. 367, at 647.
644. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (stating that "in a society
in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first
hand the operations of government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in
convenient form the facts of those operations").
645. See id. at 492 (noting that "[w]ith respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the
function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the
beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice"); see also Vincent
Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B. Found. Research J.
521, 527 (stating that "checking the abuse of power by public officials" is the key value
served by free speech and a free press).
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information about the criminal justice system and by acting as a
watchdog to ensure the system functions properly. 6
To fulfill these roles, the press must have the ability to gather
information.!7 Normally, reporters have a First Amendment right to
approach whomever they please to request an interview; as the
Supreme Court noted in Branzburg v. Hayes, "reporters remain free
to seek news from any source by means within the law."6  As
described in Part III.B.2. above, jurors have a First Amendment right
to talk to the press after their verdict is announced, should they so
desire, and the press cannot be prevented from publishing what jurors
elect to say.49 In most instances, however, post-verdict interviews
result after media representatives make the initial contact with former
jurors.65° The question then remains whether members of the press,
either as reporters or as citizens, have a First Amendment right to
question jurors following a verdict, or if judges can constitutionally
prohibit or limit reporters' contact with former jurors.
The first published appellate case to address the issue, United
States v. Sherman, involved a media challenge to a trial judge's order
that prohibited anyone from questioning the jurors about their
service.65' In invalidating the order, the court characterized it as an
unconstitutional prior restraint that limited the media's ability to
gather news. 62 None of the government's proffered competing state
interests-the defendant's right to a fair trial, the ability of jurors to
serve on future panels, or the prevention of juror harassment-were
646. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), the Court described the importance
of press coverage of the judicial system as follows:
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective
judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this regard
is documented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes
to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Id. at 350.
647. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) (recognizing that "without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated").
648. Id. at 681-82.
649. See supra nn. 544-84 and accompanying text.
650. In my study of post-verdict interviews, for example, I found only twelve articles
where it was clear that jurors had contacted the press themselves. See supra n. 500 and
accompanying text. See also Raskopf, supra n. 361, at 358 (noting that most post-verdict
interviews are initiated by the press).
651. 581 F.2d 1358, 1360 (9th Cir. 1978).
652. Id. at 1361.
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seen by the court as sufficient to overcome the media's First
Amendment rights in this situation.6 3 According to the court, post-
verdict interviews could not harm the defendant's right to a fair trial
because the verdict had already been announced.65 ' The idea that by
talking to the media, jurors could be rendered unfit for future jury
panels was dismissed by the court as trivial.655 Finally, the court noted
that the judge could protect jurors from any actual press harassment
by punishing such conduct should it occur, but could not assume in
advance that jurors would find media attention objectionable.656
Other courts, however, have analyzed the question as one of
press access to government information, rather than as a prior
restraint problem. For example, in In re Express News, the Fifth
Circuit evaluated a local court rule prohibiting anyone from
interviewing jurors with respect to their deliberations or verdict
without court permission by beginning with the proposition that the
First Amendment does not "guarantee journalists access to sources of
information not available to the public generally., 657 According to the
court, the First Amendment right to gather news could be limited if it
were outweighed by a "substantial threat to the administration of
justice., 65 8 The burden fell on the state, however, to demonstrate both
that the rule in question was necessary to protect the defendants' fair
trial rights and that it was narrowly tailored to achieve that end.659 The
court invalidated the rule because the government failed to show that
post-verdict interviews threatened fair trial rights.' The court
indicated that a narrow rule preventing "the disclosure of the ballots
of individual jurors" in certain cases might be justifiable. 6" Since then,
the Fifth Circuit has upheld judges' orders that not only disallow
anyone from interviewing jurors regarding specific votes of other






657. In re Express News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 809 (5th Cir. 1982).
658. Id. at 810.
659. Id.
660. Id.
661. Id. at 811.
662. See U.S. v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267
(5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom In re Capital City Press, 523 U.S. 1075 (1998); supra
nn. 393-98 and accompanying text.
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Some commentators have criticized the Sherman court for
treating the judge's order in that case as a prior restraint, arguing that
the order did not prohibit the press from publishing information it
already possessed. 3 Under this view, the Fifth Circuit's access
analysis is seen as more appropriate because post-verdict interview
limitations are news gathering restraints; they prevent the media from
acquiring information about jury deliberations, which are closed to
the press and public.' By characterizing judicial orders limiting post-
verdict interviews as restrictions on access, critics hope to avoid the
"heavy presumption" 665 of unconstitutionality that applies to prior
restraints, making them rarely enforceable. 6 Instead, courts would
apply the somewhat less stringent test announced by the Supreme
Court in Press Enterprise v. Superior Court, pursuant to which the
press' and publics' qualified First Amendment right of access to jurors
following a trial could only be overcome "by an overriding interest
based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. ' 667
It is far from clear, however, that a judge's order forbidding
interviewers from questioning jurors following a trial should be
663. See, e.g., Aaron, supra n. 347, at 214-15 (concluding that the Sherman court's prior
restraint analysis was incorrect and favoring an access analysis).
664. Id.
665. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976) (quoting Carroll v.
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968)).
666. See, e.g., id. at 559 (stating that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights").
667. 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). This assumes that a qualified right of access to jurors
exists post-verdict under the threshold "experience and logic" test established by the
Supreme Court in a second case involving the same newspaper, Press Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court (Press Enterprise I/), 464 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). Under that test, a qualified First
Amendment right of access attaches to court proceedings that have historically been open
to the press and public, and to which public access would play a positive and important
role. Id. Post-verdict juror interviews satisfy both prongs of this test. The media and
members of the public have traditionally questioned jurors about their service; interviews
with jurors are nothing new. American newspapers have published juror interviews with
regularity at least since the last century. For example, after the 1934 kidnapping and
murder trial of Bruno Hauptmann in the Lindbergh baby case, newspaper interviews were
published with each of the jurors. See Report of Special Committee on Publicity in
Criminal Trials (1936), reprinted in Oscar Hallam, Some Object Lessons on Publicity in
Criminal Trials, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 453, 495 (1940). The earliest example that I ran across in
my research was a letter from a juror in the notorious murder trial of Harvard medical
school professor John W. Webster, published in the Boston Traveller in 1850. See Dr.
James W. Stone, Report of the Trial of Prof John W. Webster 312-14, app. E (repub. Leslie
B. Adams, Jr. 1990) (orig. pub. 1850). That post-verdict juror interviews fulfill the second
part of the "experience and logic" test by playing a positive role in the functioning of the
judicial process has just been discussed above. See supra nn. 622-46 and accompanying
text.
20031 EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE
treated as an access restriction. Although such an order may not mesh
perfectly with traditional notions of prior restraints, neither is it
completely off the mark. Quoting Professor Nimmer, the Supreme
Court has defined prior restraints as "administrative and judicial
orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of
the time that such communications are to occur. 66 8 This is exactly
what a court order that prohibits the press from interviewing jurors
about deliberations attempts to do-it forbids questioning a former
juror before those questions can be asked. Furthermore, the judge's
order "freezes" speech by preventing juror interviews about a certain
topic altogether, rather than merely "chilling" speech by punishing
interviewers after the fact.669 Given these characteristics, such an
order bears more resemblance to a prior restraint than it does to a
denial of access to government-controlled information.
Admittedly, if media representatives were seeking to sit in the
jury room, or to record jury deliberations, the issue could be viewed
in terms of access.67 ° Similarly, when courts withhold jurors' names
and addresses from the press following a trial, an access issue is
presented.67' However, once jurors are dismissed from their service
and re-enter private life, the courts can no longer control their
activities or their speech. Former jurors can go where they want and
do what they please, and reporters or other members of the public are
free to question them about any topic. Perhaps the best way to
characterize an order limiting an interviewer's ability to question
former jurors about deliberations is neither as a prior restraint nor a
denial of access to information possessed by the state, but rather as a
content-based restriction on speech activities.672 Conducting an
interview with a former juror on a matter of public interest
constitutes pure speech,673 and a judge's order barring all questions
668. Alexander v. U.S.. 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (emphasis omitted) (quoting M.
Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.03, 4-14 (Matthew Bender 1984)).
669. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (explaining that
"[i]f it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills'
speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it").
670. See Bagley, supra n. 25, at 494-95 (describing media attempts to record jury
deliberations as an access question).
671. Seesupra n. 535.
672. See, e.g., Turner Broad. System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (stating that
"laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of
the ideas or views expressed are content based").
673. See, e.g., Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526 (noting that a "naked prohibition against
disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation of pure speech").
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about deliberations restricts only speech about a certain topic.674 Such
an order would have to survive strict scrutiny review, which would
require that the state prove that the order was necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest."'
Ultimately, however, whether the precise analytical framework
used to evaluate post-verdict interview restrictions is a prior restraint,
strict scrutiny, or access analysis makes little difference. Even under
the less-demanding access approach, restrictions on post-verdict juror
interviews would still violate the First Amendment absent special
circumstances. To overcome a qualified First Amendment right of
access, the state must demonstrate that "closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." '676 This Article has demonstrated that, in general, no
empirical evidence exists to establish that post-verdict juror
interviews pose a substantial threat to the administration of justice,677
to juror privacy rights,678 or to public confidence in the jury system.679
According to the Supreme Court, a First Amendment right of access
cannot be overcome by mere "conclusory assertion[s] ' 0 that as a
category, post-verdict interviews result in some unproven harm. Even
commercial speech, which receives a lower level of First Amendment
protection than political speech, cannot be restricted based on
nothing more than "mere speculation or conjecture.,
681
This is not to say that in the context of a particular case, a judge
could never demonstrate that post-verdict media questioning of jurors
should be limited. Rather, the judge would have to articulate specific,
defensible reasons for any restriction, which would have to be
narrowly tailored to prevent only the dangerous inquiries. For
example, if a trial judge could establish that disclosure of a juror's
medical history discussed during deliberations would invade a juror's
674. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that
"government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is 'justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech"') (quoting Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
675. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc., v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
123 (1991) (striking down state law as a content-based speech limitation that was not
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest).
676. Press Enter. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1986).
677. See supra nn. 347-66, 374-88, 396-436 and accompanying text.
678. See supra nn. 485-521 and accompanying text.
679. See supra nn. 597-605, 616-21 and accompanying text.
680. Press Enter., 464 U.S. at 510.
681. Greater New Orleans Broad. Assn., Inc. v. U.S., 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).
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privacy, the judge could craft a narrow order that prohibited
reporters from questioning jurors about "personal health matters."
However, an order forbidding the press from questioning jurors about
any aspect of their deliberations, for example, would be far too broad
to satisfy even the access test.
Furthermore, to meet constitutional standards, restrictions
limiting the media's ability to conduct post-verdict interviews would
actually have to be effective to achieve the underlying, justifying
purpose.6 This creates another First Amendment hurdle. A judge's
order prohibiting reporters from questioning jurors about a certain
aspect of their trial experiences will not necessarily keep that
information out of the media unless attorneys and court officials, as
well as jurors' friends, colleagues and family members, are also
forbidden from asking those same questions, and from talking to the
media. Otherwise, the press will be able to report jurors' comments
by interviewing third parties, which increases the risk that inaccurate
information will be disseminated to the public.63 Any judicial attempt
to gag all these various parties would present insurmountable
constitutional problems by infringing on a complicated set of
overlapping First Amendment rights belonging to jurors, the press,
and the public.
IV. Conclusion
More than a hundred years ago, the Wyoming Territory
embarked on a bold experiment by authorizing women to serve on
juries.6 Opponents predicted a parade of horribles, including that
women in the jury room would distract male jurors from the serious
business of deliberating."s Today we can laugh at such an inane
assumption, knowing it was based on nothing more than fear and
prejudice. Nevertheless, despite their exemplary performance as
682. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publg., 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979) (noting that a
publication restraint cannot serve an "interest of the highest order" if it does not
effectively prevent dissemination of the restricted information).
683. For example, in the only article I found in my study where a holdout juror was
identified by gender, race, and occupation, the information was divulged to the press by
"trial sources," as opposed to other jury members. See Bragg & Ramsey, supra n. 146, and
accompanying text.
684. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Student Author, Clearing the Smoke-Filled Room:
Women Jurors and the Disruption of an Old-Boys' Network in Nineteenth-Century
America, 108 Yale L.J. 1805, 1811 (1999) (describing the empanelment of the first mixed
jury in the Wyoming Territory in 1870).
685. Id. at 1816.
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jurors,6 women in Wyoming were again excluded from jury service a
little more than a year after the experiment began.'
Currently, some courts and commentators believe that unless
jurors' post-verdict contact with the media is restricted, the jury as an
institution is at risk. Critics argue that post-verdict interviews
interfere with fair trial rights by stifling free speech during
deliberations,' by encouraging jurors to make popular decisions that
will be easy to defend in the press, 9 and by tempting jurors to pursue
media attention more vigorously than justice.69 Others claim that
juror interviews violate juror privacy, by subjecting former jurors to
invasive questioning and by giving garrulous panelists the opportunity
to reveal personal information or opinions held by their more taciturn
colleagues.691' Finally, juror interviews have been said to destroy the
mystery and unity surrounding jury verdicts, thereby undermining
public confidence in the jury system itself." Yet these critics offer no
more proof than did those nineteenth-century naysayers who
expected female jurors to turn Wyoming jury deliberations into mere
flirtations.
Despite this lack of empirical evidence regarding the hazards of
post-verdict juror interviews, judges continue to issue orders that limit
the media's ability to question, and in some cases even identify, jurors
after they have been discharged. The New Jersey Supreme Court's
recent decision upholding a trial court's gag order that not only
prevented the media from contacting jurors following a mistrial, but
also forbid jurors from speaking with the press, is a recent example.693
Even more troubling, the U.S. Supreme Court's failure to review the
decision is likely to encourage other judges to limit juror/press post-
verdict communication.69"
What dangerous revelations do jurors make to the press that
justify restricting the First Amendment rights of the press to gather
686. Id. at 1818 (noting that a judge who presided over mixed juries concluded that "in
twenty-five years as a judge across the country he had never seen such faithful and honest
jury service").
687. Id. at 1820.
688. See supra nn. 389-90 and accompanying text.
689. See supra nn. 347-48 and accompanying text.
690. See supra nn. 367-70 and accompanying text.
691. See supra nn. 472-74, 501-03 and accompanying text.
692. See supra nn. 585-90, 591-94, 597-98 and accompanying text.
693. State v. Neulander, 173 N.J. 193, 200-01 259 (N.J. 2002), cert denied sub nom





news, the jurors to speak their minds, and the public to receive
information about the operation of our courts? After reviewing
eighteen years' worth of juror interviews published in a major
metropolitan newspaper, I can only wonder what all the fuss has been
about. As I concluded in Part II of this Article, jurors in my study
spoke to the press for two major purposes: to explain their decisions
to the public and to ensure that all trial participants remain
accountable to the community. These seem to me to be laudable,
rather than frightening, results. Juror explanations help citizens
understand and accept jury verdicts, and juror evaluations of how
courts operate can lead to needed reforms, which in turn, improve
public confidence in the ability of the system to achieve real justice.
Nothing prevents a judge from advising jurors, informally, that
they need not speak with reporters following a verdict and that they
should report instances of press harassment to the court. If a judge
believes it necessary to prevent interference with the privacy rights of
another panelist, he or she can admonish, rather than order, jurors
not to discuss personal, embarrassing, or inappropriate information
with the media that may have come to light during deliberations. At
the same time, judges must recognize that post-verdict interviews
serve valuable purposes: they can help ensure jury accountability;...
they can help the public understand, and therefore accept, trial
outcomes;696 they can educate the public about the realities of jury
service; 67 and they can improve the justice system's functioning by
exposing mistakes, misunderstandings, and misconduct. 698 The First
Amendment requires that neither a juror's ability to engage in self-
expression nor the media's duty to inform the public about the
operations of government be curtailed based on purely speculative
concerns regarding the adverse effects of post-verdict interviews. As
the Wyoming jury experiment should have taught us, our decisions
about the justice system must be based on reason, not just fear and
prejudice.
695. See supra nn. 449-71 and accompanying text.
696. See supra nn. 624-26 and accompanying text.
697. See supra nn. 627-39 and accompanying text.
698. See supra nn. 605-14, 640-46 and accompanying text.
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